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ABSTRACT

A RHETORIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF INTERPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE
EDUCATION:
COMMUNICATION ETHICS IN ACTION

By
Matthew Corr
May 2019

Dissertation supervised by Janie Fritz, Ph.D.
Healthcare professionals belong to a moral community. Caring for patients is a
community act carried out by healthcare professionals working in teams within complex
political and organizational systems. This teamwork is crucial to quality patient
outcomes; however, incivility threatens to derail necessary and effective collaboration
towards the common organizational good. Necessarily, interprofessional healthcare
education is becoming a required element for pre-health professionals. Currently, schools
are using competency-based approaches to interprofessional education to teach
ethics/values, roles/responsibilities. communication, and teamwork. For reasons
explicated throughout this dissertation, the categorizing of these particular elements as
competencies is problematic and cultivated within a positivistic and empirical worldview.
By exploring concepts of professionality/interprofessionality, biomedical discourse, and

iv

ethics, this dissertation shows how a focus on competency frames conversation, shapes
certain outcomes, and limits the educational opportunity for impactful exploration of
difference and meaning. A rhetoric and philosophy approach to team building is
recommended as a necessary complement to the current educational model.
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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to those that choose to be kind to one another at work.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE
American healthcare is deeply rooted in our industrial past.1 A 1907 article titled
“Making Steel and Killing Men” estimated that ten percent of steel workers were killed
or incapacitated while working.2 Survivors rarely received compensation, yet often lost
the ability to work and provide for their families. After decades of suffering physically
and economically, labor unions demanded protection. The result was the creation of
health insurance as well as the hiring of company doctors.3 At the beginning of the
twentieth century, potential income losses from being injured at work were, on average,
four times more4 than medical expenses.5
An increased demand for healthcare in the 1920s led to a substantial rise in cost.
Rising incomes6, increased quality standards7, technological advancements8,
urbanization9, and medicine being taken more seriously as a science10 helped to transition
medical treatment from the company clinic to the hospital. By the end of the decade,
patients expected medical care to be “precise, scientific, and effective.”11 With the
publication of the American Medical Association’s (AMA12) American Medical

1

Bill Toland, “How Did America End Up With This Health Care System?,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
(Pittsburgh, PA), April 27, 2014.
2
William B. Hard, “Making Steel and Killing Men,” Everybody’s Magazine 17, no. 5. (1907).
3
Toland, “How Did America End Up.”
4
William Beye and The State of Illinois, Report of the Health Insurance Commission (Springfield, IL State
Journal Co., 1919)
5
Melissa A. Thomasson, Health Insurance in the United States, ed. Robert Whaples (Tucson, AZ:
Economic History Association, 2003).
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Edwin J. Faulkner, Health Insurance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).
10
Thomasson, “Health Insurance.”
11
Charles E. Rosenberg, The Care of Strangers (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., 1987).
12
The American Medical Foundation was founded in 1847 to advocate the advancement of medical science
and uphold standards for medical education. Subsequently, the Judicial Council was formed in 1873 to
address issues of medical ethics.
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Directory13 in 190614, the formation of the Council on Medical Education15 in 190416, and
the subsequent medical education criticisms of the 1910 Flexner Report17, medicine in
the United States improved alongside developments in medical education. Tougher
standards for medical school entrance, and more rigorous training created better doctors,
but there were fewer of them. The increased requirements caused forty medical schools to
close between 1910 and 1922.18 As the supply of physicians decreased, the price of care
began to rise.19
Increasing costs prompted the formation of Blue Cross in 1929. During the Great
Depression pre-paid healthcare helped families obtain needed care and helped hospitals
maintain business during periods of low revenue.20 Over the following forty years
employers began to offer health insurance to employees as an additional form of
compensation, and the federal government established Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 to

13

The American Medical Directory was a list of more than 128,000 licensed physicians. Today, this list is
referred to as the AMA Physician Masterfile.
14
“AMA History,” American Medical Association, accessed November 13, 2017, https://www.amaassn.org/ama-history#Key%20Historical%20Dates
15
The Council on Medical Education (CME) collects information and provides recommendations in
regards to educational policy at all levels of medical education.
16
“About the Council on Medical Education,” American Medical Association, accessed November 13,
2017, https://www.ama-assn.org/about-council-medical-education
17
The Flexner Report, a review of medical education written by educator and reformer Abraham Flexner,
championed scientific knowledge as the definition of the modern physician. This report helped to shift
education away from less scientific proprietary schools and towards a standardized medical training
centered on the biomedical model.
18
“Medical Education in the United States: Annual Presentation of Educational Data for 1922 By the
Council on Medical Education and Hospitals.” Journal of the American Medical Association 79, August
12, 1922, 633.
19
Thomasson, “Health Insurance.”
20
Ibid.
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provide healthcare for those unable to afford care.21, 22 As enrollment increased, so did
demand for healthcare.23
The cost of health care has created a challenging health climate for both providers
and patients.24 In the late 1960s, the Department for Health, Education, and Welfare
called for a decrease in divided labor within health care fields.25 In the 1970s, both the
World Health Organization (WHO) and the Institute of Medicine (IOM) highlighted
interdisciplinary education as important to eliminating these divisions.26 These reports
mark the beginning of a perpetual shift toward efficiency through interprofessional
collaboration. The relatively new focus on healthcare teams needs to be matched with
corresponding education reform. Numerous publications from The Institute of Medicine
(IOM) show weaknesses in academic preparation for new graduates entering health
professions.27, 28, 29 These reports show inadequacies in understanding patient populations
as well as a lack of team-based skills. In 2003, the Institute of Medicine recommended
educational reform as a crucial step for improving health care quality.30 This report has

21

Ibid.
According to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 37 percent of national health expenditures,
totaling nearly 1.2 trillion dollars, were for Medicare and Medicaid in 2015. “National Health Expenditures
Fact Sheet,” Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, accessed October 27, 2017,
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-andreports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html
23
Thomasson, “Health Insurance.”
24
Elaine R. Rubin and Stacey L. Schappert, eds., Meeting Health Needs in the 21st Century (Washington,
DC: Association of Academic Health Centers, 2003).
25
Mary A. Lavin et al., “Interdisciplinary Health Professional Education: A Historical Review,” Advances
in Health Sciences Education 6, (2001): 25-47.
26
Dewitt C. Baldwin, “Some Historical Notes on Interdisciplinary and Interprofessional Education and
Practice in the USA,” Journal of Interprofessional Care 10, (1996): 173-87.
27
Health Professions Education: A Bridge to Quality, ed. Ann C. Greiner and Elisa Knebel (Washington,
DC: National Academies Press, 2003).
28
Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan, and Molla S. Donaldson, eds., To Err is Human: Building a Safer
Health System (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2000).
29
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21 st Century, Institute of Medicine,
(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2001).
30
A Bridge to Quality, Greiner and Knebel, eds.
22
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been the impetus for the inclusion of specific interprofessional healthcare competencies
by accrediting agencies.31
Healthcare in the United States no longer involves isolated, interpersonal
exchanges between physicians and patients. Today, caring for a patient is a community
act, carried out by teams of healthcare professionals, in increasingly complex
organizational systems. The professionals themselves are cultivated within distinctive
professions with unique histories, roles, and ethical codes.32, 33, 34 These diverse,
professional identities often clash, creating instances of incivility in the workplace. 35, 36
Workplace conflict is a ubiquitous component of organizational life. Janie Fritz37, in her
book Professional Civility: Communicative Virtue at Work, refers to this phenomenon as
a “crisis of incivility.”38 This crisis costs both the individual and the institution.
Individuals experience a diminished quality of life at work and increased stress,39 while
institutions see greater turnover, decreases in productivity, and, more importantly,
distraction from the organizational “good.”40 Incivility at work can be detrimental in

31

Interprofessional Education Collaborative Expert Panel. Core Competencies for Interprofessional
Collaborative Practice: Report of an Expert Panel (Washington, D.C.: Interprofessional Education
Collaborative, 2011).
32
Eliot Freidson, Profession of Medicine (New York: Dodd & Mead, 1970).
33
Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press, 1977).
34
Harold L. Wilensky, “The Professionalization of Everyone?,” American Journal of Sociology 70, (1964):
137-58.
35
Janie Fritz and Becky Omdahl, eds., Problematic Relationships in the Workplace (New York: Peter Lang
Publishing, 2006).
36
Janie Fritz, Professional Civility: Communicative Virtue at Work (New York, NY: Peter Lang
Publishing, 2013).
37
Janie Fritz is Professor of communication and rhetorical studies at Duquesne University. She is the
author and/or co-author of four books that focus on interpersonal relationships within organizations. Fritz’s
Professional Civility: Communicative Virtue at Work blends interpersonal communication, organizational
communication, and communication ethics in a way that highlights the protection and promotion of
institutional good.
38
Fritz, Professional Civility, 1.
39
Fritz and Omdahl, Problematic Relationships.
40
Ronald C. Arnett, Janie Fritz, and Leeanne Bell, Communication Ethics Literacy: Dialogue and
Difference, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009).
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certain organizations. For instance, healthcare organizations hold effective patient
outcomes as the common organizational good. Distraction from this good due to
incivility can have detrimental effects, not only on patients, but also on the organizations
and individuals providing care.41, 42, 43, 44 One study even estimates that incivility leads to
approximately one thousand deaths at work per year.45
The increased prevalence of team-based care is directly related to demands for
increased productivity in healthcare settings.46, 47 The resulting integration of
professionals into collaborative environments creates clear challenges that include
redefining professional identities and boundaries,48 engaging in constructive dialogue
while navigating the language of medicine,49 and understanding where a specific,
professional ethical code fits within the many codes embodied within a diverse healthcare
team.50 Inattentiveness to these challenges can easily manifest as incivility. Ronald C.

41

Susan Luparell, “Incivility in Nursing: The Connection Between Academia and Clinical Settings,”
Critical Care Nurse 31, no. 2 (2011): 92-95.
42
Elizabeth Holloway and Mitchell Kusy, “Systems Approach to Address Incivility and Disruptive
Behaviors in Health Care Organizations,” in Organization Development in Healthcare: Conversations on
Research and Strategies (Advances in Health Care Management, Volume 10, ed. Jason A. Wolf et al.
(Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2011): 239-65.
43
Debra Gilin Oore et al., “When Respect Deteriorates: Incivility as a Moderator of the Stressor–Strain
Relationship Among Hospital Workers,” Journal of Nursing Management 18, (2010): 878–88.
44
Dianne M. Felblinger, “Bullying, Incivility, and Disruptive Behaviors in the Healthcare Setting:
Identification, Impact, and Intervention,” Frontiers of Health Services Management 25, no. 4 (2009): 1323.
45
Scott Hutton, “Workplace Incivility: State of the Science,” Journal of Nursing Administration 36, no. 1
(2006): 22-27.
46
Thomasson, “Health Insurance.”
47
Rubin and Schappert, eds., Meeting Health Needs.
48
Charlotte Royeen, Sarah Walsh, and Elizabeth Terhaar, “Interprofessional Education: History, Review,
and Recommendations for Professional Accreditation Agencies,” in Leadership in Interprofessional Health
Education and Practice, ed. Charlotte Royeen, Gail Jensen, and Robin Harvan (Sudbury, MA: Jones and
Bartlett Publishers, 2009).
49
Scott Montgomery, “Illness and Image: On the Contents of Biomedical Discourse,” in The Scientific
Voice (New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 1996).
50
Dolly Swisher, “Professionalization and the Ethic of Care: From Silos to Interprofessional Moral
Community,” in Leadership in Interprofessional Health Education and Practice, ed. Charlotte Royeen,
Gail Jensen, and Robin Harvan (Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2009).
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Arnett51 warns that our tendencies toward individualism have endorsed the creation of a
world that is no longer structured by shared virtues.52 The professions themselves bend
towards individualism, each having spent hundreds of years differentiating themselves
from rival professions, and building thick silo walls to protect their leverage in the
marketplace.53, 54, 55 Interprofessional collaborative practice, recommended by many,56, 57,
58

asks nothing less than the tearing down of these silos. The professional clings to the

silo with one hand grasping for common ground with the other. Janie Fritz offers a
foothold by suggesting civility in the way we communicate with each other as “a minimal
common ground of the good.”59 Drawing from the virtue ethics tradition, she refers to
this professional ideal as “communicative virtue”.60 As an ethical position, then, Fritz’s
dialogic starting place protects and promotes respect for the other and their narrative
ground – their story.
Drawing from the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Robert Bellah, Stanley Hauerwas,
Charles Taylor, and Walter Fisher, Ronald Arnett and Pat Arneson use ‘narrative’ to
mean, “a story held in the public domain by a group of people.”61 Professionals, for
51

Ronald C. Arnett is Professor and chair of the department of communication and rhetorical studies at
Duquesne University where he holds the Patricia Doherty Yoder and Ronald Wolfe endowed chair in
communication ethics. The majority of his work focuses on communication ethics, philosophy of
communication, and dialogue. He has written twelve books and countless articles and book chapters.
52
Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, Communication Ethics Literacy.
53
Larson, The Rise of Professionalism.
54
Alexander Morris Carr-Saunders and Paul Alexander Wilson, The Professions, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1933).
55
Wilensky, “The Professionalization of Everyone?”
56
Framework for Action on Interprofessional Education & Collaborative Practice (Geneva, Switzerland:
World Health Organization, 2010).
57
A Bridge to Quality, Greiner and Knebel, eds.
58
Recreating Health Professional Practice for a New Century: The Fourth Report of the Pew Health
Professions Commission (San Francisco, CA: University of California, The Center for the Health
Professions, 1998).
59
Fritz, Professional Civility, 3.
60
Janie M. Harden Fritz, “Civility in the Workplace,” Spectra 47, no. 3 (2011): 11-15.
61
Ronald C. Arnett and Pat Arneson, Dialogic Civility in a Cynical Age (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999),
xiii.
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example, are embedded within one such narrative. These professional narratives carry
with them unique histories and heroes that embody certain values. Arnett and Arneson
connect dialogue to civility in a way that counters habitual cynicism and emphasizes a
balance between idealism and negativity. Their view of effective communication is
grounded in respecting difference and being open to the possibility that one’s purview
may change. A position of thoughtless recalcitrance to difference guarantees incivility.
Arnett claims that “difference is not just a motto or slogan; it is the life-blood of
the human condition in an era in which we must learn increasingly more about the
Other.”62 Arnett paraphrases Martin Buber when he says, “dialogue begins with the
ground on which one stands with an openness to learn from the Other, but never a
willingness to forego the ethical ground that propels and shapes the identity of a
communicator […]”63 Arnett then adds, “The two lineages of communication ethics and
dialogue point to narrative ground and difference, with metaphors giving us insight into
both.”64 Arnett leads us to an important, yet often overlooked issue regarding dialogue
and difference. Reducing incivility can be accomplished by prioritizing professional
civility through civil dialogue. Arnett and Arneson help us to see that civil dialogue
focuses on being open to difference and learning about and from the other.
Dialogue, then, as an act of meeting the other on their ground and listening to
their story must use an efficient and appropriate system of signification to do so.
Beginning a conversation in a particular nomenclature carries with it limitations,

62

Ronald C. Arnett, “Situating a Dialogic Ethics: A Dialogic Confession,” in The Handbook of
Communication Ethics, ed. George Cheney, Steve May, and Debashish Munshi (New York: Routledge,
2010), 54.
63
Arnett. “Situating a Dialogic Ethics,” 56.
64
Ibid.
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elevating certain metaphors and dismissing others. Ludwig Wittgenstein famously
claimed that the language one speaks indicates the limitations and boundaries of one’s
world.65 The ‘common language of science,’66 of which biomedical discourse67 is made
up, is riddled with rhetorical devices that propagate metaphors of machines and war.68, 69,
70

These metaphors, although helpful in framing disease, are not appropriate for

interprofessional encounters of a narrative nature.71
The healthcare professions have already started breaking silo walls.
Interprofessional healthcare education has become a required part of accreditation for
most healthcare programs.72 There are even interprofessional competencies that students
are required to master.73 This necessary and important movement has started the
conversation. However, the conversation is still mostly carried out by empiricists in the
discourse of science, limiting its effectiveness with problems such as incivility in the
workplace. The core-competency approach and the move towards interprofessional

65

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractitus Logico Philosophicus, (New York: Routledge, 2001).
Albert Einstein, “The Common Language of Science,” in Ideas and Opinions (New York: Broadway
Books, 1995).
67
The biomedical paradigm, also known as the biomedical model, can be traced back to a 1546 proposal by
Italian physician, Girolamo Fracastoro, who postulated that disease is caused by tiny ‘spores’ that infect the
body from direct and indirect contact (De Contagione et Contagiosis Morbis). His early theory set the stage
for germ theory, which states that microorganisms cause many diseases. Louis Pasteur sparked this
movement with his insights into the causes of disease and prevention through vaccination. This new way of
viewing disease replaced miasma theory, which claimed that disease was caused by bad air (John M. Last,
A Dictionary of Public Health, (Westminster College, PA: Oxford University Press, 2007). Germ theory
caused the study of medicine to become much more empirical and atomistic, a movement that has
dominated Western medicine ever since. The biomedical model is reductionist in its explanation of illness,
and often excludes studying that which cannot be explained in terms of biology.
68
Judy Segal, Health and the Rhetoric of Medicine, (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,
2005).
69
Montgomery, The Scientific Voice.
70
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1980).
71
Montgomery, The Scientific Voice.
72
“Center for Interprofessional Education and Collaborative Care,” Virginia Commonwealth University,
accessed November 12, 2017, https://ipe.vcu.edu/utility-bar/resources/accrediting-agencies-for-vcu-healthsciences-programs/
73
IECEP, Core Competencies.
66
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competencies, outlined below, are attempts to improve the quality of healthcare;74, 75, 76, 77
however, the accrediting bodies and professional organizations at the forefront of the
conversation have been cultivated within a positivistic purview. The Interprofessional
Education Collaborative (IPEC), for example, was founded in 2009 and includes
members from the professions of dentistry, medicine, nursing, pharmacy, and public
health.78
Linguistic relativity implies that the world we see is shaped by the language we
use.79 Language and thinking are inextricably linked. It is my belief that a new
perspective would be helpful in dealing with the less obvious challenges presented by
collaborative healthcare practice. A rhetoric and philosophy of communication
perspective may be very helpful in addressing that which biomedical discourse neglects.
The Purpose and Scope of this Dissertation
The purpose of this dissertation is to answer one primary research question: What
can rhetoric and philosophy of communication contribute to educating future health care
professionals about ethical collaborative practice? Because current trends are gravitating
towards interprofessional healthcare competencies80, my response to this question will
attempt to work within the existing ‘competency’ paradigm, more specifically, on

74

“IOM 1972 Report: Educating for the Health Team,” Institute of Medicine, accessed January 15, 2018,
https://nexusipe.org/informing/resource-center/iom-1972-report-educating-health-team
75
A Bridge to Quality, Greiner and Knebel, eds.
76
Institute of Medicine, To Err is Human.
77
Institute of Medicine, Crossing the Quality Chasm.
78
IEPEC, Core Competencies.
79
Linguistic relativity, often referred to as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, is a theory that the structure of an
individual’s language affects that individual’s worldview. Some proponents of this theory believe that
thought is determined by language, placing strict limits on available cognitive categories. Jane H. Hill and
Bruce Mannheim, “Language and World View,” Annual Review of Anthropology 21 (1992): 381-406.
80
IEPEC. Core Competencies.
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“communicative virtue”81 as a competency for interprofessional healthcare education.
The plan of this work is to add rhetorical and philosophy of communication perspectives
to the existing literature on healthcare competency approaches to education, but to do so
with a more thorough understanding of scientific nomenclature and professionalism.
With praxis as a priority, my goal upon completion of this treatise will be
recommendations for practical application of rhetoric and philosophy of communication
theory as they apply to ethical collaborative practice.
The remainder of this introduction will provide some background information on
health communication, including history, scope, and approaches that have been taken
when researching interprofessional healthcare communication. Healthcare education will
also be briefed, including the recent shift towards competency-based approaches and
interprofessional healthcare education. Finally, a roadmap for the current project will be
outlined chapter by chapter.
Health Communication
The following treatise on interprofessional healthcare education will be grounded
in the field of communication studies, specifically an area referred to as health
communication. A brief history of health communication as a sub-discipline of
communication studies will be offered and linked to the content and scope of the present
dissertation.

81

Fritz, Professional Civility.
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History and Scope
This dissertation topic is grounded in a field of study referred to as health
communication. Simply put, health communication is the “social process” of “creating,
gathering, and sharing” of health information.82 Health communication inquiry focuses
on either “health care delivery” or “health promotion.”83 Because interprofessional
healthcare education focuses on the coordination of health care professionals for the
purposes of providing more effective patient care, this dissertation will be grounded in
communication as it relates to the delivery of health care.
Psychologists, medical practitioners, sociologists, and rhetoricians in the 1960s
began to realize the importance of communication to processes of health and healing,84
and began writing and researching related phenomena. Since the emergence of this lens,
health communication has become a popular and regular research area in the fields of
communication, business, public health, and is quickly infiltrating all of the health
professions.85 Evidence for this shift is seen in publications by healthcare accreditation
boards such as the American Association of Colleges of Nursing,86 The Association of
American Medical Colleges,87 and the Accreditation Council for Pharmacy Education88,
all of which list communication as essential to healthcare education.

82

Gary Kreps, Ellen Bonaguro, and Jim Query, “The History and Development of the Field of Health
Communication,” in Health Communication Research: Guide to Developments and Directions ed. Lorraine
D. Jackson and Bernard K. Duffy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 1.
83
Ibid., 3.
84
Ibid., 5.
85
“Health Communication Division,” National Communication Association, accessed November 12, 2017,
http://www.ncahealthcom.org
86
Essentials of Baccalaureate Education for Professional Nursing Practice, Essential VI (Aliso Viejo, CA:
American Association of Colleges of Nursing, 2008).
87
Functions and Structure of a Medical School: Standards for Accreditation of Medical Education
Programs Leading to the MD Degree (Chicago, IL: American Medical Association: Liaison Committee on
Medical Education, 2016).
88
Accreditation Standards and Key Elements for the Professional Program in Pharmacy Leading to the
Doctor of Pharmacy Degree (Chicago, IL: Accreditation Council for Pharmacy Education, 2015).
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The concept of health communication as a field emerged in the late 1960s with
the publication of Korsch et al.’s study of patient satisfaction in physician-patient
encounters.89 More formal establishment occurred in 1972 when the International
Communication Association established the Therapeutic Communication Interest Group,
thus giving health communication an academic home and legitimizing research.90 The
name was changed to ‘Health Communication’ in 1975.91 This was followed in 1979
when the American Academy on Communication in Healthcare was established to
promote research and education.92 The primary research focus at this time (1960s-1970s)
was on patient satisfaction93, 94, 95 and recall, understanding, and adherence.96, 97 In 1985,
the National Communication Association formed what would become the health
communication division98, in 1989 the journal Health Communication was introduced by
Teresa Thompson99, and in the mid-1990s health communication courses started being
offered as part of both graduate and undergraduate majors.100 Around the same time,
Tufts University School of Medicine and Emerson College offered the first M.S. in health

89

Barbara M. Korsch, Ethel K. Gozzi, and Vida Francis, “Gaps in Doctor-Patient Communication: DoctorPatient Interaction and Patient Satisfaction,” Pediatrics 42, no. 5 (1968): 855-71.
90
“History of NCA’s Health Communication Division,” National Communication Association, accessed
November 12, 2017, http://www.ncahealthcom.org/History.html
91
Ibid.
92
“Mission and Vision,” Academy of Communication in Healthcare, accessed November 12, 2017,
http://www.achonline.org/About-ACH/Mission-Vision
93
Korsch, Gozzi, and Francis, “Gaps in Doctor-Patient Communication.”
94
Klea D. Bertakis, “The Communication of Information from Physician to Patient: A Method for
Increasing Patient Retention and Satisfaction,” Journal of Family Practice 5, no. 2 (1977): 217–22.
95
William B. Stiles et al., “Interaction Exchange Structure and Patient Satisfaction with Medical
Interviews,” Medical Care 17, no. 6 (1979): 667–81.
96
Vida Francis, Barbara M. Korsch, and Marie J. Morris, “Gaps in Doctor-Patient Communication:
Patients' Response to Medical Advice,” New England Journal of Medicine 280, no. 10 (1969): 535–40.
97
Philip Ley et al., “Increasing Patients' Satisfaction With Communications,” British Journal of Social
Clinical Psychology 15, no. 4 (1976): 403–13.
98
“History of NCA’s Health Communication Division.” NCA.
99
Kreps, Bonaguro, and Query, “The History and Development of Health Communication,” 1-15.
100
Ibid.
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communication.101 These collegiate programs were followed by governmental agencies
forming research divisions dedicated to health communication.102 A shift occurred in the
mid-1990s with a focus on public health (partially due to the AIDS epidemic) and
national attention being aimed at the American Public Health Association, dedicated to
promoting public health. This was evident in the 1995 establishment of National Public
Health Week and in 1999 when the APHA headquarters was relocated to Washington
DC.103 Also in 1999, The National Institutes of Health (NIH) created the Health
Communication and Informatics Research Branch (HCIRB) dedicated to communicating
information about cancer to targeted populations.104 In 2004, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) created the National Center for Health Marketing
(NCHM) for compiling marketing data.105 The social marketing approach to health
communication is often used as an effective way of broadcasting health information to
targeted consumer groups.106
Health communication has also made its way into the clinical environment. Two
examples are SBAR and the COMFORT model. SBAR107 stands for Situation,
Background, Assessment, and Recommendation. SBAR is a structured communication

101

Ibid.
Ibid.
103
“Notable Dates,” American Public Health Association, accessed November 12, 2017,
https://www.apha.org/news-and-media/newsroom/online-press-kit/apha-history-and-timeline/notable-dates
104
“Health Communication and Informatics Research Branch,” National Institute of Health: Division of
Cancer Control & Population Sciences, Behavioral Research Program, accessed November 12, 2017,
https://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/brp/hcirb/
105
“National Center for Health Marketing (CPB),” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, accessed
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protocol that facilitates clear and concrete information-sharing. The COMFORT108 model
is used mostly in end-of-life care. Each letter stands for a principle that is useful in these
health care environments. They are Communication, Orienting, Mindfulness, Family,
Openings, Relating, and Teamwork. The COMFORT model is much more ambiguous
than the SBAR protocol; however, leaves room for interpretation and meaning making.
Although helpful, it is worth noting that both of the communication models listed above
come from outside the field of communication. They are born, not philosophically, but
from necessity. Inherently, then, communication models that are born from science
become tools for efficiency.
To understand health is to enter a complex and ongoing process that spans
countless disciplines and sub-disciplines, studying both the physical world as well as the
world of experience and phenomena.109, 110, 111 To understand communication is equally
complex and multidisciplinary. Communication scholars must also study worlds both
material and phenomenological. Understanding the interplay of health and
communication creates a two-by-two, with concrete, material observations and
explications on one axis and vague, experiential encounters on the other. We also see
various research areas emerge as these discipline-specific focus areas encounter physical
and metaphysical worlds. One such area is Interprofessional Health Communication, or
the communication and collaboration of and between health care teams.
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Interprofessional Health Communication
Health Communication researchers have studied healthcare education and have
also been vocal in the area of interprofessional education; however, the communication
literature is lacking when it comes to rhetorical and philosophical approaches to
interprofessional healthcare education (IPE). Most of the current approaches to IPE focus
on the interprofessional communication of health care teams; and, for the most part,
views communication scientifically, as mere information exchange.
Marshall Scott Poole112 and Kevin Real examined health care team
communication from the perspective of group dynamics. They sought to understand
teams by studying five variables: interaction, interdependence, boundedness (level of
supervision), commonality, and motivation to work together. Poole and Real created a
health care team typology based on the different level/degree to which each variable is
prevalent. The typology breaks health care groups into six categories: ad hoc (short
period of time with short-term goals), nominal care (primary care physician makes the
decisions and directs other professionals through consultation), uni-disciplinary (team is
organized around a single discipline such as orthopedic surgery), multi-disciplinary
(professionals from different disciplines worth beside each other, but remain independent,
as often occurs in cancer treatment), inter-disciplinary (professionals from two or more
disciplines work interdependently, make decisions together, and integrate), and trans-
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disciplinary (professionals of a health care team are proficient in their discipline, but are
cross-trained in another resulting in an overlap of health care competencies).113
Building upon their previous research on health care team typologies, Kevin Real
and Marshall Scott Poole applied McGrath’s input-process-output model114 (IPO) to
health care team communication. Their model is helpful in showing how the
communication structures (inputs) such as meetings, briefings115, checklists116, 117, and
communication channels can cause certain communication processes that, in turn, effect
outcomes (output).118 Poole and Real’s work is helpful. By categorizing health care
teams, it becomes more difficult to examine all health care teams in the same way.
Context matters. By examining the effects of underlying structures on communication,
they also help to show how certain structures can facilitate or limit constructive health
care communication. Their treatment of interprofessional communication, however,
remains solely transactional.
In contrast to the information exchange models, some scholars have studied health
care teams using an interpretive approach. One popular perspective within this approach
is social constructionism. A well-known example is Sutcliffe, Lewton, and Rosenthal’s
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examination of a teaching hospital. This example works well here because it focuses on
interprofessional health care education. The researchers interviewed residents at a
teaching hospital and asked them about their daily routines and medical mishaps they had
experienced. Of the 70 reported medical mishaps, poor communication was the most
common contributing factor. The residents admitted to being “embedded in a complex
network of relationships,” that affected their ability to manage patients. The researchers
described ‘poor communication’ as “not simply the result of poor transmission or
exchange of information.” Instead they argue that it is much more complicated; poor
communication involves factors such as “hierarchical differences, concerns with upward
influence, conflicting roles and role ambiguity, and interpersonal power and conflict.”119
Sutcliffe et al. purposefully move away from the transactional model and imply that we
need to focus more on meaning.
The following year, Eisenberg et al. were exploring miscommunication in
emergency rooms. They identified miscommunication in patient evaluations, in the handoff process, and the admission process. The issues, they argue, are not with information
exchange, but with interpretation. As an example they explain how the stories told by the
patient, “narrative rationality,” are often incommensurate with the “technical rationality”
of the professional health care providers.120 Meaning becomes compromised in
translation. Scientific approaches to human communication are helpful, especially for
diagnosis and treatment, but to fully understand the dynamics of communication in
action, issues of interpretation must always be included.
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These examples are far from comprehensive, but provide a glimpse into the minds
of those concerned with communication as it relates to professional collaboration in
health care settings. These studies are representative of the dominant approaches and
perspectives to this area of research. This dissertation is an attempt to enter the
conversation. If a scientific paradigm has dominated interprofessional health
communication reform to this point, specifically within educational environments, then a
rhetoric and philosophy of communication approach may provide an appropriate counterstatement to help offset the atomistic, mechanical language that can lead to interpretive
difficulties and patient mishaps.
Communication is one of the ‘four’ interprofessional competencies listed by
IEPEC.121 The mere inclusion of communication as a competency implies a senderreceiver, or transactional model of communication. This assumption carries with it the
baggage of a positivistic worldview, distanced from seeing communication as lived
experience. If, instead we viewed communication as a tool for creating our identity,
shaping our social world, and building interpersonal and interprofessional bridges by
navigating alterity, we begin to see communication as much, much more than a
competency. A rhetoric and philosophy of communication perspective has rarely been
applied to interprofessional health care communication. However, if communication is
taught as a process, as it is in the transactional model, it becomes difficult to escape the
scientific mindset and truly encounter the other. In order to more fully comprehend the
challenges embedded within health care education in the current historical moment, it is
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necessary to review recent changes within the health care education environment,
specifically the shift towards competencies and interprofessional practice.
Healthcare Education
At some level, all of us participate in health communication in our personal lives. Many,
however, choose to enter healthcare professions where health communication becomes
central to their careers. For these professionals, more specific communication training is
helpful in learning to communicate health information to diverse populations.
Healthcare education itself has a long and storied tradition dating back to the
times of Hippocrates and the Hippocratic School of Medicine. 122 Because of the breadth
and depth of healthcare education in general, I will begin this review of literature by
looking at the shift towards competencies in healthcare education as well as the shift from
traditional healthcare education to interprofessional healthcare education. This shift
prioritizes health teams over individual physicians and recognizes the increasing demands
on healthcare professionals within the current organizational environment.
A Shift Towards Competency
Healthcare has always been a challenging professional environment. Constant
technological innovation, policy changes, and a competitive business environment make
healthcare environments difficult to predict. This makes preparing future healthcare
professionals equally difficult. Exacerbating this complexity is an ever-changing patient
population. Today’s patients are more diverse123 and are more likely to be living with a
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chronic illness such as diabetes.124 These issues become more complicated when we
consider the fact that health care workers are and will be increasingly less diverse when
compared with the overall population. The U.S. population consists of approximately 30
percent minorities, while only nine percent of physicians and six percent of registered
nurses are minorities.125, 126 Because of this disparity, intercultural communication
competence has become a useful skill in healthcare settings.
Additionally, the cost of health care has created a challenging health climate for
both providers and patients.127 These added challenges require health care providers to be
ever more efficient individually and as a member of a healthcare team. Because of the
somewhat new emphasis on teamwork, students entering the health professions should be
trained for this environment. This has been the impetus for education reform to include
interprofessional healthcare education. “Interprofessional education and interprofessional
collaboration have not often found a place in the education and practice of health.”
Furthermore, “silo-like division of professional responsibilities […] impacts delivery of
services [and is not] integrated in a manner which meets the needs of both clients and the
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professionals.”128 This lack of professional collaboration that is seen in the professional
world can be seen also in the academic world. It makes sense, then, to begin this shift
towards effective, professional collaboration at the university level.
Numerous publications from The Institute of Medicine (IOM) show weaknesses
in academic preparation for new graduates entering health professions.129, 130, 131 These
reports show inadequacies in understanding patient populations as well as a lack of teambased skills. The IOM, thus, recommends educational reforms to address these areas,
saying it is a crucial step for improving health care quality.132 Along with a report calling
for new safety standards133, the IOM also reported the need to focus more broadly on
quality-related issues. To address the latter, the IOM called for education reform stating
that although certain changes have been made throughout the last century in healthcare
education, “the fundamental approach to clinical education has not changed since the
Flexner report of 1910.”134 The IOM research previously listed prompted the creation of a
committee called the Committee on the Health Professions Education Summit (CHPES).
Professionals from the various health fields gathered to discuss ways to better prepare the
workforce to deal with the Quality Chasm. This particular IOM report included the need
for skills such as “transparent communication, collaboration among health professionals,
and the use of evidence in clinical decision-making for all health professionals.”135 The
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CHPES meetings yielded a list of core competencies that could be applied to all of the
many health professions. The list included providing patient-centered care, working in
interdisciplinary teams, employing evidence-based practice, applying quality
improvement, and utilizing informatics.136 While other competencies are important, the
Committee believed that standard competencies across curriculums would be the best
way of achieving more consistent patient-centered care. This is the origin of competencybased education for health professionals.
Competency Approaches to Health Care Applied to Professional Development
Upon entering the 21st century, there became a growing interest in competencybased educational models with the overarching goal of improving individual and
corporate performance in the health care industry. An Institute of Medicine report
exemplified this vision, arguing for a “core set of competencies across the
professions.”137 The report argues that improving healthcare quality can only be
accomplished through educational reform and professional development. This shift in
healthcare pedagogy was partially in response to earlier IOM reports that highlighted
major shortcomings in the American healthcare system.138, 139 The Joint Commission, an
independent health care accreditation and certification organization, published a paper
claiming support for competency-based education from “many educational accreditation
and professional certification bodies across the health professions.”140 The growing
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consensus for competency-based education is not inherently a negative phenomenon; it
does, however, raise new questions.
While the various professions are determining their own competency priorities,
another movement was occurring within health care education. Health care is
administered in most settings, not from a bedside physician, but by a health care team.
Interprofessional collaboration became its own area of focus, with its own core
competencies to consider. A consortium of colleges gathered in 2011 to deliberate this
new area of focus.
It is important to differentiate here the core competencies for health professionals
from the core competencies for interprofessional healthcare education. The
interprofessional competencies are a subset of “working in interdisciplinary teams”
addressed by the CHPES and the IOM. This dissertation will focus solely on
interprofessional healthcare education because anything related more specifically to the
health professions may fall outside the scope of communication studies, rhetoric, and
philosophy of communication.
Interprofessional Healthcare Education
According to the World Health Organization, interprofessional education is
defined as “students from two or more professions learn[ing] about, from and with each
other to enable effective collaboration and improve health outcomes.”141 The same WHO
report defines interprofessional collaborative practice as “multiple health workers from
different professional backgrounds work[ing] together with patients, families, carers [sic],
and communities to deliver the highest quality of care.”142 The Interprofessional
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Education Collaborative uses these definitions from the WHO, and they are provided
here to offer operational definitions of the terms. We see from these definitions that the
common term, interprofessional, carries with it an element of action, albeit interaction. It
is the learning and the working that matters. Thus, when we see interprofessional, we
may assume a working and learning together of professionals and aspiring professionals.
The goal of interprofessional health care education is to teach students to become
functional members of a health care team. According to the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
“An interprofessional team is composed of members from different health professions
who have specialized knowledge, skills, and abilities.”143 The team has a shared goal of
providing patient-centered care, which is accomplished dialectically, by “synthesizing
their observations and profession-specific expertise” to make collaborative decisions for
“optimal patient care.”144 Although the Center for Advancement of Interprofessional
Education (CAIPE) admits that there are many different definitions of interprofessional
education, some elements are common to the CAIPE, the WHO, and the IOM.
Table 1
Common elements of interprofessional education
Learners from two or more health professions
IPE Includes
The joint creation of a collaborative learning environment
Developing knowledge, skills, and attitudes that promote teamwork
Focus on interprofessional interaction and reflection
Focus on shared decision-making and responsibility
IPE Does Not Include Members of only one health profession discussing IPE
IPE curriculum created by member(s) of only one health profession
Lack of reflective interaction among different health professionals
Faculty members failing to relate topics to interprofessional interactions
Single perspective clinical experiences with no shared decision-making
Table 1 highlights the collaborative, reflective, and interaction-centered nature of IPE.
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The interprofessional education movement in health care was partially in response
to a publication from the Pew Health Professions Commission identifying areas of
needed reform and calling for professional health care programs to include
interdisciplinary collaboration145 and require standards for competency.146 The Pew
report was not the first to highlight the benefits of interprofessional practice, but it was
more a catalyst for change at the curriculum level.
In the late 1960s, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare called for a
decrease in divided labor within health care fields.147 Early attempts to create
interdisciplinary programs we not very effective. Students did not like the training, often
did not show up, and did not recommend the training to others148; however, early
attempts at interdisciplinary training offered valuable insights for future curricular design.
For instance, while participating in these interprofessional programs, “student satisfaction
increased when they were allowed to maintain their professional identity.”149 These
findings illustrate the importance of having a professional ‘home’ when working in
interdisciplinary groups. Abdicating one’s professional identity in a collaborative
environment leaves behind the gift of that professional’s unique perspective and creates
professional refugees.
Insights such as this helped guide health care education in the 1970s, leading to
expansion of interdisciplinary programs.150 During this decade, both the WHO and IOM
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supported interdisciplinary education151 and the US federal government offered funding
opportunities for professional higher education programs to incorporate proven concepts
into their curriculum.152 By the end of the 1970s, to address duplicity in courses, “basic
science colleges” were created as institutions of collaboration to act as an efficient
pipeline to more specialized professional training.153 We cannot call this education
‘interprofessional,’ due to the fact that undergraduate students do not yet have a
professional identity.
Changes in leadership during the 1980s saw the US separate from the rest of the
world in its interprofessional education trajectory. The rest of the world expanded the
reach of IPE in many areas of practice. For instance, The Journal for Interprofessional
Care arrived in the UK in 1986 and The Center for the Advancement of Interprofessional
Professional Education was established a year later. While developed nations were
expanding the breadth and depth of IPE, the US government cut funding in nearly all
areas of collaborative education. One exception was in the field of gerontology, which
had multiple sources of funding.154 Research in the late 80s often had a critical edge,
often highlighting the benefits of IPE and arguing that student growth and patient
outcomes should trump politics and fiscal shortsightedness.155 Around the same time the
WHO called for health care education programs to focus programs towards the needs of
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the populations. The report highlights “multiprofessional education” as “one such
program.”156
The transition to the 1990s saw rising health care costs resulting in an increase in
people without health insurance. At the same time, evidence was growing that the US
health system was failing its citizens.157 The obvious need for greater efficiency directly
resulted in attention being redirected to interprofessional education; however, endeavors
were still grossly underfunded.158 Nonetheless, subsequent research on interprofessional
healthcare education highlights ten main barriers. Funding, as mentioned, is the first,
followed by faculty that were not trained interprofessionally,159 resistance from faculty
and students,160 strong traditional pressure,161 perceived status and power disparities
among different professions,162 lack of time, physical resources,163 language (refer to the
‘language of science’ discussion above), administrative naïveté about the value of IPE, 164
and finally accreditation (perhaps a necessary barrier, but a barrier nonetheless). These
barriers differ in type and complexity. Some are resource-prohibitive (funding, time,
space); some are bureaucratic in nature (administration, accreditation), while others
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require a shift in perspective – the very thing IPE is designed to provide. These barriers
are outlined in Table 2.
Table 2
Interprofessional health care education barrier types
Funding
Resource Prohibitive
Time
Space
Lack of Perceived Value by
Bureaucratically Prohibitive
Administration
Accreditation
Faculty and Student Resistance
Perspective Prohibitive
Tradition (IPE requires change to status
quo)
Faculty Not Trained in IPE
Perception of Disparities in Power and
Status
Language
Like all barriers, there has to be a motivation to move forward. The ever-growing body of
research, beginning in the 1960s, has started to provide the logos for persuasion. Today,
evidence showing the benefits for interprofessional healthcare education is vast,165, 166, 167,
168, 169, 170, 171

and can directly be associated with improvements in both health care

delivery and patient outcomes.172
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More recently however, with the intent to create a more homogenous
understanding of interprofessional education, the IOM has worked to develop core
competencies for health professions education (not to be confused with Interprofessional
Health Care Education Competencies). These are competencies that all health
professionals should have upon graduation. These include the ability to “work in
interdisciplinary teams: cooperate, collaborate, communicate, and integrate care in teams
to ensure that care is continuous and reliable.”173 Furthermore, competencies that should
be achieved through interprofessional education are “team organization and function,
assessing and enhancing team performance, intrateam communication, leadership,
resolving conflict and consensus building, and setting common patient care goals.”174 As
the concepts of IPE become more concrete, it is clear to see the emergence and evolution
of a competency approach to interprofessional health care education. These competencies
inevitably focus on optimizing professional strengths through teamwork, effective
communication, understanding roles and professional responsibilities, and working
towards a common, patient-centered goal.
A Competency Approach to Interprofessional Healthcare Education: The IECEP
Model
The Interprofessional Education Collaborative is made up of the American
Association of Colleges of Nursing, the American Association of Colleges of Osteopathic
Medicine, the American Association of Colleges of Pharmacy, the American Dental
Education Association, the Association of American Medical Colleges, and the
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Association of Schools of Public Health. The collaborative embodies the CAIPE, WHO,
and IOM concepts of interprofessional education. This expert panel published a report175
that outlined a vision of interprofessional collaboration in healthcare achieved by a corecompetency approach to interprofessional health care education. The goal of this
education is to train students so that they enter the workforce able to work within a health
care team, so as to deliver team-based care.
The interprofessional collaborative competencies build upon the specific
disciplinary competencies, which, of course, are different for each profession (and for
different roles and specialties within a profession). The expert panel also mentions the
need for students to begin interacting across disciplines while they are still students. By
“deliberately working together,”176 students should be better prepared to create and
maintain patient-centered health care systems. The IECEP report lists four main
competencies for interprofessional health care education. They are Ethics/Values,
Roles/Responsibilities, Communication, and Teamwork.
Organization: Structure of the Dissertation
The first chapter introduced us to health communication including the history and
scope. The argument was introduced that interprofessional healthcare education is
something health communication has neglected. Insights into the current state of
healthcare education were given including competency-based approaches to both
healthcare education and interprofessional healthcare education. The organization of the
rest of the project will be discussed below.
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The second chapter examines the history and evolution of the various healthcare
professions in an attempt to better understand the concept of interprofessional.
Researching the origins and evolution of the professional may offer insights that could
help explain many of the challenges inherent with interprofessional practice. The concept
of the ‘professional’ carries with it associated concepts of prestige, education, expertise,
and a certain level of autonomy. It may be assumed that professionals are individuals that
have endured a rigorous and specialized training. It may also be assumed that
‘professional behavior’ brings with it an increased expectation to be ethical. Healthcare
professionals are part of a moral community, and with this membership come
accountability, certification, standardization, and trust. Though these associations easily
come to mind today when we think of professionals, it was not always the case. Tracing
the origins of the professions back through history, we find an intimate relationship
between professions, governments, ideologies, social status, and autonomy. Because this
dissertation examines the relationships between professions, better understanding what
we mean by professional is relevant to this dissertation and is worth exploring.
The chapter begins by examining the history of professions, and then examines
the professionalization of healthcare characterized by differentiation. Characteristics of
pre-industrial and modern professionalism are then compared. This section is followed by
an introduction to interprofessionality, which, in this context, is situated within the
healthcare professions. Insights and definitions from Janie Fritz as well as the
Interprofessional Education Collaborative Expert Panel lead this section. The chapter
ends with a discussion of the professional ‘oath’ as an act of professing values. The oaths
of various health professions are compared.

31

The third chapter addresses the language of science. The language we use shapes
our world; therefore, this chapter examines the nature of biomedical discourse and its
potential effects on interprofessional healthcare education. From the time of Francis
Bacon, scientific discourse has necessarily objectified, distanced, and de-humanized that
which it examines, while ignoring the phenomenological experience of everyday life.
Scientific discourse as a tool for rational thinking is helpful; yet the language has become
synonymous with truth itself. Rules have been convoluted with function. This chapter
explores the history and evolution of scientific discourse including its hidden agenda of:
exclusion, personification of processes and results, elevation of content over authorship,
and the separation of morality. Issues of accessibility and power inherent in scientific
language create interprofessional barriers that can hinder cooperative practice. This
chapter relies heavily on Scott Montgomery’s Scientific Voice, which draws insight from
Michel Foucault, Jean-Paul Sartre, Ludwig Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, John Searle,
Roland Barthes, and Jacques Derrida. Additionally, postmodern insights from Mikhail
Bakhtin and Jean Francois Lyotard are included. The chapter ends with a discussion on
Dialectic Shifting as a possible skill to counteract the hidden effects of scientific
discourse.
In the fourth chapter, rhetoric and philosophy of communication is offered as a
complementary approach to biomedical discourse. The chapter is divided into two parts:
philosophy of communication and rhetoric. A brief overview and approaches to each will
be discussed. The first half of the chapter introduces philosophy of communication as a
counter-statement to scientific discourse. When communication is taught scientifically, as
a process, it becomes difficult to escape the scientific mindset and truly encounter the
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other. A philosophy of communication perspective allows us to recognize preconceptions
in our own use of language. It allows us to recognize alterity as part of the human
condition and offers a framework for approaching the other on their narrative ground. A
philosophy of communication perspective brings to the foreground the ethics and values,
which are veiled in scientific discourse. Philosophy of communication shifts the focus
from processes to content, namely content-focused dialogue, which inherently breathes
life back into the author. Communication is lived experience. It creates and modifies the
social world; and, because this dissertation is concerned with learning how to collaborate
interprofessionally, learning what matters to the other must be given primacy. This
section is informed primarily by Ronald C. Arnett, Pat Arneson, Ramsey E. Ramsey, and
Martin Heidegger. This section ends by looking at Hans-Georg Gadamer’s The Enigma
of Health, which describes health as a phenomenon.
The contemplative nature of philosophy discovers content that is materialized via
the tools of rhetoric. Therefore, the second half of chapter two provides an overview of
rhetoric, which ends with applications to interpersonal interactions in healthcare settings.
Namely, rhetoric can be used to build trust, provide hope, instill values, educate patients
and cohorts, shift perceptions about illness and the body, and improve compliance. Closer
to the scope of this dissertation, rhetoric can also be used to negotiate professional
identities within healthcare settings. Professor of rhetoric Judy Z. Segal’s Health and the
Rhetoric of Medicine will be used to bring rhetoric into the domain of healthcare. She
draws from the works of Aristotle, Michel Foucault, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca,
Kenneth Burke, and Lakoff and Johnson to illustrate the role of rhetoric in professional
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healthcare settings. Rhetoric is useful here because, although it is a discipline unto itself,
it is interdisciplinary by nature.
Chapter five uses insights from the previous four chapters to discuss ethics and
values for interprofessional healthcare practice and education. The need for
interprofessional discussion of values and ethics is in direct response to the everincreasing prominence of team-based care. Before this movement, physicians were the
primary health care provider. While each specialty has made progress away from the
paternalism of the 20th century, these changes have happened within the boundaries of
each profession. Traditional, silo-like professionalism is embedded with concepts, values,
and ethics that are specific to one specialty and often conflict with other professions.
Defining values and ethics within an interprofessional competency pries these concepts
from their individual professions and attempts to create a collaborative value structure
from which to build cohesive healthcare teams.
This chapter will approach interprofessional ethics from a rhetoric and philosophy
of communication perspective by first grounding healthcare in a moral community with
patient care as a universal common good. In order to enter the current conversation, it is
important to know what has been done so far. Three current approaches to ethics and
values of interprofessional healthcare education will be discussed. I will enter this
conversation with a philosophical lens, with a brief discussion of ethical theory followed
by a thorough discussion of the Virtue Tradition. Drawing heavily on Alasdair MacIntyre
and Edmund Pellegrino, I will bring the virtues into the healthcare professions with an indepth look at the virtues of trust, compassion, phronesis, justice, fortitude, temperance,
integrity, and self-effacement. MacIntyre’s After Virtue will then be discussed and
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applied to interprofessional healthcare incivility. According to Janie Fritz, civil
communication is itself a virtue; and, her insights will guide the application to civility in
the healthcare workplace. Fritz’s work will connect professionalism to ethics through
communication and language, bringing the three previous chapters together.
The chapter will offer two alternative ethical approaches from a philosophy of
communication perspective. The first is Carol Gilligan’s ‘Ethics of Care,’ which centers
around responsibility and is grounded in the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty
and Martin Heidegger. The second approach, inspired by Emmanuel Levinas elevates the
face of the Other to the forefront. Healthcare professionals will be framed as answering
the call to responsibility to and for the other, and interprofessional healthcare education is
seen as a chance to listen to the Other and discover that they are not alone in their burden.
The chapter will end by examining the different approaches to ethics in interprofessional
healthcare education and framing them not as competing ethical theories, but as
complimentary.
In the conclusion I reconcile the discussions of language, alterity, rhetoric,
professionalism, and ethics, and draw insights pertaining to interprofessional healthcare
education and team building. The discussion will begin by explicating many of the
challenges uncovered in the chapters on language and (inter-)professionalism. The
conversation will then shift to alternative approaches to addressing these challenges,
namely a philosophy of communication and rhetoric approach. The discussion will
continue by framing communicative virtue as something that can and should be learned
in pre-professional health programs. This position will include the importance of
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engaging other healthcare professionals on a relational level and doing so outside of
scientific discourse.
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CHAPTER 2: HEALTHCARE AS A PROFESSION
This dissertation centers on approaches for professionals to work better
interprofessionally. Because the idea of the professional is central here, and because we
may be carrying assumptions of what it means to be a professional, I believe the concept
of professionality itself needs to be re-examined. Researching the origins and evolution
of the professional may help us to better understand the professional in this current,
transitional, historical moment.
Professionality
The concept of the ‘professional’ carries with it associated concepts of prestige,
education, expertise, and a certain level of autonomy. It may be assumed that
professionals are individuals that have endured a rigorous and specialized training. It may
also be assumed that ‘professional behavior’ brings with it an increased expectation to be
ethical. Professionals are part of a community within their chosen profession, and with
this membership come accountability, certification, standardization, and trust. Though
these associations easily come to mind today when we think of professionals, it was not
always the case.
The archetypical profession has a certain idealism in society today. Professions
are seen as a way to climb the social ladder through hard work, and offer stable
employment and relative workplace autonomy. If we trace the origins of the professions
back through history, we find an intimate relationship between professions, governments,
ideologies, social status, and autonomy. Because this dissertation examines the
relationships between professions, better understanding what we mean by professional is
relevant to this dissertation and is worth exploring.
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Freidson1 explains the idea of autonomy within the professions as being “distinct
from other occupations in that it has been given the right to control its own work.”2 This
autonomy, however, really depends on the government to protect and promote the given
profession. Thus, professions are incubated when governments, or the elite, share the
ideological ethics of the profession. At first, then, professions would be dependent on
these outside forces for their support. Autonomy would be achieved gradually through
the acquisition of specialized knowledge, and once the professions are granted the power
of self-examination, they become much less reliant on outside forces,3 and virtually
control their own professional world. Not only does the profession gain autonomy
through the acquisition of knowledge, but also begins to shape their own reality, a
worldview that defines standards of superiority. “Professionals live within ideologies of
their own creation.”4 Freidson’s statement begins to highlight the separation of
professionals from both non-professionals, and others professions.
If we explore the earliest known professions (pre-industrial professions), medicine
and law, we can see overlap in their reliance on science and rational thought. In the latter
part of the eighteenth century, a major cultural shift gave birth to the enlightenment and
the industrial revolution. Science and rational thought reduced uncertainty about the
physical world and reduced fears of instability. A new focus on progress and change
usurped aristocratic entitlements, estate ownership, and religious motivations, and offered
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the confidence to create a new economic model. Adam Smith’s5 powerful ideas about
specialized labor forces6, and David Ricardo’s7 economic insights such as the law of
diminishing marginal returns8 and concept of comparative advantage9 gave direction to
this new capitalistic system. The industrial revolution that followed completely altered
the economic, political, social landscape. William J. Goode10 trivializes the rise of
professionals as “typical byproducts of modern industrial society.”11 Large industry with
many specialties created an environment for an explosion of professionalism.
The emergence of modern professions may have been a byproduct of the
industrial revolution, but it is important to note that the economy and society were being
completely reorganized around the marketplace.12 With a large, poor, working class, and
a new group of industrialists and entrepreneurs, professions allowed individuals to create
“special categories of the social division of labor,”13 thereby separating themselves from
the poor. This separation was protected through professionalization, which Larson sees as
a “process by which producers of special services sought to constitute and control a
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market for their expertise.” He argues that “marketable expertise is a crucial element in
the structure of modern inequality,”14 thereby making professionalization a collective
effort to move upwards in society at the expense of the non-experts.
To clarify, the new markets for professionals created in the 1800s created a new
form of inequality.15 These inequalities were based on “socially recognized expertise
[…which was gained through] education and credentialing.”16 The professionalization in
the nineteenth century was simple from an economic perspective, selling expertise for
money. In order to make this work, however, the markets needed to be controlled. To
control a professional market, and the subsequent ability to move upwards in society, the
education and credentialing processes needed to be highly regulated. The idea, like any
commodity, was to create scarcity and leverage it in the marketplace.
Although the professions are market-driven and ideologically limited, the
professional must still be seen as trusted (credible) and mostly unbiased (rational). The
professions, with their focus on science and rational thought, appear to have a certain
disinterestedness for “capitalist profit motives,”17 and a detachment from society,18
perhaps making them trustworthy in the eyes of both the state and the consumers. This
trust, however, is assumed to belong to the dominant, and often more traditional
ideologies. In reality, however, professionals, grounded in science and reason, often lean
towards progress and change. Pure intellectuals, thus, must often balance the acquisition
of knowledge and implementation of change with their desire to remain in a certain social
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class and maintain the trust of the masses. Perhaps here we begin to see the essence of the
professional emerge. The professional is not just a subject-matter expert, they are part of
both an “occupation and […] social strata.”19 The professional is both empowered and
constrained by the professional communities of which they are a part.
Though there was a new market for professionals, including an increased demand,
the concept of the professional was still born from the pre-industrial model. The
transition from pre-industrial professional to modern professional was a shift from the
entitled, professional elite cultivated through “gentlemanly education,”20 to a
professionals molded in a formal education system centered on pre-professional programs
and clinical training. Before this practical instruction, and dating back to the middle ages,
professionals distinguished themselves from “traders and artisans”21 through both a
university and the Church education. The gentlemanly education was a liberal education.
During and after the Enlightenment and subsequent industrial revolution, both credibility
and authority began to shift from inherent “power and prestige” through educational
entitlement, to formal training and processes of certification and credentialing,22 or a
system based on merit.
In the early 1800s, there were really only three widely recognized professions that
included divinity (which was closely tied to university professorship), law, and
medicine.23 However, between 1840 and 1897, thirteen new professional organizations
were formally established in the United States. Chronologically, they included the
19
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professions of dentistry, medicine, civil engineering, pharmacy, teaching, architecture,
veterinarians, social work, librarians, lawyers, accountants, nurses, and optometry.24
These professions seem to closely follow the same formally established professions in
England, and at the end of the 19th century, we see capitalism evolve into its current form,
dominated by large corporations. Professionals, then begin to exist primarily within these
large, highly structured corporate systems, reflective of our present historical moment.
Professionalization of Healthcare
Of the thirteen new professions listed above, nearly half of them can be placed in
the field of medicine. This is not surprising considering how long these disciplines had
been acquiring knowledge. Medical practice and practitioners (healers) can be found in
texts possibly dating back to 3,000-5,000 BC (China and Egypt). The earliest verifiable
Chinese text, the Huangdi Neijing (written between the 5th c. and 3rd c. BC), represents
the foundational Chinese medical text including both theory and diagnosis.25 In Egypt,
the Edwin Smith Papyrus dates back as far as 3000 BC.26 This treatise is often said to be
written by Imhotep27 and contains information regarding basic anatomy, specific
ailments, prognosis, as well as cures. Skeletal remains from this time period have even
shown evidence of basic dentistry.28 Different from the Chinese Huangdi Neijing, the
Egyptian text focuses on surgery and detailed human anatomy, rather than herbal
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medicine and holistic therapies. The more holistic medical approach can also be seen in
the ancient Indian text, the Atharvaveda, dating as far back as 1200 BC.29 Around the
same time as the Indian text was written, so too was the first Babylonian text, the
Diagnostic Handbook, written by the chief scholar, ummânū. In addition to diagnosis,
prognosis, and cures, this text includes basic symptomology using logical evidence that
included detailed physical exams;30 thus, making the Diagnostic Handbook more closely
related to the Edwin Smith Papyrus. The first Greco-Roman medical writings can be
found in Homer’s Iliad (c. 1250-800 BC). Here we find the two sons of Asklepios31
acting as physicians. Asklepios, of course, became the god of healing. Medical centers in
the ancient world were called Asclepieia, where patients could receive medical advice
and have surgery performed, usually under opium-induced anesthesia.32
The famous Hippocrates appeared in Greece during the 4th and 5th century BC. He
and his pupils were among the first to describe in detail many illnesses and treatments.
He is best known for the Hippocratic Corpus33 and the Hippocratic Oath,34 which
physicians still use today (although extensively modified). Also from this period, we see
the physician, as a professional, appear in Plato’s Gorgias. Galen appears in the second
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and third centuries AD. Known as the greatest of the ancient physicians, Galen’s medical
teachings and anatomical models were used in universities through the Middle Ages.35
Although holistic treatments for illness can be found in the earliest medical
writing, more scientific pharmacological texts show up for the first time around 1550 BC
with the Ebers Papyrus, containing over eight hundred pharmaceuticals. A more
comprehensive pharmacological compilation appears for the first time in Rome between
50-70 AD. The De Materia Medica was encyclopedic in scope, and included hundreds of
herbal cures for disease. Written by Dioscorides36, this reference book replaced the
Hippocratic Corpus and was used well into the 19th century.
A few hundred years after Dioscorides, around 300 AD, the Roman Empire
ordered hospitals to be built in every city. With these hospitals came the need for
“nurses.” Both male and female nurses were charged with caring for the sick. During the
Middle Ages, the need for nurses grew alongside the Catholic church, which called for
hospitals to be built next to all existing churches and monasteries. Nurses, mostly nuns
and monks, were charged with caring for the sick regardless of nationality or religion.
The duties of nurses continued to expand and many even made house calls. The
expansion of nursing followed the expansion of the Catholic church, and, during the
church’s decline following the protestant reformation, so too did nursing fall. The
elimination of hospitals caused the field of nursing to remain idle throughout the 1600s
and 1700s. Modern nursing, like the other professions, rose during the Enlightenment and
the Industrial Revolution. In 1860, Florence Nightingale, gaining valuable experience
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fighting infection during the Crimean War, opened the first nursing school in London.37
The demand for nurses continued to grow throughout America’s history. World War I
and World War II sparked a huge demand for nurses and offered invaluable training. By
the 1960s, there were approximately 170 Bachelors of Science in Nursing (BSN)
programs nationwide.38 Today, there are over 670 nursing schools in the U.S. working to
supply the growing demand for nurses nationwide. According to the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Registered Nurses (RNs) have been the largest growing profession since
2008.39 With 3.1 million registered nurses, nursing is currently the largest of the health
care professions.40
To this point, we have seen the origins of the physician, the surgeon, the dentist,
the pharmacist, and the nurse. While they were not referred to as professionals, most of
the practitioners discussed studied in a system of organized apprenticeship and worked to
further knowledge in their specialty, illustrating common characteristics of the modern
professional. During the Middle Ages, medical men existed in the upper and lower
echelons of society. Those with lower social status tended to practice in more rural areas.
Beginning in the 1500s, there was an increasing prevalence of medical men throughout
England. The business of medicine became much more profitable in the 1600s for both
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elite physicians and the lowly apothecaries, who achieved relative legitimacy in the
1700s, gaining socioeconomic distance from the mere druggist.41
It was also around the 18th century that the surgeons were gaining prestige. As an
organized group, surgeons formed their own guild when they broke away from the
Barbers’ Company in 1368, calling themselves the Fellowship of Surgeons; however,
reunited with barbers by decree in 1540 and becoming the Company of Barbers and
Surgeons. They remained united until the aforementioned rise in professionalism, where
they once again broke away from the barbers and became the Company of Surgeons
(1745). In 1800 they were renamed the Royal College of Surgeons.42 From this brief
history of organized surgeons, we see pre-industrial professionals in a sense, both
collaborating and differentiating themselves from another profession. This gradual
process of differentiation came to a head at the end of the 18th century. Urbanization and
more efficient means of communication made the world smaller resulting in increased
pressure for more professional organizations, and, of course, more need for regulation.
The aforementioned changes created ideal conditions for the creation of
professional health markets in the United States. The restrictions of the British Royal
College of Physicians did not apply in America, which opened the door for many to enter
the field by taking a few classes at proprietary schools. In fact, competition for these
students led the schools to lower their standards quite dramatically. This phenomenon
resulted in a rapid growth of the professional physician and the standardization of
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training.43 The universal need for health-related services did not benefit health
‘professionals’ until the markets were monopolized. Until that time, the high demand
merely created equally intense competition.44 Low standards at American medical
schools prohibited lawmakers from requiring practitioners from being licensed, because
the licenses carried little weight in the minds of the public.
The different medical associations of the mid nineteenth century continued the
slow process of differentiation between “graduate physicians” and “unlicensed
empirics.”45 Although increasing standards in medical schools, standardizing education,
and “enforcing codes of professional etiquette”46 helped to create better physicians, there
was still a need to qualify the graduate in the minds of the public. This sentiment was
echoed in the late 1800s by Richard Shryock47 when he commented “most laymen had
nothing but contempt for medical science, while holding their own family doctor in great
respect.”48 This observation is telling in that is elevates public trust over science. The
post-industrial process of professionalization, then can be seen as not only creating
specialized markets for health professionals, but shifting public perception about medical
science as a whole. Without a new public perception towards science, the demeanor and
“priestlike”49 wisdom of the family physician mattered more than his “medical
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effectiveness.”50 The private nature of the family doctor – patient relationship, however,
may have been a weakness during the process of professionalization. Those practicing
outside of an established professional organization lacked the benefit of peer review to
share opinions, support one another, a trademark of professional etiquette that enhances
one’s “social credit.”51 This professional etiquette was being taught and reinforced within
the university setting. Thus, similar to the church and the hospital during the Middle
Ages, professionalization and the traditional university had a symbiotic relationship, each
depending on, strengthening, and adding credibility to the another. The differences
between the graduate physician and the uneducated practitioner continued to grow and
eventually laws were put into place outlawing uncertified medical practice.
An interesting observation of the evolution of the medical professions is the focus
on differentiation, an intentional distancing form other ‘professionals.’ The ideas inherent
in specialization, made popular by Adam Smith (but existing throughout the history of
medical practice), are geared towards separating the content and delivery of knowledge
and creating unique identities of what it means to be part of a particular profession.
Freidson illustrates that this differentiation was initially motivated by a desire to control
one’s own work, and gain relative autonomy. Another motivation for differentiation, as
exemplified by Larson, was gaining control of professional markets. As we move into the
21st century and a focus on healthcare teams, it may be important to remind ourselves that
for thousands of years the medical professions have been focused, not on collaboration,
but on separation.

50
51

Larson, Rise of Professionalism, 22.
Ibid., 23.

48

Based on the above research, we can identify similarities between pre-industrial
and modern professions, which include relying on science and rational thought, having a
certain level of inherent trust, and striving for a certain amount of relative autonomy.
What is perhaps more apparent, however, are the differences in the characteristics of
each. The differences are outlined below.
Table 3
Comparing Characteristics of Pre-Industrial and Modern Professionalism
Characteristics of Pre-Industrial Professionalism
*Credibility and Authority gained through entitlements and apprenticeship
(including a liberal arts education gained through both the university and the
church)
*Reliant on governmental support, thus, supportive of government ideologies
*Autonomy achieved through the acquisition of specialized knowledge
*Blurry boundaries between professions
*Individual differentiation
Characteristics of Modern Professionalism
*Credibility and authority gained through merit and peer review (defined by a
formal, specialized, and standardized education at the traditional university).
*Professions create their own ideologies (which empower and constrain)
*Autonomy achieved via a professional community’s ability to self-examine
*Clear boundaries between professions (clear roles and responsibilities)
*Differentiation by the professional community to separate from nonprofessionals (professional training differentiated individuals from the poor,
working population).
*Driven by markets for expertise - Professionalization was a process where
producers of specialized services attempted to control markets for it.
Professional specializations fill market-driven demand (mostly from large
corporations).
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Now that we have explored the concept of the professional as it has evolved
throughout human history, specifically in healthcare fields during the industrial
revolution, we can have a more enlightened conversation about concepts of
interprofessionalism. The examination of professionalism has also highlighted an
intentional movement within each profession to differentiate it from other professionals
and from non-professionals. This motivation to differentiate can be seen as a critical and
deeply-seated obstacle to interprofessional communication. It may be beneficial to attack
this obstacle head-on by adopting a communication strategy that begins with the ear. As
we will later see, many interprofessional healthcare education curricula include roles and
responsibilities as a necessary competency for collaboration. Chapters four and five will
address this competency in depth and offer rhetorical and philosophy of communicationbased insights that focus on active and attentive listening to the other. We will begin,
however, to construct our concept of interprofessionality with current constructs of the
term.
Interprofessionality
The Interprofessional Education Collaborative Expert Panel52 grounds their
definition of interprofessionality in the work of D’Amour and Oandasan.53 Their
definition sees interprofessionality as a “process by which professionals reflect on and
develop ways of practicing that provides an integrated and cohesive answer to the needs
of the client/family/population.”54 They further elaborate that this process requires
52
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ongoing learning through the interaction of professionals. According to D’amour and
Oandasan, interprofessionality is a sort of mindset where professionals explore issues of
patient care and education “while seeking to optimize the patient’s participation.”55 They
argue that thinking interprofessionally requires thinking outside one’s own profession
because interprofessionality has “values, codes of conduct, and ways of working” that are
unique and exist outside of each individual profession.
In light of the previous discussion on professionalization, D’Amour and
Oandasan’s definition, which focuses on integration and “thinking outside” one’s
profession, gains complexity. Now that we understand the deep-rooted nature of each
profession’s values, roles, and communication styles, we can become more realistic about
approaches to professional collaboration. We can also see the importance of early
interprofessional interaction.
Civility
Interprofessionality is only possible when a working environment is characterized
by civility. Unfortunately, research shows that almost all employees have experienced
rude behavior at work.56 Healthcare workplaces becoming faster, more complex, and
diverse places stress on professionals that often takes the form of incivility. This,
sometimes thoughtless and unintentional behavior yields a loss of interpersonal common
sense, 57 often leaving employees or cohorts feeling disrespected. Consequences of
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incivility include decreases in performance,58 employee turnover,59 and negative
customer (patient) interactions.60,61 Additionally, employees that feel disrespected are less
engaged, avoid teamwork, don’t share knowledge with others, and are less creative. In
short, incivility kills collaboration.
Because healthcare is administered by teams that rely on collaboration, civility
becomes vital for healthy patient outcomes. Civility derives from the Latin civilitas,
meaning ‘relating to citizens.’ And so, the concept of ‘relating’ is inherently associated
with politeness, courtesy, and respect. However, because these associated concepts are
culturally contingent, the meaning of civility should be negotiated within the confines of
each healthcare team. The act of defining civility creates an accountability to that
socially-constructed meaning.
Janie Fritz: Professional Civility
Janie Fritz discusses in depth what it means to be a professional.62 She argues that
professions are enveloped in tradition, and warns that professionals are in the midst of a
crisis, marked by incivility. By grounding professional communication in a virtue of
civility, she transitions nicely to a perspective of interprofessionality. She grounds her
understanding of professional civility in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre’s virtue ethics,
William Sullivan’s civic professionalism, and Bruce Kimball’s history of the true
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professional ideal.”63 Fritz’s work will be referenced in the chapter on virtues/ethics and
featured in a future chapter on communication as it pertains to healthcare education.
Oath: The Act of ‘Profession’
Additionally, health care professionals possess a certain body of knowledge
useful to their particular craft. Whether a surgeon, a nurse, or a pharmacist, this
knowledge has been acquired for thousands of years and is held “in trust for the good of
the sick.”64 If we view medical education, not as the personal possession of medical
knowledge, but as a societal privilege, an invitation into a calling for social good, then we
can see the responsible use of that knowledge as a social pact. Some health care
professionals solidify this pact in the form of an oath. For instance, the Student Academy
of the American Academy of Physician Assistants (SAAAPA) has adopted the following
oath:
The PA Professional Oath
I pledge to perform the following duties with honesty and dedication:
I will hold as my primary responsibility the health, safety, welfare and dignity of
all human beings.
I will uphold the tenets of patient autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and
justice.
I will recognize and promote the value of diversity.
I will treat equally all persons who seek my care.
I will hold in confidence the information shared in the course of practicing
medicine.
I will assess my personal capabilities and limitations, striving always to improve
my medical practice.
I will actively seek to expand my knowledge and skills, keeping abreast of
advances in medicine.
I will work with other members of the health care team to provide
compassionate and effective care of patients.
I will use my knowledge and experience to contribute to an improved
community.
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I will respect my professional relationship with the physician.
I will share and expand knowledge within the profession.
These duties are pledged with sincerity and upon my honor.65
The first line of the PA Professional oath, ‘I pledge to perform the following duties with
honesty and dedication’ corroborates Pellegrino and Thomasma’s focus on honesty and
duty. We also see within the oath a commitment to interprofessional practice, both with
physicians and ‘other members of the health care team.’
If we look now to nursing, a revised version of Florence Nightingale’s Pledge is
commonly recited by graduating nursing students at pinning ceremonies.
The Nursing Pledge
I solemnly pledge myself before God and in the presence of this assembly, to pass
my life in purity and to practice my profession faithfully. I will abstain from
whatever is deleterious and mischievous, and will not take or knowingly
administer any harmful drug. I will do all in my power to maintain and elevate the
standard of my profession, and will hold in confidence all personal matters
committed to my keeping and all family affairs coming to my knowledge in the
practice of my calling. With loyalty will I endeavor to aid the physician in his
work, and devote myself to the welfare of those committed to my care.66
In 1893, this pledge, modeled after the Hippocratic Oath, was created to pay homage to
Florence Nightingale and the Christian history of the nursing. The pledge includes
elements of trust, responsibility, and devotion; however, it has a much different feel than
that of the PA Oath. The nursing pledge is much more submissive, focusing on reliably
following instructions (original versions of the pledge especially) and limiting liability.
The pledge above (given to nurses at a 2017 conference) has been modified to promote
nursing as a practice of faith and devotion.
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Whatever oath or pledge is recited represents a ‘profession’ or promise to the
public. The ‘profession’ bonds professionals through a “collective responsibility” that
transcends “self-interests, exigency, and even social, political, and economic forces.”67
Health care professionals are part of an inherently moral community that enters into
healing relationships with patients based first and foremost on trust.
The oath of each individual profession is indicative of the values and professional
standards they promote and protect. When working in a health care team, which oath
should be used? Although elements of cooperation can be found in nearly all the
professional pledges, should there be an oath specifically for interprofessional practice?
The WHO believes that such an oath “could serve as a means of promoting collaboration
which has the potential to improve patient outcomes and safety.”68 This question has also
inspired the work of Brown, Garber, Lash, and Schnurman-Crook who propose just such
an oath. Using the Interprofessional Education Collaborative Expert Panel’s (IECEP)
2011 report as a guide (this is the same study that lays out the IPE competencies used in
this dissertation), they attempt to develop an interprofessional oath that identifies shared
professional values. During an interprofessional leadership course, medical students, PA
students, and nursing students, working in multidisciplinary teams, were asked to create
their own interprofessional health-care professional oath. The researchers emphasized
that these oaths should focus on shared values. The 18 oaths were reviewed and
combined to form the following oath:
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Proposed Interprofessional Oath
We make this oath in due faith and we recognize the unique role of being a
healthcare professional and the associated responsibilities which include honesty,
faithfulness, compassion and collaboration.
We pledge to promote health in individuals and the community rather than just
treating the sick. We will protect privacy and confidentiality.
The patient is the ultimate priority and focus of our care. Our role is to empower,
teach and promote health in the patient, treating all persons equally and
appropriately. The patient is more than a body and we will benefit the patient
rather than harm.
Our care will be of the highest quality, safe, and based on evidence. We will seek
to provide care within our scope of practice with ever-growing knowledge and
skills.
We will work with others to provide care, recognizing the unique skills of each
and we will seek to collaborate effectively on the healthcare team.69
The ethical concepts that the researchers found within these proposed oaths included
“honesty, promoting health, research, respect for team members, faithfulness,
compassion, equality, patient autonomy, privacy, confidentiality, beneficence, safety, and
justice.”70 If an oath binds a moral community, then an interprofessional oath would be a
symbolic ‘profession’ among professionals that, while part of a profession they are part
of a larger, professional moral community. It could also be noted that the end result of
Brown et al.’s project is less important than the cooperative process of construction.
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CHAPTER 3: THE COMMON LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE
Rationale: Trapped Within a Biomedical Discourse
Because our health care system, including medical education, has been cultivated
within a biomedical paradigm,1 it is important to ask the following question: How does
the biomedical paradigm (and the type of discourse it manifests) affect our approaches to
interprofessional healthcare education? While commencing research into the present
topic, a fundamental observation became apparent: nearly all discussions about
healthcare are, a priori, lodged within the biomedical model of healthcare created with an
equally stubborn biomedical discourse. The core-competency approach to healthcare
education is an attempt to improve healthcare quality, yet the accrediting bodies and
professional organizations have been cultivated within a positivistic and empirical
worldview. It may be helpful, then, to become somewhat familiar with the contents of
this discourse. Scott Montgomery’s chapter entitled “Illness and Image: On the Contents
of Biomedical Discourse” 2 explores this idea and will be used heavily in the following
section.
The Common Language of Science
On October 2, 1941, Albert Einstein, a name synonymous with science, gave a
radio address that he titled, “The Common Language of Science.”3 His speech focused on
epistemology and scientific discourse as a tool for rational thought. Einstein states “The
mental development of the individual and his way of forming concepts depend to a high
1
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degree upon language. This makes us realize to what extent the same language means the
same mentality.” 4 What Einstein is saying is that language and thinking are intricately
linked. This powerful idea will be a cornerstone of this discussion, but did not originate
with Einstein. In fact, in the same year as Einstein’s public address, American linguist,
Benjamin Whorf passed away. Just as Einstein is famous for his theory of general
relativity, Whorf’s most famous contribution to language is called ‘linguistic relativity,’
which implies that “the language one speaks shapes the world one sees,”5 or put simply,
language determines thought. Going back even further, philosopher and semiotician,
Charles Sanders Peirce,6 makes a similar claim that “all thought is in signs.”7 Peirce takes
a more epistemological approach to language, which he lays out in his tripartite semiotic
theory, which eventually informs his famous pragmatism.8 Peirce’s claim offers a vision
of language that is fundamentally and necessarily distant from the ‘objects’ of the world.
This may be an important concept to remember as we start talking about scientific
discourse and illusions of truth within it. Furthermore, thinking about language in terms
of signs was not new to Peirce. St. Augustine states that we can learn nothing from signs
themselves, only from what the signs represent.9 Augustine claims that conventional
signs (as opposed to natural signs, like smoke from a fire) are subjective. The lesson from
Augustine is that we need other sources of knowledge than just signs (words) alone.
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These ancestral concepts warrant reflection because those that speak primarily in
the tongue of scientific discourse, characterized by Scott Montgomery10 with terms such
as “dispassion, neutrality, detachment, intellectual purity, [and] objectivity,”11 may begin
to think primarily in terms of scientific discourse, and all of the social and historical
distillations that are embedded within it. Taken further, if scientific discourse dehumanizes and objectifies human beings and cultures, then the scientists, who are more
likely to think in these terms, are more likely to de-humanize and objectify the world
outside of their sterile, professional environments. What is omitted, then, is the
phenomenological experience of human life; a concept alluded to in Michel Foucault’s12
Archaeology of Knowledge, which according to Scott Montgomery, was in response to
the “professionalization of knowledge and the uptake of scientific discourse as a model
form of truthful communication.”13 By invoking the ‘method’ of archaeology, Foucault
attempted to ‘objectively’ uncover grammatical and logical structures that existed
beneath a subjects’ consciousness as they acquired knowledge. One objective of
Foucault’s work was an attempt to determine how conceptual systems of different
historical periods limited the possibilities of both language and thought. Foucault also
warns against a retrospective, structuralist view of the history of ideas, and the
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assumption of one, long, continuous narrative. Foucault says that in doing so we impose
our subjective worldview on the past. Moments of transition between ideas are rarely
logical and continuous, but often violent and disruptive. Foucault was interested in the
‘rules’ of language. He believed that meaning sprung from these rules. Foucault’s
approach to language was thus different from the meaning-laden semiotic approach of
Peirce.
Inspired by Foucault’s unique approach to discursive history, it may be helpful
and fitting for this dissertation to briefly explore the origins of scientific discourse.
Intentionally ‘de-animated’ discourse can be traced back to the Royal Society of
London14, which was one of the first ‘modern’ scientific organizations inspired, in part,
by Francis Bacon and other early scientific writers from the 16th and 17th centuries. Bacon
was concerned with abstract and subjective processes and procedures of science. He
stated in 1620 that “the manner in which the experiment was conducted should be added”
to scientific publications so that “men may be free to judge for themselves whether the
information obtained from that experiment be trustworthy or fallacious,” and so that more
exact methods can be discovered.15 Bacon was skeptical of subjective interpretation and
wanted to know how the scientist came to their conclusions. The how for the scientist
concerns method. In addition to sterilizing language, Bacon’s objective, then, was to
unveil, improve, and standardize scientific methodology so that both scientific inquiry
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and discourse would “more closely approximate the ‘primitive purity’ of things.”16 This
is the type of thinking that Jean-Paul Sartre17 was responding to when he wrote: “The
word, which tears the writer of prose away from himself and throws him into the midst of
the world.”18 Sartre illustrates how a simple word, and the associations that come with it,
can tear a scientist or a professional away from their singular focus and allow them to
explore all the different ideas that are embedded within that word. Scientists’ objectives
are, in part, to distance themselves from what they are studying including experiential or
subjective thinking. Experimental design is a process for achieving this end. Moreover,
because words, with their endlessly colorful and diverse associations, can ‘tear’ the
scientist away from the search for truth, the Baconian plan was to de-animate these
words, to take the life out of these words so as to allow scientific discourse the transfer of
‘pure,’ untainted information.
Social constructionist19 thinking, however, adds complexity to the Royal Society
of London’s plan. From this perspective words and language gain meaning and
complexity through their shared use. Wittgenstein adds that the meaning of words exists
within a “language game,”20 which are “embedded in broader patterns of actions and
objects,”21 which Wittgenstein calls “forms of life.” Wittgenstein’s pupil, J. L. Austin
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adds that we “do things with words.”22 “Performative utterances”23 are, thus, are a form
of action, moving a chess piece in the larger form of life (the game of chess). Austin adds
that “we must attend to the performative, character of our language, how it functions
within a relationship.”24 Austin’s ideas were later adopted by John Searle25 with his
Speech-Act Theory, which details various rules, propositions and conditions, illustrating
ways in which speech goes beyond merely describing reality and takes on a more
functional and predictive quality.
What, then, does this mean for scientific discourse? The plan of the Royal Society
of London was to create a language where one meaning or referent is dedicated to each
word, or sign, in order to create and maintain a thoroughly objective language. However,
we can see that this can only be done when only a few speak the language and understand
the rules of language ‘game’ called science. “When we engage in actions such as
describing, explaining, or theorizing, we are also performing a kind of cultural ritual.”26
To realize that science is a ritualistic game, with rules, propositions, conditions, and an
objective of pursuing truth, then we can clearly see that any attempt to sterilize science
from culture is a failure to see science as culture. Furthermore, it can be problematic to
convolute functions and rules. Trying to tell the truth is a rule of science; however when
truth-telling is assumed to be a function of scientific discourse, science fails to be the
cultural game that it is, the “game of truth,”27 and becomes the “form of life” itself.
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Wittgenstein clarifies this argument with a fictional dialogue in his Philosophical
Investigations, “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is false and what
is true? – It is what human beings say that is false and true; and they agree in the
language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in forms of life.” 28 “Forms of
life” that use scientific discourse, then, often give meaning to the world blinded by their
own ontology. This discussion leaves us with an overarching question helpful when
discoursing in the language of science – What are we taking for granted?
Thus, scientific discourse, born alongside the scientific method, has since spread
and evolved. Scott Montgomery calls it “the grand master narrative of modernism, ideally
suited to its content.”29 Since the 19th century, scientists and those who read the scientific
journals have not reflected much on the linguistic qualities of scientific discourse, almost
treating it as a priori. A danger may exist then in assuming that this language is devoid of
alternative meanings. The language is trusted because it is seen as objective, devoid of
politics, culture, and perhaps even of history. One inherent assumption with scientific
language is that it carries absolute truth and objectivity at the exclusion of plurality. A
certain type of faith is required to use this language, according to Montgomery, a faith in
the presumed accuracy that goes along with it. Montgomery says “language can be made
a form of technology, a device able to contain and transfer knowledge without touching
it.”30 Montgomery suggests that the language of science, characterized by codes and
conventions, is purified from rhetorical devices, and thus, rhetorical influence. Scientists
that work in this “mill of hypothesis and data,”31 accept their subservient role to this
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language. By acting as a servant to the language and not the creator or author of the
language, the scientist, then, becomes inferior to the language itself.
At this point is not reasonable to think that we can change the language of
science, nor would we want to. To argue for its utility one need only look at the
technological innovations over the last 200 years for verification. Our technological
advances, including advances in medicine, go hand-in-hand with scientific progress,
which have only been possible because of a dense and concise language of endless
connotation. The system of concepts that makes up scientific language, says Einstein,
“has served as a guide in the bewildering chaos of perceptions so that we learned to grasp
general truths from particular observations”32 The processes and procedures of inductive
reasoning, and the scientific language that allows for its explication, have a clear and
visible power in the material world. Montgomery reminds us of common words used in
science, words like evidence, documentation, and proof.33 These words imbue the
language itself with an objective quality, where truth is assumed, often without question.
Montgomery alludes to the Industrial Revolution and the subsequent spread of
positivistic thinking, which ran right alongside the rise of the university giving, in a
sense, science and technology the voice and responsibility to bear truth.
Scientific language is not only used by professionals in the hard sciences, but by
professionals in general. Montgomery adds, Nearly all “modern professional writing
follows the lead of science.”34 We can see proof of this in the rise of the academic journal
over the book, in the way that we cite sources in our writing, and Montgomery illustrates
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in the structured, standardized, and explanatory way that science is written, usually
starting with an introduction, having some kind of a main text, often containing
hypotheses, and usually ending in some kind of the concluding section, which may
include implications, discussion, limitations, and areas for future research. Furthermore,
the standardization of professional education over the last 150 to 200 years has created a
rather rigid vocabulary. It is more the way that these papers are written, more so even
than their content, that leads people down a path of linear, rational thought, and dictates
how information will be processed, rather than how the ideas themselves matter in the
minds of those reading.
Let us now ask how a better understanding of scientific discourse can lead to
improvements in cooperation among healthcare professionals. To answer this inquiry we
need to more clearly uncover the hidden agenda the discourse. Scott Montgomery
attempts to deconstruct scientific discourse from both a modern and postmodern
perspective. He writes:
Technological discourse might be said to contain a mixture of modernist standards
and post-modern realities. While the former allow for scientific substance, and
dictate a great deal of the experience of authorship, the latter cannot be ignored, for
they prove in the end that the writing and reading of this language is a densely
cultural (one might say human) activity in which many fascinating and crucial
influences, conflicts, and ambitions have been deposited.35
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What does Scientific Discourse Do?
Creation of insiders and outsiders
Montgomery isolates three main attributes of scientific discourse from a modern
perspective. The first being the creation of insiders and outsiders. Montgomery says
“Technical language sets up a barrier between those who can speak and understand and
those who cannot.”36 He quotes Roland Barthes37 when he says “exalts, reassures all the
subjects inside, and rejects and offends those outside.”38 Montgomery then goes on to talk
about how this division between insiders and outsiders splits the speaking world in half,
with half speaking the language, and half not, which has more to do with passivity than
the illiteracy.39 Montgomery states that this inaccessibility of language for much of the
speaking world holds the power of intimidation.40 The power acquired through
inaccessibility, those who speak and those who do not, often manifests in terms of social
status. This attribute highlights the inverse relationship between information and
accessibility.
Montgomery then characterizes scientific discourse as mystifying the ordinary41,
which we have probably all experienced when somebody uses the Latin name for a plant,
insect, or animal instead of the common name. Scientific discourse reifies, and with this
reification comes possession, and with this possession comes a power to control. Push
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back, then, against this control becomes difficult. As Roland Barthes states, “I was
fascinated by scientific language, euphoric for me precisely to the degree that I had no
resistance to offer it.”42 Barthes implies the inherent difficulty in repulsing that which one
cannot understand. This can be coupled with an assumption that those on the inside, those
that speak scientific discourse, would not want to push back against something that
privileges them.
An aspect of scientific discourse that is partially responsible for creating
inaccessibility is the tremendous compression of the language. “It is a form of speech
made super heavy by modes of shorthand condensation, by substitution, redefinition,
fusional reduction of terms, and by the continual adding on of new and more precisionoriented nomenclature.” 43 As a tool for information transmission, this language is highly
effective. Scientific discourse, in a sense, sacrifices expressiveness “for a chance to
approach the performative,”44 Montgomery invokes the words-as-actions perspective of
J. L. Austin in his statement that scientific language does “not merely try to document or
articulate knowledge, but to transact it as well.”45 To dilute this language diminishes its
function. For those on the inside, the use of scientific discourse can pack a lot of
information into a small amount of space, so substituting this language for a more
common one ends up decreasing the amount of information that is transmitted, or what
Montgomery calls “sacrificing information for accessibility.”46
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One important side effect of the language of science is that it creates an “insider
voice” used by professionals to “gain legitimacy” and maintain their status through the
“exclusion” of others.47 This insider-outsider exclusion becomes a real challenge to
interprofessional collaboration where some elements of language may overlap but other
elements create distance. The information/accessibility dichotomy has a power dynamic
as well where those with more access to the language hold power over those with less
access. While the differences in scientific language access are obvious between
healthcare professionals and non-professionals, there are levels of accessibility among
healthcare professionals as well. In professional healthcare environments this can be seen
in hierarchies and pay scales that correlate with levels of scientific language literacies. As
previously mentioned, the in-group/out-group attribute of scientific discourse highlights
the inverse relationship between information and accessibility. This may represent an
obstacle when collaborating interprofessionally.
The Personification of Processes and Results
Montgomery’s second characteristic of scientific discourse from a modernist
perspective deals with the authorship, or the “who” of technical speech. Montgomery
calls attention to “grammatical and syntactic strategies that attempt to depersonalize, to
objectify all premises, such that they seem to achieve the plane of ahistorical essence.”48
When readers encounter statements such as “Recent advances have shown” or “Analyses
were performed,”49 we often do not reflect on the fact that the processes, procedures, or
the evidence end up becoming the subjects that perform actions and, thus, take on the
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responsibility or accountability for what happens afterwards.50 The language then, itself,
tends to separate the author from any individual or social processes that occur during the
research process. Montgomery elaborates that “minimal use of pronouns and habitual
reliance on transitive verbs”51 act to simplify the syntactic qualities of the writing. “What
seems to appear is Truth, not a claim for it; the scientist, not a particular individual; data,
not writing.”52 When writing takes this syntactically simple, and accountability-free
attribute, the human behind the writing disappears.
Another procedural characteristic of scientific writing that convolutes authorship
also reinforces the insider-outsider dichotomy. Scientific articles always close with a list
of references that include insiders and rarely include non-scientific sources. Scientific
discourse ‘done well’ very carefully and intentionally excludes voices, which
Montgomery calls “sealed professionalism.”53 Voices and worldviews from outside the
profession remain silent in the world of scientific discourse.
Content Trumps Authorship
Montgomery’s third characteristic of scientific discourse from a modernist
perspective deals with the ‘who’ of authorship. The third characteristic is similar to the
second characteristic, the ‘who’ of technical discourse, which exemplified the
personification of processes, procedures, and results.
Montgomery refers to scientific writing as a type of “death of the self, a literary
annihilation.”54 He is speaking about the lack of love that comes from scientific writing,
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where it is uncommon to use personal pronouns like I, or we, and to completely submit to
the codes and conventions of scientific writing. Roland Barthes calls this the act of
“making content everything, expression nothing.”55 Writing in this sense eliminates any
“components of personal speech itself: play, humor, exaggeration, diversion, excitement,
anger.”56 In scientific discourse then language becomes secondary to content, always.
Montgomery uses the example of Watson and Crick’s seminal paper on DNA to illustrate
this point. The discovery of the structure of DNA by Watson and Crick was a profound
scientific discovery with implications that far superseded science itself and directly spark
questions concerning ethics, culture, and the future of humanity; however the codes and
conventions of scientific discourse trap them in a monochromatic world of content,
bracketing out any implications that their discovery could unlock answers to physical
existence. Watson and Crick’s excitement is clearly missing in their statement, “This
structure has novel features which are of considerable biological interest.”57 Their
‘profound’ statement shows no signs of human authorship, of love.
Scientific writing is the exemplar for what structuralists claim for writing in
general: a focus, not on authorship, but on form and function as it relates to meaning
creation. For structuralists, language, and the study of it, becomes a scientific endeavor,
able to be studied and understood in its fixed state. With his “Structure, Sign and Play in
the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” and Of Grammatology, Jacques Derrida argues
that meaning is not fixed, but unstable and contingent. Derrida’s deconstruction lies
within a larger poststructuralist movement. Barthes applies central tenets of Derrida’s
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deconstruction to authorship in his seminal essay, “Death of the Author” where he argues
for collaborative authorship between the original author’s writing and the reader’s unique
interpretation. Barthes claims, “to give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text,
to furnish it with a final signified…”58 Taken together, “if anything is destroyed in a
deconstructive reading, it is not the text, but the claim to unequivocal domination of one
mode of signifying over another. A deconstructive reading […] analyses the specificity of
a text’s critical difference from itself.”59 Methods of deconstruction and poststructuralist
thinking, then, may act as a counter-statement to science’s self-referential claims to truth.
Education, then, becomes important to include in this conversation. Scientific
writing is most often taught at the university level, with courses on science writing,
technology writing, or simply “how to write clearly and effectively.”60 Young scientists
are being methodically taught in college to eliminate their voice and focus on content in
the most condensed terms possible. Other than problems of exclusion and shifting
accountability, this also creates problems of motivation, since this type of writing is
“neither particularly interested in language, nor the writer.”61 Scientific writing, thus, is
seen as a chore, nothing to get excited about. As noted above, scientific writing has lost
the love. A potential remedy to this love-loss may be as simple as “reading good writing.
Students should be reading professional journals, but also Shakespeare.62
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To summarize, Montgomery lists three essential characteristics of scientific
discourse from a modernist perspective: “its ability to split the speaking world, it's
erasure of origins and influences, and it's repression of the individual writer.”63
If scientific discourse claims truth based on its separation from politics and
culture, it should be scrutinized more than other forms of discourse, based on logical
fallacies inherent in self-referential truth-telling. Those who understand science can be
the only ones that write about why science is truth, so discussions of truth can only be
had by those included in the group. It begs the question: Can truth be separate from
culture and social interaction?
This discussion relates closely to the present dissertation on interprofessional
healthcare education because, presently, nearly all of the writing that has been done on
the subject comes from within scientific discourse itself. For instance, the
Interprofessional Education Collaborative (IPEC), which has assembled the list of
interprofessional competencies used in this thesis, is made up of experts from the fields
of nursing, osteopathic medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, medicine, and public health. The
professional collaborators were all trained, albeit at various levels, in the language of
science. That is the main rationale for the present work, calling for pluralism or a
multivocality in order to bring back what has been lost from scientific inquiry, and add
culture and history back into the conversation when trying to understand how to better
collaborate as a team in the healthcare environment.
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Separating Morality from Science
Montgomery reminds us that scientific discourse was not always characterized by
linguistic separation. He references scientific speech before the end of the nineteenth
century that included alternative discourses. Montgomery lists scientists such as Galileo,
Leibnitz, Newton, Darwin, and Freud as far more universally expressive and willing to
“borrow from other forms of discourse” 64 These scientists were known as natural
philosophers. Montgomery reminds us “when Copernicus composed his famous De
revolutionibus65,”66 during the Renaissance, “differences between science, philosophy,
and literature hardly existed at the level of basic discourse.”67 Montgomery also
illustrates Darwin’s scientific prose, which appealed to wide-ranging audiences, and was
also technically legitimate.68 This reminds us that legitimation, whether intentional or
unintentional, is socially determined.
Only in recent years has all other non-technical speech been driven out of
scientific discourse. This process of distillation emerged alongside the professionalization
of science, the rise of the university, and as previously mentioned, coincided with the
shift from writing scientific books to peer reviewed journal articles. The scientist “no
longer writes of moral matters or offers analogies for philosophical reflection.”69
Relevant to the current dissertation, this eschewing of morality and ethics from scientific
writing should raise a red flag as to a primary obstacle that needs, not to be overcome, but
reflected upon, as we try to decide how scientific professionals can learn to cooperate
64
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with one another in a professional healthcare environment, where ethics and values are at
its center.
Postmodern Perspectives of Scientific Discourse
In addition to Montgomery’s modernist perspective on scientific discourse, he
also offers a more postmodern look at scientific discourse when he states:
There is a very practical reason why scientific discourse fails in its bid to become
fully universal in every way; it remains divided among the many separate
languages of the contemporary world, each of which impresses a quality of
difference upon it. In what way or manner is science in French different from that
in German or English or Russian or Hindi? What kind of structural or semantic
changes take place when it is transferred from one language to another?70
Derrida discusses metaphorical writing within the language of science as
“orienting research and fixing results.”71 Mikhail Bakhtin’s view that every text is always
and already part of a larger discourse, is expounded upon by Roland Barthes who says “a
text is not a line of words releasing a single theoretical meaning… but a multidimensional
space in which variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash.”72 Barthes
paints a picture of an ongoing and complex battleground of discourse and meaning that
cannot be controlled or contained. Montgomery adds that “other structures, other voices,
other context of meaning are always there, waiting, as it were, for emancipation.”73
Two postmodern scholars that have addressed scientific discourse in depth are
Mikhail Bakhtin and Jean Francois Lyotard74.

70

Montgomery, Scientific Voice, 44.
Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1978), 17.
72
Barthes, “Death of the Author,” 147.
73
Montgomery, Scientific Voice, 46.
74
Jean-Francois Lyotard was a twentieth-century French philosopher best known for his interpretation of
postmodernism. Lyotard laments the demise of the meta-narrative and the rise of the little narratives when
it comes to postmodern science. He claims this shift carries with it a de-legitimation, where faith in the
scientists’ search for truth is no longer assumed and replaced by data and technology.
71

74

Mikhail Bakhtin
According to Mikhail Bakhtin, the Russian theorist on language, meaning is
created through our utterances in relation to others. The words gain meaning through
context, which may include culture, community, time, place, and the other’s expressions.
Words for Bakhtin, then, are always embedded in a history, or chain of ongoing contextrich moments. Meaning does not originate from abstract sentences out of context.
Scientific discourse, then, according to Bakhtin, will either fail in its attempt to eschew
culture and history, or we must view scientific discourse as situated in a culture,
community, history, and place of scientific discussion. Bakhtin also argues that a spoken
word is always addressed to someone, “provoking and answer,”75 with the anticipation of
some kind of response. Bakhtin states that speech is “inherently responsive […] any
utterance is a link in the chain of communication.”76 Bakhtin’s perspective allows us to
view all discourse as dialogic. This inseparable links words and context. Scientific
discourse must also be inherently dialogic, always contributing to a larger conversation.
Scientific discourse, then, cannot live in its sterile, dictionary form. Bakhtin continues,
“Neutral dictionary meanings of the words of a language ensure their common features
and guarantee that all speakers of a given language will understand one another, but the
use of words in live speech communication is always individual and contextual in
nature.”77 Applied to professional, scientific discourse, Bakhtin helps us understand the
importance of context, and the impossibility of separation from it. We may begin to see
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that culture, history, community, and the voices of others have been perpetually
underappreciated.
The speech experiences of individuals develop over time, through interaction and
assimilation with others speech patterns. Bakhtin refers to this concept as heteroglossia.78
For the health professional, we can understand this by stating that the speech of medical
professional is a combination of styles borrowed from other medical professionals they
have interacted with. Taken further, the more a health professional is isolated from other
health professionals (or others in general), the less interaction and assimilation from those
outside, and the more difficult it will become to start communicating with similar words
and styles. Thus, the more healthcare professionals exist and communicate in silos, the
less polyphonic their particular discourse becomes. The risk, then is a kind of ‘closing
off’ of the discourse. From. Bakhtin’s The Dialogic Imagination, “discourse lives, as it
were, beyond itself…; if we detach ourselves completely from this connection, all we
have left is the naked corpse of the world, from which we can learn nothing at all about
the social situation or the fate of a given word in life.”79 A detached scientific discourse,
then, teaches us nothing about the world.
Bakhtin actually “develops a scheme for delineating how natural science and the
humanities differ in their approach to language.”80 Bakhtin claims, unsurprisingly, that
the human sciences have much more of a dialogue with culture than do the hard sciences
or natural sciences. This is mainly because, according to Montgomery, the human
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sciences study other forms of discourse, including “documents, literature, art, music,
[and] criticism.”81 The reason that the humanities are important in scientific discourse is
because they do not just involve the content of science or the content of the material
world, they involve direct communication and direct analysis of other types of speech,
other voices.82 Bakhtin reaffirms Montgomery's claim that scientific discourse
personifies non-textual things, abstract truths, and gives them a voice. This voice is “the
scientist.”83 The scientist is both the writer of scientific discourse and the reader of
scientific journals, and scientific writing.84 The scientist is faceless, nameless, without
history, and without culture. The scientist speaks only in monologue.
Jean Francois Lyotard
Jean Francois Lyotard agrees with Montgomery’s assessment of scientific
discourse in that it distances itself from non-speakers of this discourse. Lyotard goes
further in The Postmodern Condition, however, and makes clear distinctions between
scientific knowledge and narrative knowledge (knowledge gained through narrative). He
arrives at his conclusions from a language-as-action perspective introduced above by
Bakhtin; through devices he calls ‘language games.’ Language games are structures and
rules governing knowledge statements. Different games have different rules. Lyotard
begins this investigation by differentiating scientific knowledge and narrative knowledge,
which he claims are in “competition and conflict with each other.”85 Categories of
language games that Lyotard analyzes are denotative, such as, ‘The patient is sick.’; and
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performative declarations, which do more than just describe, they are not true-false
statements and may change the state of something, such as ‘I promise to take the full
course of antibiotics.’ Lyotard also includes prescriptive categories, such as ‘Pick up your
medication on the way home.’ These games deal with what ought to be done.
Lyotard’s analysis finds four common elements across games: the sender,
receiver, referent (subject or object), and the meaning. Lyotard also identifies three
invariant rules within these games: 1) the rules are not inherently legitimate, but are
explicitly or inexplicitly agreed upon between participants, 2) without rules there is no
game, and 3) “every utterance should be thought of as a ‘move’ in a game.”86 These rules
are significant when considering social bonds created during the course of a game. “The
observable social bond is composed of language moves.”87 Thus, language games are not
really about the language itself, but the “type of social interaction encouraged and
facilitated through language.”88 Studying scientific discourse and the rules that govern it,
then, becomes extremely relevant to social interactions facilitated through its use.
Lyotard carries his analysis further by making a comparison between narrative
knowledge acquisition (through narration) and scientific knowledge acquisition. He
explains the importance of narrative knowledge including the triumph of the ‘hero,’ and
the subsequent judgment and evaluation of the self against this benchmark. A narrator is
deemed competent by having heard the story before. The “narratee gains access to this
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authority by listening.”89 Access, then, for narrative knowledge and the authority that
comes with it, requires only an ability to process the language of the narrative.
Following Lyotard’s discussion of narrative knowledge games, he frames his
main argument by stating “postmodern society is characterized by the
incommensurability between languages games.”90 Focusing specifically on scientific
discourse as a language game, he shows this game is not comparable to the narrative
language game. His argument has five main properties. According to Lyotard, 1)
“Scientific knowledge requires that one language game, denotation, be retained and all
others excluded.”91 Furthermore, 2) scientific knowledge is not necessarily part of social
bonding, 3) the required competence lies solely with the sender, 4) the mere act of
reporting science does not give it validity, and 5) science assumes a memory of past
scientific discourses.92 It becomes initially apparent in the Lyotardian analysis that much
of the incommensurability has to deal with exclusion, social bonding, and legitimation…
“both clash and fail to see the other as valid. It is not possible to validate narratives on the
basis of scientific knowledge and vice versa.”93
Lyotard focuses heavily on the ideas of validation, or what he refers to as
legitimation. “It is through legitimation that science gains its credibility.”94 This relegates
the ‘grand narrative’95 to an inferior position. Lyotard argues that scientific discourse, as
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a language game, legitimizes itself in the way it acquires ‘proof.’ Proof is acquired as a
function of efficiency and performativity. Knowledge, no longer being good for its own
sake, needs legitimation through efficiency. This commodification of knowledge can now
be packaged and sold. The relevance to the current dissertation now becomes clear.
Healthcare education packages and sells scientific knowledge within a criterion of
performativity. In doing so, grand narratives are subjugated and marginalized because
they cannot ‘prove’ their value to the system. With this same logic, scientific discourse
and a focus on performativity and efficiency, constrains itself from new ideas.
The plan of the Royal Society of London during the 17th century, for the creation
of a language devoid of extraneous meaning, was destined to fail on its promise to deanimate, it may have tranquilized the animal inside the word, but the anesthetic had its
own side effects… exclusion, objectification, self-legitimation, sterility, and creative
limitation.
The Return of the Natural Philosopher
Montgomery calls for a more postmodern approach to science writing, integrating
“multiple discourses: history, politics, economics, cultural criticism, art, literature,
philosophy, mythology, personal anecdotes, fantasy, biography, and much more. Only by
means of such integration can science be given back its natural place within the general
culture.”96 So, what Montgomery is calling for is not a change to scientific discourse
itself but understanding that scientific discourse is only one language, one code, one
language game among many, and that good writers speak in the language of science,
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while at the same time acknowledging the existence of other perspectives. So, what
postmodernists such as Derrida, Barthes, Bakhtin, and Lyotard may advocate, would be,
in a sense, an appreciation for pre-nineteenth century scientific discourse, a return from
the scientist to the natural philosopher. They would not abandon scientific discourse
altogether, but would acknowledge the inherent biases within the language itself.
Scientific language would resort to the place of ‘tool,’ to be used instrumentally – not
deterministically. “Told through and beside these other voices, […] science regains its
living, its ordinary location in the physiology of culture. It becomes something knowable,
something with a reality of connectedness.”97 Part of what Montgomery may be calling
for here is a return of the author itself, the return of accountability back to the human
being and away from personified processes. Derrida and Barthes would agree with
authorship and accountability, but would remind us that the author is a small part of the
hermeneutic process. With the author back in their place, the interpretive process can
resume. Legitimacy can, once again, be granted by the other.
To conclude the discussion and analysis of scientific writing, the question
remains, what can we learn from the deconstruction of scientific discourse that we can
apply to interprofessional healthcare pedagogy? Regarding inter-professional dialogue,
while keeping in mind the history of professionalization and the silos of both professional
skill and language that it creates, Rowland Barthes states “the language of the same
suffices us […] We lock ourselves into […] our own social, professional cell, and this
sequestration has a neurotic value: it permits us to adapt ourselves as best we can to the
fragmentation of our society.”98 Barthes statement alludes to a feeling of security that
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comes with shared linguistic competence. This, no doubt, facilitates professional
bonding; however, also creates distance. The uncertainty and discomfort of estrangement
remains one of the barriers to interprofessional cooperation.
For the present work it may also be helpful to keep in mind that “specialization
leads to overlap as well as divergence.”99 What we have seen in the last hundred and fifty
years are combinations of seemingly different disciplines such as biology and chemistry
into biochemistry, which was coined in 1850. It is moments like this in which we realize
our interdependence and our need to increased collaboration. This involves, not only a
sharing of concepts, theories, and ideas, but a sharing and hybridization of our language
itself… the language of science, thus, morphs and changes with new ways of thinking
and perceiving the world. Although created to stand outside of language, the language of
science ultimately submits to the rules of any other nomenclature.
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CHAPTER 4: THE NEED FOR MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES IN HEALTHCARE:
A RHETORIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATION APPROACH
Philosophy of Communication
Overview and Approaches to Philosophy of Communication
This dissertation is about improving interdependent, professional relationships
with a common goal of quality patient care. In the United States today, health care teams
deliver the majority of patient care. That being said, we desire better working
relationships, in part, because we desire effective and efficient teams. Thus, to achieve
the shared goal of quality patient care, we must establish and maintain quality
interprofessional relationships. A first step in working towards this end is understanding
and acknowledging alterity1, or our state of being different from others. This otherness
can be either a chronic source of conflict or an ocean of perspectives. The attitude from
which we approach alterity will determine the quality of working relationships, thus, the
quality of patient care.
Ronald C. Arnett and Patricia Arneson have worked with the concept of alterity,
or Otherness, as it applies to communication ethics and philosophy of communication. In
their treatment of the subject they begin with the assumption that we are born into
Otherness, and dwell within it. This “diversity of positions”2 represents different ideas
inherent in “otherness”3 – ethics, values, and virtues grounded in unique histories. They
use an example “… one can understand capitalism and communism as contrasting
philosophies of communication that find their origins in differing assumptions about the
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good life engaged in the marketplace.”4 This example is helpful here because it
exemplifies fundamental differences in socioeconomic structure (capitalism versus
communism), but also illuminates a common goal (the good life). We can easily make the
connection that differences in professional values, may originate from different ideas
about patient care. If we heed the insights of Arnett and Arneson, our focus shifts from
processes (of relationship building) to content (what values matter to us). If we truly want
to understand the Other, in this case, those from other professional silos, we must “learn
what philosophies of communication and ethics matter to the Other, as well as to
ourselves.”5 This learning should arise from genuine, content-focused conversation.
Hans-Georg Gadamer6 says “We say that we ‘conduct’ a conversation, but the
more genuine a conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either partner.”7
Gadamer’s comment points to the inherent desire to control the conversational
environment, to control the process, a desire born of the scientific ethos and deeply
embedded within the language of science. Much of the research on communication and
professional relationship building is engaged from an empirical, post-positivistic
approach, the social science equivalent of the scientific method. Scientific
methodologies, from which the biomedical model of medicine is derived, are process
oriented. These processes are inherent in the inductive approach to reasoning. Inductive
reasoning begins with observation and generating theories from them. Research from this
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approach looks for patterns, creates theories, and tests them with hypotheses. Good
science leads to accurate prediction that is repeatable. This need for repetition requires
standardizing and controlling the environment, which is done via strict processes and
procedures. Understanding the limits of the biomedical paradigm can illuminate a new
path towards understanding each other. Philosophy of communication breaks the urge to
control communication and opens one up to the possibilities of otherness. Using a
philosophy of communication perspective, grounded in content, offers a valuable
compliment to the process-driven biomedical model.
Philosophy of communication examines communication as lived experience. The
term blends philosophy with communication, which have always been intimately related.
Philosophy can only become manifest through communication, making it reasonable to
investigate communication philosophically.8 This endeavor involves communicating
about both communication and philosophy, and about their relationship to one another.
Communication from a philosophical perspective acts to bring others near, while
“keeping the self intact.”9 Communication is an invitation to converse.
Some problems emerge when trying to define philosophy of communication.
Attempts to reify either philosophy or communication undermine the dynamic nature of
each. Ramsey notes that communication “is fundamental for relating with the world, with
others, and with ourselves. [Furthermore], there needs to be a rigorous account of how
these relations are constituted, and philosophy [is] the means for providing such an
analysis.”10 Human beings are born into a world and into a community that is already
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using language; therefore, human beings are “always in language.”11 This inescapability
from language means that language is a central part of being in the world.
Communication is not merely a way of expressing our existence, but is part of our
existence. Pat Arneson, in her book Perspectives of Philosophy of Communication, states,
“Philosophy of communication examines questions related to the nature and function of
human communication.”12 This human expression occurs in specific contexts, but is
rooted in various cultural and historical backgrounds. Philosophy of communication is a
journey of exploration into the background of “self, other, and society”13 as a whole.
Within the present context, philosophy of communication assumes that society is
created and modified through communication. This is a shift in perspective from
traditional, sender-receiver models of communication. Communication from this
perspective must be analyzed philosophically. This does not mean it is unimportant to
study the objective speech acts themselves; however, it is a fundamental argument of this
work that communication is much more than a ‘competency’ of interprofessional
communication; communication is a tool for creating societies, shaping identity, making
sense of our alterity, expressing ourselves to others and building bridges into other
worldviews.
This approach to communication and philosophy highlight the inadequacies of
current communication pedagogy. When communication is viewed scientifically,
communication is looked at as merely reproductive and representational.14
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Mathematician, Claude Elwood Shannon, and scientist, Warren Weaver, created the most
popular model of communication in the past seventy years. Published in Bell System
Technical Journal, the Shannon Weaver model of communication15 (originally known as
the mathematical theory of communication) clearly illustrates the process-oriented nature
of traditional communication education. Because we view and teach communication as a
process, it becomes increasingly difficult to remove oneself from the scientific mind. This
is specifically what a philosophy of communication approach can offer, a new way
thinking and seeing. Communication becomes an art of interpretation from an orientation
to the world that is “open to possibility.”16 There is a creative benefit to approaching
communication philosophically, as seeking possibilities outside of oneself. Calvin Schrag
believes that worldviews are expressed with every utterance or action.17 This makes
interpretation and meaning-making an ongoing event. Thus, a philosophy of
communication approach to interprofessional healthcare education assumes that all
members of the healthcare team have a narrative situated within a culture and history,
with worldviews and identities created by and sustained through language.
Therefore, a philosophy of communication perspective offers a new way of
thinking about health, health care, and healthcare education. For instance, Martin
Heidegger’s understanding of health as an unimpeded ability to understand, to tune-in to
the world, and to participate in discourse is useful not just in understanding the concept of
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health, but also in offering a new way of approaching healthcare education. Health
education today emphasizes thinking and talking (Shannon Weaver), but lacks focus
when it comes to attunement, or feeling. This dissertation will attempt to compliment the
biomedical model and the ‘language of medicine’, by approaching health and healthcare
education through the spectacles of philosophy of communication.
Philosophy of Communication and Healthcare
Gadamer and The Phenomenon of Health?
Health communication in its most basic form is nothing more than
communicating about health. It makes sense then to begin with the question: What is
health? This is not a new question. The ancients understood the importance of health for
multiple reasons. First, all men desired a general feeling of well-being. Second, the
ancient Greeks fought constant wars and good physical condition was a matter of national
defense. Third, gladiators and Olympic competitors required good health and physical
fitness. In fact, even the famous physician, Galen18, was appointed by the Roman
government to advise the diets and exercise regimens of Roman athletes.19 There is little
difference in the way we view health today. We no longer fight to the death in arenas,
and most of the wars we fight do not require hand-to-hand combat; however, for the last
seventy years, the World Health Organization has defined health in a way that
emphasizes that ancient notion of well-being. Health is “a state of complete physical,
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mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity,”20 This
definition allows those living with chronic conditions, such as type-1 diabetes, or HIV to
be considered healthy. At the same time, those that are in pristine physical health may be
dealing with severe depression, or emotional abuse, and so may be considered unhealthy.
Health implies a state of harmony with physical bodies, mental states, and interpersonal
relationships. The WHO definition allows room for interpretation.
The present work will assume that health is an enigma, and will not attempt to
reify it. I will, however, offer a non-traditional perspective from which to conceptualize
health. Fredrik Svenaeus21 looks at health as a phenomenon. Embedded within this lens is
the understanding that the science of medicine can never answer all of the questions
encountered in the clinic. Svenaeus sees limitations in the language of medicine, and
instead suggests a language of lived experience, specifically the language of
phenomenology. A language of lived experience offers a vehicle to express “the feelings,
thoughts, and actions”22 of someone actively experiencing the world. Svenaeus is by no
means discounting the importance of physiology, or of the biomedical model. Our
physical bodies set the parameters from which we are able to experience the world,
including illness, and the biomedical paradigm, in which modern medicine is grounded,
has allowed us to live life without constant worry of disease and death. What Svenaeus is
offering is an additional way to look at health. When communicating with patients, the
language of medicine can be somewhat atomistic, treating individuals as a collection of
20
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cells. Phenomenology offers a more holistic lens from which to view patient interactions.
This lens allows us to try to determine how a patient is experiencing a particular
physiological state, and what meanings can be drawn from that experience.
A phenomenological approach to health and illness does not begin with
EMR/EHR (electronic medical/health records) codes, biomedical diagnoses, and
pharmaceutical prescriptions. It begins, as Husserl intended, with ‘the things themselves,’
in this case the ‘things’ are the unwell patients. Furthermore, a phenomenology of illness
seems much more tangible than a phenomenology of health. Illness brings with it feelings
of pain, nausea, uncertainty, and sometimes meaninglessness. These are phenomena to
which one can attune. If we think of disease as a biological state or process, then illness
can be understood as the experience of that biological state. Health as an experience, it
seems, can only be defined in relation to illness (as we understand darkness as an absence
of light). Svenaeus phrases it nicely when he says that health “effaces itself in an
enigmatic way.”23 Svenaeus is alluding to Gadamer’s The Enigma of Health, where
Hans-Georg Gadamer acknowledges health as elusive, but describes health as a state
where we are open to new things, ready for adventure, and, in doing so, forget
ourselves.24 Gadamer attempts to define health without contrasting it to illness, and in
doing so uses the language of Martin Heidegger. Gadamer writes:
Health is not a condition that one introspectively feels in oneself. Rather it is a
condition of being there (Da-Sein), of being in the world (In-der-Welt-Sein), of
being together with other people (Mit-den-Menschen-Sein), of being taken in by
an active and rewarding engagement with the things that matter in life – It is the
rhythm of life, a permanent process in which equilibrium re-establishes itself.
This is something known to us all.25
23
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It is worth noting here that Gadamer defines health as ‘openness,’ just as a philosophy of
communication demands openness to alterity. Health professionals can attend to their
own health by sharing with one another and reflecting on “the things that matter in life.”26
Gadamer’s phenomenology of health does not differ much from the definition put forth
seventy years ago by the World Health Organization. They both include a state of
physical, mental, and social well-being. Gadamer’s use of Da-Sein is in itself meaningful.
Martin Heidegger creates the word in his magnum opus, Being and Time. Da-Sein is the
‘being-there’ of existence, but also involves the ‘asking’ of what is means to be there.
Da-Sein, then, includes conceptually a mental and physical state of being. According to
Heidegger, the outside world is not external to Da-Sein, but constitutive; thus, meaning is
made/given through our actions. Meaning is active. So, meaning is not dependent upon
appearance, but on use. Svenaeus argues that illness presents resistance to everydayness.
We become, in a sense, out of tune, not with the world (it is not external), but with
ourselves. Svenaeus calls illness, a “form of homelessness.”27 It may be helpful for both
patients and providers to discuss illness through the metaphor of homelessness as it offers
a common and relatable frame of reference.
For Heidegger, the tools we use for action include understanding (thinking),
attunement (feeling), and discourse (talking). Meaning is created through these
interdependent actions as Da-Sein binds itself to the world and to others. Communicating,
experiencing, and reflecting in this sense become a manifestation of health itself. The
active process of creating meaning is what connects us to the world, and what makes us
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healthy. Health, then, must be considered “not a passive state but rather […] an active
process – a balancing.”28
Philosophy of Communication and Interprofessional Practice
As we learned in the Introduction, interprofessional collaboration occurs when
professionals from various disciplines work together to deliver high quality of care.” This
dissertation, however, is more concerned with the education of future collaborators, with
interprofessional education. We have determined from the CAIPE, the WHO, and the
IOM that interprofessional education should be centered on interaction, collaborative
learning, and reflection. How, then, can philosophy of communication contribute to these
essential educational elements?
To begin to answer the above question, it is important to highlight one
fundamental difference between the scientific perspective and the philosophy of
communication perspective. In the former, communication is a transactional process to
which one can become competent. For scientists and positivists, communication recreates
representations of the world. In the latter, communication is much more than a
competency. Communication shapes identity, creates and continually modifies meaning,
acts as a bridge between ourselves and others, constructs and destroys society, and is the
way we all live in the world. Communication is an interpretive activity that creates
meaning and does not merely represent.
A primary component of philosophy of communication is difference. Research on
alterity highlights the importance of acknowledging our differences from one another.
The attitude with which we approach difference will determine how well we collaborate
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with others. Welcoming ‘otherness’ opens the pre-professional up to diverse perspectives.
The open student listens to the ‘other’ with the intent to understand, not to reply or
control the communicative environment. A student that can reconcile differing value
structures receives the benefit of multiple perspectives, better understands their own
values, and is better equipped to locate common ground.
Philosophy of communication views communication as lived experience. Where
scientific thinking frames communication as transactional, as processes to be controlled
and manipulated, a philosophy of communication perspective view communication
phenomenologically. The world is experienced through language. Words offer invitations
to converse, to be with and understand others. Interprofessional education activities that
promote genuine and meaningful conversation allow participants the opportunity to
experience different worldviews within a specific context of healthcare.
The speech experiences of individuals develop over time, through interaction and
assimilation with others speech patterns. Bakhtin refers to this concept as heteroglossia.
For the health professional, we can understand this by stating that the speech of medical
professional is a combination of styles borrowed from other medical professionals they
have interacted with. Taken further, the more a health professional is isolated from other
health professionals (or others in general), the less interaction and assimilation from those
outside, and the more likely that health professionals will start communicating with
similar words and styles. Thus, the more healthcare professionals exist and communicate
in silos, the less polyphonic their particular discourse becomes. The risk, then is a kind of
‘closing off’ of the discourse. To combat this, healthy dialogue between different health
professionals must become an important component of healthcare education. Dialogue
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becomes a principal vehicle of action and for fostering heteroglossia. There are,
however, different ways of thinking about dialogue.
Dialogue as Philosophy: Multiple Perspectives on Dialogue
Dialogue is no less than an act of philosophy. When we consider philosophy we
are often reminded of Socrates and his method of questioning. He would often ask
questions such as ‘What is love?’ Socrates asked questions, answered questions, and most
importantly listened to arrive at answers.
Plato’s Laches: 420 BC
In the West, Plato was probably the first to systematically use dialogue as a
literary form. The first instance of this was seen in his Laches, a dialogue on courage.
The dialogue involves moral questions about raising sons and whether they ought to learn
how to fight in armor, and Socrates, in his usual fashion, turns the dialogue into a
philosophical inquiry, an “investigation into the nature of courage.” The conversation
ends in aporia and does not really uncover an answer to the question. This is because
Plato’s focus is more on the process of the Socratic method, which tries to bring “correct
notions to birth.” In Lamb’s introduction to the Loeb edition he argues that:
…we should observe the care bestowed on evolving the general notion of a
quality, as distinct from its various concrete instances, and the insistence on the
universality of knowledge, which must somehow embrace all the virtues, and can
suffer no limitation in point of time. The way is thus prepared for the doctrine of
the permanence and invariability of the true objects of knowledge. 29
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Plato believes that knowledge is universal and that true knowledge knows itself to be
knowledge and is based on reason. True knowledge is invariant and does not depend on
external objects to determine it. It also transcends sense-perception and moves toward the
idea or universal, which is intuitively, and a priori known to the soul (True knowledge is
not inductive). Plato’s ideas of knowledge are closer to those of Locke, where ideas, or
more specifically the nature of things, can be known intuitively.
Plato’s early concept of dialogue can be seen immediately in his introduction to
Laches. He says early on that:
…we think we should speak our minds freely to friends like you. Some people, of
course, pour ridicule on such appeals, and when consulted for their advice will not
say what they think, but something different, making the inquirer’s wishes their
aim, and speaking against their own judgment.30
Here, Plato shows a sophisticated conception of dialogue being genuine and not
predetermined. For Plato as well as many contemporary scholars, dialogue emerges as a
by-product as we genuinely relate to each other.
After Plato, dialogues became more popular as a major literary genre and
continued in various states of popularity from antiquity to modern times. The Platonic
dialogues, as a genre, experienced a sort of resurgence in the 20th century with
Santayana’s Dialogues in Limbo and Murdoch’s Two Platonic Dialogues. The dialogues
are great examples of ‘dialogue in action,’ and are often used by philosopher to
exemplify the process of truth-seeking.
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Most of the research on dialogue today, however, is not dialogic in structure, but
emphasizes the importance of perspective when engaging the other. Cissna and Anderson
in the essay “Communication and the Ground of Dialogue,” offer four unique,
contemporary perspectives on dialogue.
Martin Buber
The first perspective on dialogue listed by Cissna and Anderson is that of Martin
Buber. In contrast to the linear process of information transmission, which was a popular
communication model during the first half of the 20th century, Buber offers a definition of
dialogue that focuses on the relationship with the other, or Thou. He writes: “There is
genuine dialogue… where each of the participants really has in mind the other or others
in their present and particular beings and turns to them with the intention of establishing a
living mutual relation between himself and them.”31 This concept of dialogue places the
human being as the central focus of the dialogic exchange, not the message, per se.
Matson and Montagu draw extensively from Buber in The Human Dialogue, and
view dialogue as a “transactional process concerned with the development of self, the
knowing of other, and the formation of human relationships.”32 They emphasize dialogue
as a “task to be achieved,”33 and not simply a transaction of information sharing. Buber’s
philosophy of dialogue is existential, for him existence is an encounter. We are engaged
‘at all times’ in ether an I-It or an I-Thou interaction. His concepts are clarified in his
most popular work, I & Thou, where he differentiates between the I-Thou relationship
31
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and the I-It relationship. The I-Thou relationship is an authentic and intimate exchange
between two beings. This relationship has neither structure nor content and cannot be
measured. The I-It relationship is the most common and confronts encounters as I-Object
encounters, even with other beings. All objects are mental representations and controlled.
The I-It relationship is monologic. True dialogue occurs within the world of I-Thou, and
suggests that any subsequent practical learning must occur in a reflection upon the I-Thou
encounter.
Conversation Analysis
The second perspective on dialogue included here involves “dialogue to denote
human conversation.”34 This perspective was developed in the late 60s and early 70s by
sociologist Harvey Sacks, though inspired by Erving Goffman’s “The Interaction Order.”
The approach began to gain popularity in the 1980s and 90s with the works of Beach
(1989), Craig and Tracy (1983), Hopper (1992), McLaughlin (1984), Nofsinger (1991)35,
Markova and Foppa (1990), and Tannen (1989). This research focused on the details of
conversation such as etiquette, turn-taking36, and greeting management,37 and was usually
quantitative in nature. The methods usually involve videotaping conversations, analyzing
every detail of the interaction, and reaching inductive conclusions based on patterns of
interaction.
Markova and Fopper, for example, define dialogue as “face-to-face interaction
between two or more persons using a system of signs.”38 This perspective tries to answer
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questions such as ‘what is dialogue’ and ‘how does it operate?’ This is different than the
Buberian approach which views dialogue as an existential event that transcends and kind
of analysis.
Mikhail Bakhtin
The third approach to dialogue can be represented by the work of Mikhail
Bakhtin. His concept of dialogue is that ideas by nature are dialogical; “they are held in
response to others and in anticipation of what others may say. An utterance is always a
reply.”39 Bakhtin saw dialogue not as a communicative achievement, but as a function
inherent in language itself. His concept of dialogue was not rigid, but could exist in
varying contexts and lengths of time. For Bakhtin, “the simplest and most classic form of
speech communication”40 is when two people converse with one another in an alternating
fashion for a given amount of time.
Dialogue for Bakhtin, as previously stated, can materialize in many different
forms; for instance, “a series of scholarly papers dealing with a particular topic published
over a number of years by various authors constitutes a dialogue.”41 Dialogue, then, is not
only the alternating of roles, but how one incorporates the other into his/her utterance.
This is an important concept for Bakhtin as “even the slightest allusion to another’s
utterance gives the speech a dialogic turn,”42 and since every addressed utterance is just a
link in a chain of previous and future utterances, all utterances that acknowledge a past
utterance or future utterance can be thought of as dialogic in nature. Bakhtin argues that
“an utterance is never just a reflection or an expression of something already existing
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outside it that is given and final. It always creates something that never existed before,
something absolutely new and unrepeatable.”43 The idea of unrepeatability takes
dialogue, and the utterance altogether out of the realm of the empirical analysis. This
perspective may even apply to thought.
For Bakhtin, even individual consciousness is a social process, not autonomous.
In fact, the self can only materialize by fusing with others. Bakhtin writes: “I achieve
self-consciousness, I become myself only by revealing myself to another, through another
and with another’s help… Cutting oneself off, isolating oneself, closing oneself off, those
are the basic reasons for loss of self.”44 By fusion, Bakhtin does not mean a joining or
assimilation, but a complementation by differentiation. For Bakhtin, dialogue does not
lead to action – dialogue is action. “In dialogue a person not only shows himself
outwardly, but he becomes for the first time that which he is… not only for others but for
himself as well. To be means to communicate dialogically. When dialogue ends,
everything ends.”45 He shares the Burkeian belief that identification happens by
simultaneously experiencing similarity and difference, ‘what I am’ and ‘what I am not.’
Hans-Georg Gadamer
One final perspective on dialogue can be seen in Hans-Georg Gadamer. Gadamer
believed that people are embedded in a unique history and culture, which create certain
prejudices that affect subsequent interpretations. While we cannot escape our biases, we
do need to understand what they are in order to foster a more thorough understanding of
the situations we encounter. His most popular work Truth and Method argues that the two
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terms (truth and method) are incompatible. He criticizes the two most common modes of
human inquiry: scientific approaches modeled after scientific methodologies and a desire
to achieve original authorial intent. Gadamer argues that the meaning of a text can no be
reduced to an author’s intentions; instead, meaning lies in the context in which one is
interpreting.
Truth and Method was Gadamer’s way of “resuscitating a dialogic conception of
knowledge.”46 Gadamer’s concepts of knowledge can be applied to dialogue because
Gadamer looks at the relationship between interpreter and text and subsequently
acknowledges and represents ways of thinking and of questioning. Like Bakhtin,
dialogue for Gadamer can exist between a person and a text, which does not require the IThou experience required in Buber’s concept of dialogue. Knowledge then, for Gadamer,
“becomes a developmental process of questioning positions, a process that presumes both
an historical positioning and an immersion in a particular tradition.”47 On Gadamer’s
concept of ‘dialogic conversation, Warnke writes: “… just as in conversation, the result is
a unity or argument that goes beyond the original position of the various participants;
indeed, the consensus that emerges in understanding represents a new view and hence a
new stage of the tradition.”48 Gadamer adds his thoughts on conducting such
conversations:
To conduct a conversation means to allow oneself to be conducted by the subject
matter to which the partners in the dialogue are oriented. It requires that one does
not try to argue the other person down but that one really considers the weight of
the other’s opinion. Hence, it is an art of testing. But the art of testing is the art of
questioning… To question means to lay open, to place in the open. As against the
fixity of opinions, questioning makes the object and all its possibilities fluid…
46
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Thus a genuine conversation is never the one that we wanted to conduct… The
partners conversing are far less the leaders of it than the led. No one knows in
advance what will ‘come out’ of a conversation. Understanding or its failure is
like an event that happens to us… All this shows that a conversation has a spirit of
its own, and that the language in which it is conducted bears its own truth within
it – i.e., that it allows something to ‘emerge’ which henceforth exists.49
In Gadamer, as well as all four conceptions of dialogue, space is created for something
new to emerge, a new object subject to interpretation. The resulting knowledge is
something that could not have been achieved in isolation. Furthermore, “the theory of
communication underlying a dialogic conception of relationship represents a way of
understanding the world. In particular the world of other selves as well as one’s self.”50
From this perspective the world can only be understood in the meeting of the self and the
other, and the combination of hermeneutics and ‘being’ with another.

Rhetoric: Overview and Approaches
A Brief History
The philosophical concepts discussed above represent reflective and dialectic
methods of perceiving the world (including concepts of health) and discovering truth.
Yet, truth without action does nothing to improve our social world. Furthermore, many
individuals are not moved to act from logic alone. Thus, the tools of rhetoric are essential
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in getting people to act toward a common good. Rhetoric, in this sense, is much more
than mere persuasion; rhetoric must be grounded in the good.
Rhetoric, however, was not always seen as a constructive tool for disseminating
truth; rhetoric could potentially cause great harm. The battle between rhetoric and
philosophy goes back more than 2,400 years and is central to Plato’s early dialogues. To
better understand the anti-rhetoric perspective, it is important to understand how rhetoric
was being used in ancient Greece. Citizens studied the art of public speaking in order to
participate in Athenian society. Athens was a direct democracy, meaning they did not
elect representatives to vote on their behalf, every Athenian citizen (that was not a slave)
cast an individual ballot. Improving one’s speaking ability, improved their chances of
persuading others to vote with them in political and legal matters. In order to improve
their rhetorical prowess, citizens would hire teachers of rhetoric called Sophists, the most
famous of which were Protagoras, Isocrates, and Gorgias. It was common practice for a
Greek defendant or politician to hire a Sophist to write a speech for them, which they
would memorize and deliver in a public venue as if it was their own. Unsurprisingly, this
Sophistic rhetoric drew strong criticism from philosophers of the day.
Plato’s most famous attack on rhetoric can be found in Gorgias where he
introduces his main contention that rhetoric is concerned only with persuasion via
manipulation and lacks true knowledge of justice. James Herrick51 paraphrases Plato
stating, “[…] an adequate view of justice must be grounded in true knowledge
(episteme), and aim at the well-being of the individual and the city-state (polis).”52 In
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dialogic form, Plato invokes Socrates to debate three increasingly sophisticated
interlocutors at a dinner party. The first dialogue between Socrates and Gorgias is aimed
at determining the nature of rhetoric, specifically whether it is a true art, or techne.53 Plato
corners Gorgias into agreeing that rhetoric deals with the use of persuasive words in
court, which Gorgias calls justice. It is here that Plato illustrates the distinction between
true knowledge about justice and mere opinion about it. For Plato, “to understand justice
is to love it, and at the same time to recognize just how repulsive injustice is.”54 Plato
accuses the Sophists of presupposing a just outcome and teaching tricks to achieve that
predetermined and often false view.
During the next debate with Gorgias’s student, Polus, Socrates makes the
argument that rhetoric is nothing but a ‘knack’ for ‘flattery’ that involves no real
knowledge and “aim[s] at pleasure without consideration of what is best.”55 Socrates
concludes that rhetoric is a counterfeit art. It is also here that Plato expounds his
philosophy of health. “Real health, for Plato, is a state of well-being in which one is in
full possession of mental and physical powers; and is directing those powers toward good
ends such as justice. Health also involves self-control and peace of mind.”56 For Plato
health does not ensue, but is “pursued through various arts that demand effort, discipline,
and even pain.”57 He even goes as far as to identify the “four true arts of health, two for
the body and two for the soul, an art of maintenance and an art of restoration for each.”58
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Table 4
Plato’s Arts of Health
Body

Soul

Maintain

Gymnastics

Legislation

Restore

Medicine

Justice

What we can learn from Plato’s concept of health is the importance he places on justice.
Legislation is meant to keep us from going astray morally and the judicial system is
meant to restore the health of the soul. “It is of utmost importance, then, that a judge
understand the true nature of justice.”59 Plato’s argument against Gorgias now becomes
clear. The Sophist teaches tricks to imitate health (of the soul) and convince (flatter)
people that they are healthy (justice has been served) when they are not. Plato then lays
out a corresponding “sham art” for each of the four arts of health. The sham arts claim the
outcomes of the true arts but lack any true knowledge of the subjects.

Table 5
Plato’s Sham Arts of Health
Maintain

Restore

59

Body

Soul

Makeup (lets people appear
healthier than they are
through artificial coloring
and ornamentation)
Cookery (home remedies
that make people feel good
in the short term)

Sophistic (self-interested
political speeches to
influence legislation)

Ibid.
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Rhetoric (create beliefs
about justice that
manipulate true judgment)

In Plato, rhetoric and health are intimately connected through the soul, and it is rhetoric’s
potential damage to the soul that drives his unfavorable treatment of the ‘sham arts.’
They create injustice, which for Plato is the worst evil, even worse than the suffering of
injustice.60 As a remedy, Plato demands that a steadfast and virtuous ethical grounding
must drive the use of rhetoric. This marriage of goodwill and rhetoric can be found in
rhetorical treatises throughout antiquity and the middle ages, and is a recurring theme in
contemporary rhetoric.
The final debate in Gorgias involves Socrates and Callicles. In this dialectic
Socrates agrees that rhetoric can be beneficial but only if it is used to bring about justice;
and, because Plato had already accused the Sophists of lacking true knowledge of justice,
the argument turns toward the relationship between rhetoric and true knowledge. This, in
turn becomes a discussion of the difference between opinion (doxa) and true knowledge
(episteme). Socrates’s attack shifts from rhetoric toward the Sophists use of rhetoric.
Socrates admits that rhetoric can be extremely valuable when applied to the pursuit of
truth or in revealing injustice. In fact he claims that “this is the best way to spend one’s
days: to live and die in the pursuit of justice and other virtues.”61 By illustrating that
rhetoric can achieve a beneficial outcome (true justice), Plato hints that there may, in fact,
be a true art (techne) of rhetoric. This techne is elaborated in Plato’s Phaedrus.
In Phaedrus, Plato defines rhetoric as “an art of influencing the soul through
words.”62 His definition of rhetoric does not conceptualize rhetoric as inherently good.
For Plato, the true rhetorician must also be a philosopher. For “’when an orator who

60

Ibid., 59.
Plato, Gorgias, 527e.
62
Plato, Phaedrus, trans. Harold North Fowler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical
Library), 1914), 553.
61

105

knows nothing about good or evil undertakes to persuade a city in the same state of
ignorance’ the results are disastrous;”63 therefore, before anyone embark on a study of
rhetoric, they should first seek truth, which comes from philosophical inquiry. Plato
dedicates much of Phaedrus to philosophical inquiry into the nature of the soul, which he
separates into three parts: love of wisdom, love of nobility, and a love of appetite. For
rhetoric to achieve its goal, which for Plato is “to establish order in the individual and in
the city-state,” then “the wisdom-loving part of the soul [must persuade] the other two
parts to submit to its control.”64 Plato’s techne of rhetoric, then, involves an “ordering of
the two lower parts so that they can obey reason, in the same way as good government
depends on the lower orders obeying the wise rulers.”65 It can be implied then that the
ultimate goal of rhetoric is persuading an audience that is led astray by ego and pleasure
to return to reason. The lover of wisdom (philosophy) must always drive the chariot if the
destination is truth and justice. When one or both of the horses begin to stray, rhetoric
may act as the reins.
While Plato sees rhetoric as subservient to philosophy, Aristotle views them as
equal. He begins his famous Rhetoric with “Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic.”66
The opening claim is a deliberate response to his mentor, Plato. In short, Aristotle is
saying that public speaking and logical discussion cannot be separated. “Moreover, his
logical works show an equal regard for the interconnection of rhetoric and logic,
particularly in the area of inventio,”67 which will be explained below. “At every point he
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is concerned with definition, with implication, and with the relation of one art to
another.”68 This deep connection of logic to rhetoric is central to understanding
Aristotle’s concept of rhetoric.
Logic must be demonstrated, and in this we find rhetoric’s utility. According to
Aristotle, the function of rhetoric is not mere persuasion, “but rather to discover the
means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case
allow.”69 Comparing rhetoric to medicine, Aristotle adds that “it is not the function of
medicine simply to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the road
to health; it is possible to give excellent treatment even to those who can never enjoy
sound health.”70 In his analogy, Aristotle limits the outcomes of rhetoric to what is
possible for a particular audience and situation. The art of rhetoric is primarily concerned
with discovering these possibilities, which drives his famous definition: “Rhetoric may be
defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of
persuasion.”71 This definition is still used by contemporary rhetoricians to define their
field.
Aristotle not only defines the function of rhetoric, but also offers four ways in
which rhetoric is useful in everyday life. His first reason is that when everything else is
equal “true and just ideas would usually prevail on their own.”72 If judges do not make
decision based on truth, it must be “due to the speakers themselves.”73 In short, the truth
needs capable speakers to deliver its message.
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Aristotle’s second reason that rhetoric is useful relates to the audience. With some
people “[…] even if we possessed the most accurate scientific knowledge, we should not
find it easy to persuade them by the employment of such knowledge. For scientific
discourse is concerned with instruction, but in the case of such persons instruction is
impossible.”74 Simply stated, Aristotle plainly states that there are people whom one
cannot instruct. Because literacy was so important to civic life, most Athenian citizens
after the sixth century B.C. were literate and capable of high-level thinking.75 Therefore,
we may interpret Aristotle’s statements not as lacking the mental ability to learn via
reasoning, but more of a stubbornness to engage new ideas. Facts alone cannot persuade
everyone. Rhetoric can help address this challenge by making “connections between the
point we are arguing and beliefs already held by the members of our audience [… more
specifically, their] experiences, values, and beliefs.”76 Rhetoric, for Aristotle, can help a
speaker identify with an audience.
Rhetoric is also useful because it allows one to examine and explicate both sides
of an issue to better see the facts. This is the spoken form of the dialectic process
commonly seen in argumentation and debate. Understanding both sides of an argument
greatly helps in the construction of one’s argument and in the refutation of a
counterargument. Herrick adds that “this skill in argument advances the three benefits
inherent to the practice of rhetoric: testing ideas, advocating points of view, and
discovering relevant facts and truths.”77
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The fourth and final reason that rhetoric is useful has to do with defending oneself
against attacks. Aristotle writes, “it is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of
being unable to defend himself with his limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself
with speech and reason, when the use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human
being than the use of his limbs.”78 Aristotle’s fourth reason is driven by his insights into
the nature of man. In his Politics, Aristotle claims “[…] man is by nature a political
animal.” Aristotle goes on to clarify what he means by political animal.
The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and therefore is
possessed by the other animals as well […], but speech is designed to indicate the
advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is
the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has
perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and
it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a city-state.79
In sum, Aristotle is saying that we have purpose, and we use our capacity for speech to
communicate observations and values to one another to foster collaboration. And, where
some animals fight for what they want with their limbs, it is more natural for human
beings to defend themselves with speech and reason.
Table 6
Aristotle’s Four Reasons Rhetoric is Useful
According to Aristotle, rhetoric is useful because…
1

Truth needs capable speakers to deliver its message

2

Rhetoric can help a speaker identify with an audience

3

It allows one to examine and explicate both sides of an issue to better see the
facts
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4

It gives man the ability to defend himself in the way that an animal uses its limbs

Aristotle sees rhetoric as very practical and attempts to systematize an art of persuasion.
Within his system there are three elements of speechmaking, three rhetorical situations
(settings), and three modes (ways) of persuasion.
The three elements of speechmaking are the speaker, the subject, and the
audience. It is the type of audience (public, judges, lawyers, politicians), according to
Aristotle, that determines the type of speech. The speech types are labeled according to
the rhetorical settings and are as follows: judicial (forensic), epideictic (ceremonial), and
deliberative (political). These settings deal with the past, present, and future respectively.
Judicial rhetoric is used in the courtroom and “either attacks or defends somebody.”80
These speeches “reconstruct the past”81 and address questions related to justice.
Epideictic rhetoric is usually seen in public ceremonies such as speeches of
commemoration or dedication where a person receives praise (or sometimes blame).
Deliberative rhetoric looks to the future and asks questions focused on “the best or most
advantageous (sympheron) course of action to be taken by the state.”82 These speeches
argue for the adoption or abortion of a certain political policy and should be guided by
the concept of eudaimonia83, which translates to “human well-being, happiness, or
fulfillment.”84
Eudaimonia is closely related to Aristotle’s overall concept of ethics and is
echoed in the first sentence of Nicomachean Ethics: “Every craft and every inquiry, and
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similarly every action and project, seems to aim at some good; hence the good has been
well defined as that which everything aims.”85 He argues that this final end, first, must be
chosen for its own sake and never as a means to some greater end, and second, the
concept cannot be used except for a final end. Aristotle concludes that eudaimonia is this
end, the highest human good, and the answer to his famous question, “What is the good
life?” Political rhetoric, then, must be grounded in the ethical desire for eudaimonia,
general human flourishing. Once again, an ancient philosopher connects rhetoric to
health, not as flattery, but as a tool to pursue it.
For Aristotle, the three rhetorical situations listed above represent most speaking
situations. Aristotle, however, is most generally known for his three modes of persuasion,
ethos, pathos, and logos. These modes or ‘proofs’ answer Plato’s questions, as found in
Gorgias, regarding the content of rhetorical education. Rhetoric teaches the three ways of
effecting persuasion. “The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the
second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof […]
provided by the words of the speech itself.”86
Ethos is used by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics to mean “moral, showing moral
character.”87 Because Aristotle’s definition of ethics is so closely related to human
flourishing, moral character would mean being generally concerned with eudaimonia.
This goodwill is one of the three characteristics of ethos, the other two being virtue and
phronesis (phronesis is described in depth in the chapter on ethics). Aristotle later
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describes these characteristics as “good sense, good moral character, and goodwill.”88
Ethos opens the door to persuasion as we are inclined to agree with credible people who
want the best for us. Without ethos, the other two modes of persuasion are irrelevant.
Pathos, or the stirring of emotion, is not an emotional manipulation, but an appeal
to intelligent and rational human beings that experience the world. A speaker should
develop knowledge of certain beliefs and feelings that may affect one’s judgment. They
can then move the audience into the “right frame of mind”89 to be able to judge correctly.
Aristotle writes “Our judgments when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as
when we are pained and hostile.”90 Speakers that use pathos to persuade tap into audience
motivations. Aristotle uses anger as an example stating that it is important to know three
things about anger before we can evoke the emotion: the state of mind of an angry
person, the types of people that normally invoke this emotion in others, and typical
reasons people become angry.91
Logos is the third mode of persuasion for Aristotle. Logos refers to an audience
appeal grounded in reason. These appeals usually take the form of a syllogism, which is a
simple three-part deductive logic consisting of a major premise (a general truth), minor
premise (specific example of that general truth), and a conclusion. Aristotle describes the
syllogism in more detail in his Topica. The most famous example of a syllogism is: All
men are mortal (general), Socrates is a man (specific); therefore, Socrates is mortal
(conclusion). In the context of a speech, these syllogisms often take the form of an
enthymeme, which is a shortened syllogism. The above example may sound like this:
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Socrates is mortal because he is a man. In a healthcare setting a persuasive syllogism may
look like this: The normal blood sugar level for an adult is 70-140 mg/dl (milligrams per
deciliter); the patient’s blood sugar is 40 mg/dl; therefore, the patient needs a glucose
tablet. The corresponding enthymeme may sound like this: Give the patient a glucose tab
because his blood sugar is 40.
Aristotle is consistent in his “philosophic approach to the problems of
communication.”92 For Aristotle, logos is always grounded in the truth of the speech
itself, by the enthymemes representing a solid deductive process. Only when pure
deduction fails should we rely on examples and other supporting evidence to convince
our audiences. Aristotle clearly wants to argue from general principles to specific
conclusions. Arguing from examples will shift the argument from deductive to inductive;
thus, will shift the argument to balance on the uncertainty of the inductive leap.93 The
conclusions of induction can be influential, but cannot be stated with absolute certainty
(If the major premise is true and the minor premise is true, then the conclusion must also
be true).
In the remainder of his treatise, Aristotle approaches rhetoric somewhat
scientifically, dividing and examining relevant speech elements and creating rules for
specific situations in order to achieve maximum persuasive effect. He includes a section
on style, arguing primarily for clarity. “Clearness is secured by using words (nouns and
verbs alike) that are current and ordinary.”94 Aristotle discusses the persuasiveness of
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being natural and avoiding the somewhat artificial feeling of an overly artistic speech.
Although not central to his Rhetoric, Aristotle includes advice for the organization or
arrangement of a speech, and offers tips for effective delivery. Furthermore, he
introduces concepts used in contemporary argumentation including common logical
fallacies95 and common topics (topoi) and refutations.96 Throughout his Rhetoric,
Aristotle consistently maintains rhetoric as the delivery vehicle for true knowledge in the
pursuit of justice.
Although rhetoric was born in Greece, it was adopted by Rome and became
central to their liberal arts education. Two early Roman rhetoricians, Cicero and
Quintillian, stand out as solidifying rhetoric as “the system of education in the Roman
Empire.”97 Cicero’s rhetorical writings would, in fact, be cemented in liberal education
for the next 1,800 years.
Marcus Tullius Cicero was Rome’s greatest speaker during the first century B.C.
His intuitive understanding of the people of Rome, supercharged his mastery of public
argumentation theory.98 He is credited with adapting Greek rhetoric to make it more
accessible to Roman orators and more focused on judicial rhetoric than on Greek
deliberation. Often overlooked was his gift of translation. He created Latin terminology
that was “capable of expressing the meaning of the Greek ones.”99 His first attempt to do
this, De Inventione, was admittedly a bit “rough;”100 however, was written when he was
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nineteen years old. One of his major themes from this work was the importance of both
wisdom and eloquence in rhetorical education, echoing both Aristotle and Plato. He
begins his treatise with the following:
I have often seriously debated with myself whether men and communities have
received more good or evil from oratory and a consuming devotion to eloquence.
For when I ponder the troubles in our commonwealth, and run over in my mind
the ancient misfortunes of mighty cities, I see that no little part of the disasters
was brought about by men of eloquence. When, on the other hand, I begin to
search in the records of literature for events which occurred before the period
which our generation can remember, I find that many cities have been founded,
that the flames of a multitude of wars have been extinguished, and that the
strongest alliances and most sacred friendships have been formed not only by the
use of reason but also more easily by the help of eloquence. For my own part,
after long thought, I have been led by reason itself to hold this opinion first and
foremost, that wisdom without eloquence does too little for the good of states, but
that eloquence without wisdom is generally highly disadvantageous and is never
helpful.101
Cicero, like Aristotle and Plato (more in Phaedrus than Gorgias), understood the worldaltering potential of rhetoric, and the importance of grounding eloquence in wisdom.
Cicero, however, is more Aristotelian in his understanding of wisdom. For Romans in
general, wisdom is acquired “through practical experience, expert knowledge, and a sense
of responsibility in both private and public life.”102 Cicero’s understanding of wisdom
shaped rhetorical education in a way that gave special attention to “philosophy, ethics,
and other disciplines important to careful thinking and good government.”103 In addition
to these focal areas, Cicero divided the study of rhetoric into five parts commonly
referred to as the five canons of rhetoric. These are: Invention, Arrangement, Expression
(Style), Memory, and Delivery. These canons are not original to Cicero and can be found
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in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. These five canons can be used to serve each of the three functions
of oratory: to teach, to delight, and to persuade.
Invention, which Cicero calls the most important, is the discovery of valid
arguments. This systematic investigation for arguments draws heavily on philosophical
inquiry and the discovery of proofs. Inventio is also a creative endeavor because each
speech is tailored for a specific audience in a particular historical moment. Thus,
invention involves finding balance between convention and invention.
Arrangement, the second canon, is the organization of the discovered arguments
into their proper order. The goal is to arrange arguments for maximum persuasive appeal.
Classical rhetoricians often used the following organizational order: Introduction (state
your thesis, captivate your audience, and build credibility), Statement of facts (educating
the audience so they can gain context for your argument), Division (this is a transition
between the statement of facts and your first argument that provides a preview of the rest
of your speech), Proof (main body of speech, construction of logical arguments),
Refutation (highlighting weaknesses in the counter-argument), and Conclusion
(emotional summary).
Cicero refers to style as “the fitting of the proper language to the invented
matter.”104 Style does not focus on content, but on how that content is delivered. There
are, in fact, five virtues of style developed in Greece by students of Aristotle and adopted
by both Cicero and Quintilian for use in Roman education. These virtues are: correctness,
clarity, evidence, propriety, and ornateness.
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Correctness refers to the matching of vocabulary, grammar, and usage of words
or groups of words to the conventions of a given language and culture.105,106,107 Similar to
correctness, Clarity refers to the intelligibility of the language. Clear language is not
ambiguous and uses common terminology. Clarity can be aided by other rhetorical
strategies such as repetition.108 Evidence as an element of style does not refer to logical
proofs; it refers to the vividness of the descriptions of events and how effectively the
speech creates emotional affect.109 Propriety, also referred to as decorum, is an element of
style that fits appropriate words to the specific subject matter, audience, and speaker.
Propriety takes circumstances into account. The fifth virtue of style, ornateness, focuses
on the rhythms of words and their aural appeal.110 Developing a mastery of style is an
audience-centric activity that allows an orator to deliver content in an appealing package.
The fourth canon, memory, “is the firm mental grasp of matter and words.”111 The
importance of public oratory in Greek and Roman culture necessitated the exercising and
reliance on memory. Speeches were not given from notes; in fact, the ancient Greeks
often looked down on the act of note taking itself. Plato’s Phaedrus, for instance,
included a warning against relying on the written word:
If men learn this, it will implant forgetfulness in their souls; they will cease to
exercise memory because they rely on that which is written, calling things to
remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of external marks.
What you have discovered is a recipe not for memory, but for reminder. And it is
no true wisdom that you offer your disciples, but only its semblance, for by telling
them of many things without teaching them you will make them seem to know
105
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much, while for the most part they know nothing, and as men filled, not with
wisdom but with the conceit of wisdom, they will be a burden to their fellows.112
Memory, in a sense, is related to Aristotle’s notion of ethos, which encompasses
perceptions of intellect, competence, and dynamism.
There were certain techniques that students of rhetoric would perform to exercise
their memory. These included memorizing long speeches through memory techniques
such as loci, Latin for places. This technique involves the visualization of familiar
physical places within one’s spatial memory, such as the layout of your home. By
‘placing’ elements of your speech in different rooms of your house, one simply walks
through their house to easily recall information. This technique was inspired by the story
of a Greek poet named Simonides113, whom Cicero credits with inventing “the science of
mnemonics.”114 Quintilian also praises Simonides for his ability “to excite pity” in his
writing.115 In addition to remembering existing speeches, speeches are also created to be
memorable using techniques of elaborative encoding with the goal of making
meaningless content meaningful.
The fifth canon, delivery, is “the control of voice and body in a manner suitable to
the dignity of the subject matter and the style.”116 Where rhetorical invention is the
discovery of content for a speech, delivery is the performance of that content. Modern
instruction of delivery usually involves rate, volume, tone, and use of pauses; however,
ancient orators also spent a lot of time studying “movement, gesture, posture, [and] facial
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expression[…].”117 Thus, Greco-Roman political speeches had a much different feel than
contemporary political rhetoric.
In addition to translating Aristotle for the Roman audience and introducing the
five canons of rhetoric, Cicero also argues for the use of humor and that an orator should
be broadly educated.118 For Cicero, great orators are rare. The audience is always of
central concern and so an orator must be in tune with all of humanity, concerning
themselves with the “common practice, custom, and speech of mankind.”119 This
involves the study of philosophy, art, literature, law, history, ethics, and foreign
languages because “it is from knowledge that oratory must derive its beauty and
fullness.”120 In speaking the language of mankind, the orator’s central focus is on the
audience. He does not pander to the ignorant, as Plato suggested in Gorgias.
If Cicero was Rome’s greatest speaker, then Quintilian was its greatest teacher.
Where Aristotle laid the foundation for rhetorical theory and Cicero applied Aristotle’s
theories to the Roman orator in his many important pragmatic rhetorical works, Marcus
Fabius Quintilianus focused on the complete education of the orator. Quintilian, as he is
known, “was placed in charge of the first public school of Rome”121 by the Emperor
Domitian. His most important work, Institutiones Oratoriae Libri XII (12 books covering
the Institutes of Oratory), was nothing short of a complete and systematic review of the
rhetoric to date. Institutio Oratoria is often described as four works in one including “a
treatise on education, a manual of rhetoric, a reader’s guide to the best authors, and a
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handbook of the moral duties of the orator.”122 This “cradle to grave”123 education was
liberal in nature, designed to be “a complete educational [program] for young Romans
who were to become the leaders of the state.”124 These so called citizen-orators would
lead through careful analysis, reflection, eloquent speaking, and decisive action in
situations including “trials, in councils, at the assemblies of the people, in the senate, and
in every province of the good citizen.”125
First and foremost, Quintilian’s orator “had to be a good man, able to speak
well.”126 He uses Cato the Elder’s famous vir bonus, dicendi peritus, or “the good man
skilled at speaking”127 to emphasize the moral component in his definition of rhetoric. To
begin an education with this moral imperative, Quintilian urges parents to be careful with
the people that interact with a child, such as friends and nurses. Parents should also be as
highly educated as possible.128 As Quintilian states in his preface, “Nothing is
unnecessary to the art of oratory.”129 This statement echoes Cicero’s description of
rhetoric. However, Quintilian differs from Cicero and Aristotle in that he focuses
primarily on morality in the education of the orator. Quintilian’s definition highlights
what Cicero implied by uniting wisdom and eloquence. For Cicero, (as well as Socrates,
Plato, and Aristotle) wisdom has an inherent moral quality grounded in truth. This
wisdom, unlike the pure philosophy of Socrates and Plato, burdens the orator with social
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responsibility. The “ideal orator is no philosopher because the philosopher does not take
as duty participation in civic life.”130 Taken together, the works of Quintilian and Cicero
grounded rhetorical education for centuries to come.
Rhetoric, however, nearly lost its foothold during the rise of Christianity and the
fall of Rome. There was a strong disdain for rhetoric by early Christian scholars because
it represented all they disliked about Rome.131 The pagan art of rhetoric had no place in
the delivery of scripture. One proponent of this view was Tertullian who famously wrote
“What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the
Academy and the Church? What between heretics and Christians?”132 It was St.
Augustine of Hippo that famously challenged this anti-rhetoric prejudice with the
publication of De Doctrina Christiana, specifically Book IV. The first three books are
philosophic in nature, focusing on interpreting the Scripture. The fourth book of De
Doctrina Christiana was written nearly 30 years later. It was not completed until 427,
after the fall of Rome in 410.
James Murphy refers to book IV as “the first manual of Christian rhetoric.”133
Yet, perhaps more significant than the how-to nature of the book, is the argument to
which it rebuts. As Murphy states, “it is the fourth book which contains an outspoken
plea for the use of eloquentia in Christian oratory.”134 Augustine acknowledges the
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dangers inherent in empty eloquence,135 even referencing Cicero’s similar warning in De
Inventione of wisdomless eloquence. However, Augustine argues that eloquence is
valuable in promoting evil or justice. He also makes the argument to those that maintain
the idea that eloquence is a tool used by only the wicked by showing that those preaching
lies have the tools of eloquence and the preachers of truth remain “sluggish, cold, and
somnolent.”136 Why should the wicked have the advantage? Here Augustine declares,
“the art of eloquence should be put into active service, and not rejected out of hand
because it is tainted with paganism.”137 Augustine reiterates his point, explaining that
“eloquence is that to be used in teaching, not that the listener may be pleased by what has
horrified him, nor that he may do what he has hesitated to do, but that he may be aware of
that which lay hidden.”138 Simply stated, “the purpose of Christian eloquence is to clarify
obscure points of doctrine, not to make audiences like what they previously disliked.”139
Because of his formal training in classical rhetoric, Augustine understood that
“the audience would not accept the teaching without a speech that was pleasing to the
ear.”140 Augustine also knew that incorporating rhetorical elements, such as the
Ciceronian styles,141 would be an effective tool for converting the people of Hippo to
Christianity. Throughout De Doctrina Christiana, Augustine promotes another
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Ciceronian ideal, that of learning broadly in so far as it helps one interpret Scripture or be
able to relate to members of the congregation. This was a breath of fresh air for a
congregation used to the rather boring, homiletic style. The fourth century “marks a high
point of popularity for the simple ‘homily’ style of preaching.”142 Although Christians of
the early fifth century were expected to leave the pagan rhetoric at the door of the church,
Augustine spent his life trying to convert the people of Hippo to Christianity using all of
the pagan tools at his disposal.
Although there are many similarities between the rhetoric of Cicero and
Augustine, there are many divergences as well. Ciceronian rhetoric focused on individual
achievement, which often led to pride. Augustine’s Christian elocutio subordinated the
rhetorician to the Scriptures. “The Christian orator is above all a teacher who embodies
the Biblical text, whether by using the ‘rule of charity’ to paraphrase the truths found in
Scripture, by simply repeating the actual words of the Bible, or by leading a life of
charity that constitutes a kind of speech without words.”143 Similar to Comargo, Fortin
argues that Cicero valued “persuasion and pleasing the audience over teaching”, where
Augustine values doctrina, or “teaching, as the most valuable duty of Christian
rhetoric.”144
Although Augustine did much to preserve the study of rhetoric, over time the
fundamentals of Greco-Roman rhetoric became disassembled and divided.145 For
instance, rhetoric, which was originally used to develop “persuasive cases through the
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discovery and arrangement of arguments,”146 was associated more with written style as
preparation for preaching. Invention and arrangement were replaced in the educational
curriculum by “dialectic and logic.”147 Rhetoric was no longer the counterpart of
dialectic. For the church, as well as education, rhetoric became dialectic. Elements of the
rhetorical arts could be found in various rhetorical arts, namely, preaching, letter writing,
and poetry.148 Jeffrey Walker149 argues that these changes to rhetoric do not indicate a
decline, but a modification, which he calls a “literaturizing,”150 or changes in style. For
Walker, these modifications do not represent new thinking, but a return to the original
Greek rhetoric, before Rome adapted it for more pragmatic and utilitarian purposes.
Walker argues that poetry, rich with style, was the original form of rhetoric, especially
epideictic, and that Platonic and Aristotolic thinking demoted poetry to study in grammar
(the art of letters).151 The metered nature of poetry served a mnemonic function blending
the canons of style and memory and giving permanence to oratorical creations. Even
written speeches of the day were meant to be read aloud. Written text eventually took
over this role from poetry, and the “mnemonic function of metered discourse was
rendered obsolete.”152 Poetry, with its powerful ability to blend logos and pathos, became
synonymous with only metered verse.153 With this evolution, epideictic rhetoric changes
from poetic in style and form to audience-centric and logos-driven. With poetry no longer
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being taught as part of rhetoric, interest in poetry began to decline, and thus the rhetorical
power of poetry was absent in Roman rhetorical education.
Aside from some slight adaptations “to the needs of their day,”154 classical
rhetorical education remained mostly unchanged throughout the middle ages. The reason
for this may have been that “the political climate which had encouraged such writing in
ancient Greece and Rome simply did not exist in medieval Europe.”155 Murphy reminds
us that “most of the ancient documents dealing with the perceptive tradition continued to
be studied and used throughout the Middle Ages.”156 What is important is not so much
the evolution of rhetoric in the Middle Ages, but that these works were kept alive. In the
schools, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and the Bible were the undisputed, and mostly
unquestioned, expert sources of this period in education, which is referred to as
scholasticism.
Classical rhetoric saw a considerable increase in attention from 1350-1600, where
“assumptions and institutions that had held sway for centuries were radically challenged,
including the Christian worldview and the Catholic Church.”157 In this era, Lorenzo
Valla158 was perhaps the most influential humanist scholar.159 In addition to his
contributions to the Latin language, he helped rhetoric break free from the stagnation of
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scholasticism. He attacks the Aristotelian tradition, namely the overuse of dialectic and
philosophy, and argues that a more Quintilian rhetoric should be the foundation for
education. Valla shows similarity to the ancient sophists in that he explicitly places
eloquence over philosophy. “Philosophy is like a soldier or a tribune under the command
of oratory.”160 Morality, for Valla, came not from philosophy, but from community
standards and rhetoric would guide ethical deliberation.
Towards the end of the Renaissance there was another push towards logic and
dialectic over rhetoric. Instrumental in this shift was Agricola,161 who was interested in
the logical appeals of speech and wrote extensively on argumentation.162 Agricola’s
influence sought to place rhetoric, once again, as synonymous with ornamentation.
Picking up where Agricola left of was Peter Ramus163, who strongly opposed Aristotelian
scholastic education. He proposed “an alternative approach to learning that did not make
reference to authorities such as Aristotle or Cicero at all.”164 He explicitly blames
Aristotle for lacking systemization and for the ongoing confusion between rhetoric and
dialectic, calls Cicero “verbose,”165 and challenged Quintilian for his ignorance of the
fact that eloquent speakers could be evil.166 Because of Ramus’s influence, rhetoric as a
field of study was relegated to the margins of education, namely the study of style.
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Walter J. Ong167 exposes Peter Ramus’s Remarks on Aristotle as incompetent, filled with
falsehoods and misrepresentations, and also unmasks Ramus for attacking Aristotle’s
dialectic “without giving evidence of understanding it.”168
The separation of dialectic and rhetoric had radical consequences when it came to
education. Peter Ramus “may have exerted an even more dramatic influence over
Western education by driving a wedge between reason and language in his effort to
demote rhetoric.”169 With this shift, language becomes a “neutral tool for expressing the
discoveries of other disciplines,”170 and not worthy of study itself. Ong points out that the
entire education system becomes overly simplified and reductive. For example, Ramus
recommends the use of summaries, clear headings, and familiar examples to simplify the
writing and reading processes.171 “Ramus’ streamlined reorganization of the age-old
Western tradition of logic and rhetoric seemed to signal a reorganization of the whole of
knowledge and indeed of the whole human lifeworld.”172 Ong’s claim implies that Ramus
not only changed the definition of rhetoric to include only elocution and pronunciation,
but also affected the whole of human consciousness.
Fast-forward almost two centuries and we begin to see the social and education
effects of Ramist thinking. Italian rhetorician, Giambattista Vico173 writes, “the greatest
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drawback of our educational methods is that we pay an excessive amount of attention to
the natural sciences and not enough to ethics.” He specifically points to that part of
ethical education “which treats of human character, of its dispositions, its passions, and of
the manner of adjusting these factors to public life and eloquence.”174 Vico laments that
the study of politics and human nature has been all but abandoned for the study of
physical phenomena. This results in young men that are “unable to engage in the life of
the community, to conduct themselves with sufficient wisdom and prudence; nor can they
infuse into their speech a familiarity with human psychology or permeate their utterances
with passion.”175 Vico’s assessment of 18th century youths as apolitical, socially ignorant,
and passionless is of no surprise considering Ramus’ reductive agenda.
Vico challenged the status quo of early eighteenth century education by
questioning the very nature of human thought itself. In his New Science, Vico claims that
education systems focus on the natural sciences because “whenever men can form no
idea of distant and unknown things, they judge them by what is familiar and at hand.”176
Because man, out of conceit “makes himself the measure of all things,”177 truth becomes
limited to the perception of human observation. He offers a compelling argument that
“historical method could be just as exact as mathematics.”178 These inquiries led him to
write extensively on poetry and mythology, which give us clues into the origins of human
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language and thinking. Vico’s thought was that “primitive men were necessarily poets
because they possessed strong imaginations which compensated for the weakness of their
reason.”179 The history of these common human arts could give us insight into human
thinking and potentially help us “sort out common sense in a given moment.”180 This
focus on shared human learning, creative thinking, and dialogue was a new, commonground approach to pre-enlightenment education based on learning about human history,
cooperation, and a “willingness to unite fragility of insight with temporal clarity.”181
Vico’s approach was much different than the natural science focus of the late
Renaissance. With emphasis on developing practical judgment, student thinking would be
fundamentally changed. Students would be better equipped to deal with contingency and
lead their communities both practically and morally.
Vico believed that “rhetoric was essential to all the arts and all human ways of
making sense of the world. By means of language, humans have imposed order on a
fundamentally disordered nature.”182 He elevates poetry to a level of importance not seen
since the pre-Socratics. Vico believed that the metaphors and analogies of early man
displayed an innate human ability to discover relationships between seemingly unrelated
things; something that logical deduction alone is unable to do. Human thinking is poetic
in nature; thus, as Jeffrey Walker would later corroborate, rhetoric itself must be
grounded in poetry. A rhetorical education would be centered on “practical decision
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making about matters that did not yield to scientific analysis, issues like law, art, ethics,
and politics.”183 A rhetorical education needed to be education for daily life.
While Vico may have paved the way for rhetoric to reclaim lost territory and
reshape education, social changes in eighteenth century Britain allowed Vico’s vision to
gain traction. To help combat increasing religious skepticism, the churches studied and
applied rhetoric in both their preaching and writing. At the same time a more general
cultural shift from oral to written discourse brought attention back to English prose as a
subject useful for study.184 Perhaps an even greater change occurred in the language of
scholarship. English was replacing traditional Latin, which greatly increased access to
knowledge.185 Those that were excluded from knowledge were suddenly invited into it.
Women were one of the largest benefactors of the shift away from Latin as they were
being admitted to British universities in record numbers.186 Furthermore, eighteenth
century urbanization brought together different English dialects, some more polished than
others. Rhetorical education, thus, included “education in proper diction” and was vital
for personal advancement and upward mobility in British society.
The elocutionary movement, made famous by Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice,
focused on “public manners, poise, and expressiveness,”187 rhetoric’s performative
function. Social performance, specifically speech, was often an indicator of social class;
thus, improving one’s public speaking often translated into improving one’s social status.
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Eventually, the social movement found its way into British education. Thomas
Sheridan188 was an educator of the time who fought for education reform to correct the
“neglect of elocution or rhetorical delivery,”189 especially in the education of preachers.
He laments how often one shamelessly speaks to hundreds of people “in such
disagreeable tones and unharmonious cadences, as to disgust every ear; and with such
improper and false use of emphasis, as to conceal or pervert the sense.”190 Sheridan was
fighting to shift rhetoric, once again, to favor delivery over invention and arrangement.
The rhetorical training he designed entails “facial expressions, gesture, posture, and
movement,” which some saw as an education more in acting than speaking.191 It makes
sense, then that some argued these practices “led to declamation without sincere
conviction and earnest feeling.”192 These arguments echo Plato’s concern that eloquence
without wisdom lead to men being filled “not with wisdom, but with the conceit of
wisdom,”193 or Cicero’s warning that “eloquence without wisdom may frequently hurt
[the state], and can never be of service to them.”194
Rhetoric’s shift may have increased the chasm between dialectic and invention,
but it opened the door for more depth of study in “literature, literary criticism, and
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writing generally.”195 The belletristic movement196 in rhetoric was concerned with
“examining the specific qualities of discourse and their effects.”197
Although the belletristic movement had expanded the scope of rhetoric within
British education by further separating it from dialectic, there were some philosophically
minded rhetoricians devoted to reuniting philosophy and eloquence under the umbrella of
rhetoric. Inspired by David Hume’s198 scientific approach to philosophy, George
Campbell approached both rhetoric and philosophy through a scientific lens. For
Campbell, science was any “organized and rational account of a subject.”199 Therefore,
“all art is founded on science,” as are “theology and ethics,” which he refers to as “the
most sublime of all sciences.”200 Campbell applied new scientific discoveries of the
human mind to the study of rhetoric. In doing so, Campbell developed a scientific theory
of eloquence grounded in his belief that people are moved “only by those ideas it accepts
as truthful and good.”201 He divided up the human mind into different faculties, which
spoke their own languages (i.e. language of logic, language of emotion) and performed
their own functions (i.e. seeking understanding, seeking beauty), and played an
independent role in the persuasion process. Campbell’s scientific theory of elocution
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represents attempts to marry the eloquence of Vico and Sheridan with the Enlightenment
zeitgeist.
Throughout the Enlightenment and subsequent Industrial Revolution, logical
positivism replaced rhetoric as the preferred method to deal with contingency in all
matters. The scientific method that created the industrial world was also making rhetoric
impractical and relatively useless. Observation replaced dialectic as the go-to method for
seeking truth.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, rhetoric was all but obsolete. However,
intellectuals began to witness their beloved logical positivism shape unconscionable
social structures such as fascism in Europe and Russia, and gross social inequalities born
from industrial capitalism. The intellectual community was slowly losing confidence that
the thinking of Hume and Campbell should be applied to issues of human society and
morality. The tools used to study causation in the natural world are not sufficient, nor
appropriate for questions regarding values and human decision-making, human
motivation, and the intricacies of power and politics. As academics searched for a new
logic, attention shifted, once again, towards rhetoric, specifically “argumentation and the
audience.”202 Even scientists understood the role that human motivation plays in
interpreting data, creating institutions, allocating funding, and in formulating theories;203
thus, they too were intrigued by the potential of rhetoric to improve their positions in
scientific debates.
Philosopher Chaim Perelman and Madame L. Olbrechts-Tyteca sought to find a
way to rationally prove moral claims “in a culture in which there are few agreements
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about values.”204 In The New Rhetoric, they elevate the benefits of public argumentation
over reliance on absolute truths, such as God. They also emphasize the importance of
audience. They write that “knowledge of those one wishes to win over is a condition
preliminary to all effectual argumentation.”205 For, the audience and argumentation are
inseparable. Their audience-centric rhetorical perspective focus on three audience types:
the universal audience, encompassing “the whole of mankind;”206 the “single
interlocutor,”207 experienced through interpersonal interaction; and deliberation with the
self. Within each of these audience situations, the goal of the speaker is to “make certain
facts present”208 to a particular audience, or what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call
“presence.”209 The speaker establishes presence by choosing “to emphasize certain ideas
and facts over others, thus encouraging an audience to attend to them.”210 The idea of
presence is similar, in part, to rhetorical magnification.
Through the strategic use of language, a speaker can magnify certain ideas,
bringing them to the foreground of an audience’s thought. This directing, or attuning, an
audience to one idea while necessarily minimizing other ideas, is often called
magnification. Kenneth Burke understood the power of language to direct our thinking.
For Burke, our culture, identity, and our experiences are contained within our language.
Because of its symbolic nature, “language thinks for us;” thus, the words we present or
magnify to an audience shape their thinking as well.
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While Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca focus on the mere presenting of ideas to
audiences, Kenneth Burke sees this presenting (magnification) as a way to identify with
other human beings on a deep level. Burke’s rhetorical perspective is important to
contemporary rhetorical education and will be briefly introduced.
Burke’s Identification and Rhetoric
Burke’s definition of rhetoric places the human animal in motion. Human
actors use words as meaning-laden symbols to induce identification, thus cooperation. If,
then, one wishes to construct social cohesion or cooperation, rhetoric becomes the
primary tool of the social carpenter. It is through the means of rhetorical discourse that
human animals “overcome social estrangement, or, at least, attempt to do so.”211
Therefore, by granting primacy to issues of identification, one confronts the “implications
of division”212 head on.
Burke’s A Rhetoric of Motives considers the “possibilities of classification in its
partisan aspects,” considering all the ways individuals oppose one another, or “become
identified with groups more or less at odds with one another.”213 Indeed, if men were not
at odds with one another, “there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their
unity.”214 Burke claims “Wherever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric. And wherever
there is meaning, there is persuasion.”215 Symbolism, rhetoric, and identification are
intimately linked in the motive of ‘belonging.’ Burke states in A Rhetoric of Motives:
“We are in pure symbolic when we concentrate upon one particular integrated structure
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of motives. But we are clearly in the region of rhetoric when considering the
identifications whereby a specialized activity makes one a participant in some social or
economic class. ‘Belonging’ in this sense is rhetorical.”216 If human beings have a
primary motive to belong, then “people belong to one another through identification,”217
which is accomplished through audience-centered language.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca and Kenneth Burke ground argumentation in the
audience and the symbolic, respectively. “The force of persuasive appeal propels
conviction and response.”218 When negotiating for values, personal and professional
identities, or roles and responsibilities, “context and audience unite”219 as differing sides
move towards mutually beneficial outcomes. Argument in this sense is an ethical
responsibility, one that shapes the culture and environment of a healthcare organization.
The ethical action of healthy argument avoids thoughtlessness by fostering participation
in the process of value construction and decision-making.
Another argumentation theorist, Stephen Toulmin focuses more on argument
structure, specifically on the development and analysis of argument components.
Understanding that different argumentation situations (argument fields) may necessitate
different elements of form, Toulmin isolates six key standards for assessing arguments
that are always present, regardless of the argument context (field-invariant). The six key
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factors of an argument are: claim, grounds, warrant, backing, counter-argument/rebuttals,
and qualifier.220 A simplified version of the model can be seen below:

Figure 1
Simplified Toulmin Diagram

Toulmin’s model acts as a dissection table for an argument in that it allows the isolation
of argument components for close examination and discussion. Scholars can separate
claims from reasons and get a picture of how or if they connect. Additionally, Aristotelian
argumentation works in a rational world with rational decision-makers; however, is
difficult to use in everyday argumentation. Toulmin offers a new way of evaluating the
rationality of everyday arguments without adhering to the strict limitations of the
syllogism.
This brief history of rhetoric is by no means exhaustive; however, it is clear that
throughout its 2,400-year history, it has been controversial. Rhetoric’s five canons have
been shuffled between philosophy, literature, writing, speaking, and even psychology,
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continually asking the questions: What is the place of truth in rhetoric? And, what is the
place of rhetoric in education?
There is power in truth, but only when acted upon; thus, Aristotle believes truth
needs a messenger. There is power in language; and so, Quintilian demands that a good
speaker first be ethical. Burke sees rhetoric as a tool to counter estrangement and connect
to one another. Walker reminds us that we are creative by nature by highlighting innate
human creativity as evidenced by the poetic origins of rhetoric. Because there are few
agreements about values, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca start deliberation not with
moral claims, but with the audience – prioritizing the conversation over winning an
argument.
In the end, rhetoric is a powerful tool for enacting truth. Rhetoric can both help
people gain insight into their thinking and get people to act toward a common good.
Through its reflective and explicative functions, rhetoric provides tools for living in civil
society. Logical positivism and the predominantly natural science focus in healthcare
education is important for understanding the material world but ignores the more human
components of experiencing the world. Vico argues for education that enhances practical
judgment by focusing on shared learning, creative thinking, and dialogue.
The next section will explore current research and writing regarding rhetoric and
healthcare.
Rhetoric and Healthcare
For Cicero, great orators are rare. In speaking the language of mankind, the
orator’s central focus is on the audience, and so, an orator must be in tune with all of
humanity including culture, foreign languages, history, philosophy, art, literature, law,
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and ethics. Although theoretically rational, Cicero’s advice for the aspiring orator does
not seem plausible for the aspiring healthcare professional.
What, then, can we learn from rhetoric that can be useful when applied to
healthcare? Perhaps rhetoric’s utility is in its interdisciplinary nature. Rhetoric as a tool
lives amidst contingency and complexity, two adjectives that are also easily attributable
to most healthcare experiences. Rhetorical study has untapped explanatory power and
offers the opportunity “to reflect on health and medicine’s complexity.”221 A rhetorical
approach to healthcare allows us to analyze the persuasion inherent in most health-related
messaging and most medical encounters. The rhetorical analysis forces us to ask
questions like “’Who is persuading whom of what?’ and ‘What are the means of
persuasion?’”222 in order to increase our understanding of health situations.
Judy Segal223 claims that a rhetorical perspective is helpful in understanding
healthcare as discourse-in-use, as public discourse, as commercial discourse, as
professional discourse, and as discourse of service.224 As previously covered in the
chapter on scientific discourse, the goal of the Royal Society of London was to deanimate scientific language. A rhetorical perspective allows us to identify a persuading
actor, which in this case is the Royal Society of London. Rhetoric also allows us to
consider the motivations for this change and perhaps more importantly the unintended
consequences of this shift in terms of ethics, power, and authorship. For instance, we
learned in chapter two that a more compressed and inaccessible language creates insiders
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and outsiders and therefore legitimate and illegitimate voices within various healthcare
exchanges. Furthermore, a sterile language personifies processes and results (i.e., these
findings suggest…; the results indicate…), which gives precedent to content, namely
form and function, over authorship. With this reprioritization we also see accountability
shift from the person to the inanimate, which also helps explain the elimination of
morality from the discourse.
Segal’s inclusion of ‘discourse-in-use’ reminds us that the language itself acts
surreptitiously, carrying meaning that often predetermines outcomes. “We converse in
this discourse and are persuaded by it into some things and out of others.”225 Segal
illustrates how this persuasive power is present in language when we talk about health.
There are hidden values within our metaphors.
Values and Metaphors
Scholars from sociology, anthropology, history, ethics, nursing, and other medical
fields have addressed values in healthcare by studying specific metaphors.226 For
example, the machine metaphor originating in the seventeenth-century led to healthcare
becoming synonymous with “disease cure.”227 A common counter to the machine
metaphor is the “human being as an organism”228 metaphor. Segal recognizes the
diagnosis is health metaphor common in American hospital and clinical settings. Much
of healthcare today is simply the “administration of diagnostic tests.”229 Additionally,
metaphors of war, sports, and technology and commonly associated with medicine,

225

Ibid., 154.
Ibid., 117.
227
Joan Boyle and James Morriss, “The Crisis in Medicine: Models, Myths, and Metaphors,” A Review of
General Semantics 36 (1979): 261-74, 273.
228
Marlaine C. Smith, “Metaphor in Nursing Theory,” Nursing Quarterly 5 no. 2 (1992): 48-49, 48.
229
Ibid.
226

140

especially in American culture.230 When discussing biomedical discourse, Laurence J.
Kirmayer231 argues that “when values are explicit, they may be openly debated.”
However, metaphor has the power to “smuggle” values into a discourse that proclaims
itself free of values.232 Kirmayer’s warning is that metaphor works beneath the surface,
thus, often avoids rhetorical scrutiny. Therefore, any debate about healthcare takes place
within the language of biomedicine.
Kenneth Burke suggests that “the nature of our terms affect the nature of our
observations,” and that “much that we take as observations about ‘reality’ may be but the
spinning out of possibilities implicit in our particular choice of terms.”233 Burke then
would support Segal’s position that the unquestioned use of biomedical discourse to
discuss healthcare policy predetermines outcomes before the debate begins. Thus,
rhetorical analysis should be used as a way to uncover and analyze these hidden
meanings in the context of healthcare. “Examining metaphor is one way of shifting the
ground of debate – from the values we think about to the values we think with.”234
Segal highlights certain metaphors prevalent in healthcare today, specifically, the
body is a machine, the person is genes, health is diagnosis, medicine is war, and
medicine is business. These are worth exploring in more detail because each metaphor
shapes thinking about health and medicine in different ways.
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The body is a machine metaphor suggests the human body is a collection of parts
that can be fixed or replaced when they are not working properly. Biomechanical
thinking frames our concept of illness as a cause and effect of dysfunctional systems. The
resulting discourse is exemplified by phrases such as ‘run down,’ ‘beat up,’ ‘neglected,’
‘finely-tuned athlete,’ ‘fit as a fiddle,’ and talking about food as ‘fuel.’ Segal also
includes the computer metaphor as a more recent addition to mechanistic thinking. We
often refer to our physical brain as a ‘hard drive’ and the content of our brains as ‘data.’
Brain scientists often teach neuroanatomy by analogizing the brain in terms of neural
processing, levels of programming, information transfer. Neuroscientist, Jill Bolte Taylor,
differentiates the processing of information in the right and left-brain hemispheres as
serial processing (left brain) and parallel processing (right brain).235
Kenneth Burke takes issue with the computer as a model for human thought in
that a computer, being an artifact, not an animal, does not “act.”236 The difference then
between machine thinking and human thinking lies in motives and expression. A
computer moves, but the human being acts symbolically. To convolute the two causes
problems in either mistaking the computer for a human or by treating the human like a
machine. Furthermore, “a mechanical notion of the body produces a mechanical notion of
health care. A society working with a mechanical model of medicine will prefer the sorts
of interventions that are observable and measurable.”237 These observable and
measurable outcomes manifest in another metaphor that has invaded human health,
health is diagnosis. Systemic issues arise when diagnostically-minded health
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professionals and policy makers tend to focus on “health-care policy rather than health
policy.”238 Paul Farmer addresses this issue while treating tuberculosis in povertystricken Haiti. He realized that taking the course of antibiotics was not enough, patient
also needed to eat. Farmer ran an experiment where he treated half of his patients with
only antibiotics and the other half with antibiotics and food. After the treatment course
was completed, all of the patients receiving the drugs and food made a full recovery
compared to only 48 percent of the drug-only control group.239 The body is a machine
metaphor reduces the complexity of a system to its parts. Treating affected parts and not
the whole being creates policy that focuses on the efficiency of the observable. When
diagnosis becomes synonymous with health, the metaphor has fundamentally shaped our
collective philosophy of medicine.
The machine metaphor (as well as health is diagnosis) has become ever more
reductive in a new metaphor, the person is the sum of his/her genes. Genes are often
referred to as our ‘blueprints.’ When the person becomes their genes, health is framed by
a determinism that often shifts focus from the environmental and social factors of health.
Segal differentiates thinking in terms of germs versus thinking in terms of genes where
the former is an attack from outside the body, and the latter an attack from within. Gene
thinking may cause us to feel betrayed by our own bodies.240 The betrayal fuels an
already prevalent mind-body dichotomy which may lead to existential disassociation. We
no longer feel at home in our own bodies, a certain existential homelessness.
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Another manifestation of the machine metaphor surfaces in the way we often
speak of disease as ‘infiltrating’ or ‘invading’ the body. The medicine is war metaphor
can be seen in the way we talk about ‘fighting’ cancer. Cancer is ‘invasive’ and needs to
be ‘detected’ before it ‘colonizes.’ Bodies’ ‘defenses’ need to be ‘fortified’ and
‘strengthened’ to ‘defeat’ the ‘onslaught’ of disease. Susan Sontag adds that “Treatment
also has a military flavor. Radiotherapy uses the metaphors of aerial warfare; patients are
“bombarded” with toxic rays. And chemotherapy is chemical warfare, using poisons.”241
In addition to the context of cancer, the war metaphor is also commonly associated with
terminal illness and euthanasia. Doctors play the role of the hero, fighting against evil.
Death is often seen as defeat.
Once the mechanistic view of healthcare establishes roots, it naturally becomes
sponsored by another pervasive metaphor, medicine is business. While the business of
health can include nutrition, exercise, stress reduction, tobacco cessation, education,
social groups, and brain exercises. The business of health-care includes diagnostics,
pharmaceuticals, and administration (insurance companies, health system administrators,
and intermediaries). Within this metaphor, patients are transformed into consumers of
diagnostics and drugs. An efficient provider is the king or queen of the twenty-minute
visit. Patient education is replaced by the prescription pad.
“The truth is that good health care is uneconomical for the same reason that it is
good business: People who are saved from early deaths live to spend more money on
health care or have more money spent for them.”242 An important goal of any business is
to make money and save money, yet this goal is incompatible with the goals of
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healthcare. For instance, illness prevention causes people to live longer, which means
they will cost the health system more money over time. Economically speaking, “the
cheapest medical consumer is not the healthy person but the dead one. A health-care
system cannot then be motivated by the desire to save money any more than it can be
motivated by the desire to make it.”243
The power of the business metaphor is often overwhelming. Attempting to discuss
policies that focus on health in terms of equality and access are countered by metrics of
cost and ideologies of socialism. The outcomes of any conversation of health are
predetermined by the language of business. Willard Gaylin244 argues that Americans need
to have a conversation about healthcare that includes “the goals of medicine, the meaning
of ‘health,’ who shall live and who shall die (and who shall decide).”245 Only by having
conversations about the covert values that are ever-present in healthcare discourse can we
wake up these “sleeping metaphors”246 and rediscover our concept of health and care.
Despite the efforts of the Royal Society of London to de-animate scientific
speech, there remains power in the words we use in clinical and educational settings.
Understanding the power of the metaphor is important in exposing hidden values and can
be useful in finding new ways to discuss healthcare. For instance, introducing a metaphor
of ‘ecology’ may yield discussions that focus on ‘integrity,’ ‘balance,’ ‘diversity,’ and
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‘conservation.’”247 In addition to understanding the power metaphors have in shaping and
framing health conversations, narratives can be just as influential.

Health Narratives
David Morris248 famously wrote “The delicate balance between biology and
culture, as it alters in a continuous flow, is what constitutes the elusive truth of illness.”249
Narrative reminds us that each health experience is unique and helps to reanimate
individual voices from the purgatory of statistics and applied data analytics. In the social
sciences, narratives are used as a research method to better understand how lived
experiences shape concepts of social reality. Becoming popular in the 1980s, narratives
of illness have often been used in medical sociology and medical anthropology to
highlight the limited scope of biomedical discourse, as well as point out “the role of
culture and society in understanding health, illness, and suffering in everyday lives.”250
An important distinction between disease and illness was made early on in the
applied study of health narratives. Here, disease refers to any “biological dysfunction of
the physical body;”251 and, illness is defined as a “syndrome of experiences, a set of
words, experiences, and feelings which typically run together for members of a
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society.”252 This distinction allows a more interpretive approach to understanding illness
and medicine through a context of culture. This approach assumes that “medicine and
clinical reality itself are culturally constituted.”253 Unfortunately, narrative is rarely used
in diagnosis. Medical decision-making “remains largely rooted to the grand narrative of
medicine and its focus on the body and a single isolable disease.”254
Philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin reminds us that words gain meaning through
context, which may include culture, community, time, place, and the other’s expressions.
The spoken word is always embedded in a history, or chain of ongoing context-rich
moments. Meaning does not originate from abstract sentences out of context. Even
scientific discourse must be viewed as situated in a culture, community, history, and
place of scientific discussion. “Narrative is a fundamental way of giving meaning to
experience. In both telling and interpreting experiences, narrative mediates between an
inner world of thought-feeling and an outer world of observable actions and states of
affairs.”255 Storytelling, then, can be a way to better understand illness in contemporary
social contexts and locate the individual patient within this larger context.
The importance of narrative in the health context lies in existing power
imbalances of clinical encounters. The focus of contemporary medicine is on
pathophysiological deviations from the statistical average. As biological systems become
fragmented, so too does the social, spiritual, and emotional person. What is being
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overlooked is “the impact of socially constructed barriers to functionality and well-being,
whether they are physical, attitudinal, or institutional obstacles.”256 Health practitioners
and researchers have recently recognized “the importance of sociocultural factors in
disease and disability and has developed new standards for knowledge and approaches to
care that draw on the work of social scientists and researchers in the humanities.”257
Shifts towards more humanistic healthcare are often seen as more participatory and often
begin “with listening to patients’ accounts, their stories of what brought them to health
care.”258 A health narratives approach to health research, provider and patient education,
and medical practice may involve “including qualitative analyses of patients’ stories, the
study of published narratives of illness and disability, and clinicians’ narratives.”259
Heeding the words of rhetorician Kenneth Burke, narratives can “immunize us by
stylistically infecting us with the disease,” while at the same time giving us an “allopathic
strategy of cure.”260 For Burke, narrative, being creatively produced by and through
culture, has the power to protect, promote, and restore our sense of well-being.
Two rhetorical tools that have proven useful in healthcare are metaphors and
narratives. A major value of studying metaphors is uncovering hidden value structures in
the words we use. Revealing hidden values in biomedical discourse allows for open
debate about these values. After examining metaphors such as ‘the body is a machine,’
‘the person is genes,’ ‘health is diagnosis,’ ‘medicine is war,’ and ‘medicine is business,’
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it becomes clear how our terminology can often predetermine the outcomes. Health
narratives add meaning through context and shift agency back to the patient and their
families. Narratives gave individual faces to general statistics and reemphasize the
importance of social and environmental factors in health and illness. The next section will
examine applying rhetorical tools to interprofessional healthcare education.
Rhetoric and Interprofessional Healthcare Education
Now that the concepts of rhetoric have been introduced, what can they contribute
to educating future health care professionals about ethical collaborative practice?
Although abundant literature exists at the intersection of health and rhetoric, the literature
focusing a rhetorical lens on interprofessional healthcare education has yet to be
established.
A philosophy of communication approach to interprofessional healthcare
education offers different ways of discovering truths about ourselves, about health, and
about each other. Truth without action, however, does little to improve our community.
Discussing rhetoric in the context of interprofessional healthcare education allows
students to see the benefits of a rhetorical understanding on multiple levels. For instance,
rhetoric can strengthen interprofessional relationships through storytelling and the use of
identification to build common ground and trust; rhetoric can be a tool for strengthening
arguments to test ideas; or, rhetoric can be viewed as having clinical application, such as
in motivational interviewing techniques.
The previous chapters have oriented the reader to thinking about language and
communication as meaningful and constructive. The rhetoricians introduced above have
discussed elements of rhetoric such as context, content, audience, and purpose which are
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still important to identifying with one another and building a shared sense of community.
The importance of rhetoric in interprofessional healthcare education lies in the early
shaping and articulation of values, attitudes, and personal and professional identity.
Because rhetoric is grounded in ethics, and every craft aims at some good, it is
important to contemplate that common good which interprofessional healthcare education
protects and promotes. For example, healthcare professionals are individually dedicated
to quality patient care. Because interprofessional healthcare education focuses on
understanding other professions’ values, roles, communication, and teamwork, we can
assume that interprofessional education protects and promotes respectful and civil
collaboration.
From Cicero we learn the importance of gaining wisdom through a broad
education and practical experience tied to a sense of responsibility. This responsibility
begins with learning to collaborate. Because effective patient care relies on healthcare
teams, and team-based care relies on collaboration between different professions, preprofessional students have a responsibility to learn to collaborate. This can be done in a
number of ways. For instance, students may begin by studying the literature on
interprofessional healthcare collaboration to gain an awareness of the need. Furthermore,
students of different disciplines may study together on a singular topic to gain a better
understanding of different roles within a healthcare team. To further one’s identity
development and orientation to professional roles, students may collaborate in a
supervised clinical context where they learn from healthcare professionals. The direct
observation of effective teamwork demonstrates how different professional skills can mix
to improve patient care.
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Quintilian focused his rhetorical education on observation and imitation as well as
careful analysis, reflection, eloquent speaking, and decisive action, educational capacities
that are vital to all healthcare professionals. Quintilian understood that the best education
begins at an early age in an environment of broad learning in language and culture which
allows one to relate to more people. Thus, early exposure to healthcare professionals
collaborating in their natural professional environment is a powerful pedagogical
strategy.
Rhetoricians live in a contingent world with no clear answers, thus, begin by
contemplating possibilities. These possibilities begin with the context and the audience.
The contingent nature of rhetoric changes our focus on processes that can be mastered to
a focus on content that must be learned. Our eyes must shift from sterile communication
diagrams to history, culture, language, and ultimately the other person. Rhetoricians
attune to the hopes, dreams, desires, motivations, and possibilities of individuals and
communities.
As mentioned above, Aristotle claims rhetoric is useful because truth needs
capable speakers and teachers. Pre-professional health students are charged with
discovering these truths through scientific processes and subsequent analyses of healthrelated data. The responsibility that comes from finding truth is applying it and sharing it
to benefit one’s community. In addition to practicing, healthcare professionals must
always be both teachers and lifelong learners. The ability to teach others, to effectively
share their discoveries with members of their moral community, demands an interest not
just in science, but in people.
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Aristotle also says rhetoric can help speakers identify with audiences. Rhetoric
taps into the innate human motive to belong. Rhetoric can be a tool for identifying, or
showing consubstantiality with others by expressing goodwill, showing competence, and
using audience-centric language. In short, rhetoric can build ethos. There is persuasive
power in our character. We believe people that we like and respect. Elements of ethos
include charisma, intelligence, experience, goodwill, and other personal characteristics
that facilitate trust. A student is more likely to learn about the values and roles of other
professions if their interlocutors are competent and worthy of respect. Without ethos, the
doors to persuasion are closed.
Aristotle also mentions that rhetoric allows one to examine and explicate both
sides of an issue to better see the facts. “Being forced to defend an idea provides an
opportunity to test it.”261 Interprofessional healthcare education allows opportunities to
build habits of advocating points of view from one professional perspective while at the
same time discovering valuable truths in other perspectives. Paulo Freire262 says “To
safeguard myself against the pitfalls of ideology, I cannot and must not close myself off
from others or shut myself into a blind alley where only my own truth is valid.”263
Because dogmatism cripples new learning, this orientation to openness is perhaps
rhetoric’s greatest gift.
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As a focus on competency begins to shape interprofessional healthcare education,
it is important to understand the limits of this approach. Focusing on efficiency, utility,
and competency detracts from the opportunity to discover adjacent histories, cultures, and
narratives. Within this approach is a tendency to predetermine outcomes and domesticate
students. A philosophy and rhetoric approach to interprofessional healthcare education
preserves the curiosity and sense of adventure that comes with meeting the other. It
fosters an openness to learning from the other and relinquishing control – necessary for
effective team-based care.
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CHAPTER 5 : VALUES AND ETHICS FOR INTERPROFESSIONAL
HEALTHCARE PRACTICE
Competency Rationale
The need for interprofessional discussion of values and ethics is in direct response to
the ever-increasing prominence of team-based care. Before this movement, physicians
were the primary health care provider. From the 18th century in England to mid-20th
century America, the physician was part of a professional “community of gentlemen”1
bound by Thomas Percival’s (England) ethical precepts2, which inspired much of the
early code of ethics for the American Medical Association, founded in 1847. Along with
a paternalistic approach to caring for the poor and the sick, the ethical code of the early
AMA focused heavily on intra-professional etiquette, including consultations.3 Decisionmaking in this era was the sole responsibility of the physician with little or no input from
outside their tight-knit community. Pellegrino and Thomasma describe this era as one of
“privilege and condescension,” and admit that this elitist and undemocratic ethical model
persists “among older physicians today.”4 While each specialty has made progress away
from the paternalism of the 20th century, these changes have happened within the
boundaries of each profession. Presently, every healthcare specialty has its own set of
core values, focusing on the common good through a commitment to safety, efficiency,
and effectiveness.5 These assumptions remain somewhat unchallenged. The literature
seems to assume that the values and ethics lie within the idea of a professional identity.
1
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Defining values and ethics within an interprofessional competency pries these concepts
from their individual professions and attempts to create a collaborative value structure
from which to build cohesive healthcare teams.
Traditional, silo-like professionalism is embedded with concepts, values, and ethics
that are specific to one specialty and often conflict with other professions. More recent
approaches to professionalism within the health professions focus more on creating
“public trust.” 6 This idea of trust may be a good foundation for interprofessional values
and ethics, but needs further development. To date there have been three main
approaches to interprofessional health care ethics: (1) virtues in common, (2) cooperation
to provide health care as a right, and (3) relationships grounded in values. We will
examine these three approaches as well as the concept of patient-centered care as a
common goal. A rhetoric and philosophy of communication approach will then be
examined followed by a brief analysis of the different approaches.
Health Care as a Moral Community
One important insight from Pellegrino and Thomasma that was partially inspired
by the work of Alasdair MacIntyre is the conceptualization of medicine, or health care in
general, as a moral community. This assertion is made because “its members are bound
together by a common moral purpose.”7 Thus, in order to achieve this overarching
purpose, there must be some “fundamental rules, principles, or character traits that will
define a moral life consistent with the ends, goals, and purposes of medicine.”8 If we are
to find common ground between a virtues approach to health care and a principles
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approach, it needs to be situated within a community, and the values of that community.
MacIntyre asserts that the detachment of moral rules from a community causes those
rules to “become nothing but a set of arbitrary prohibitions.”9 Therefore, as part of an
inherently moral community, health care professionals have a certain obligation to care
for the sick. Incidentally, as a member of a health care team, in order for individual
professionals to achieve this end, they must also be able to effectively work together.
Pellegrino and Thomasma list three inescapable things that make medicine (and
health care in general) inherently moral. They are: “(1) The nature of illness; (2) the
nonproprietary nature of medical knowledge, and (3) the nature and circumstance of a
professional oath.”10 When a person becomes ill, they find themselves in an
uncomfortable state of uncertainty, dependence, and vulnerability. In a typical sick visit,
the patient reveals intimate and very private physical and psychological information to a
stranger, whom they are required to trust. This relationship has no equivalent outside of
the health care context. Health care professionals are bound by the nature of illness itself
and the trust that is vital to facilitate the encounter. Health care must be, first and
foremost, a community of trust. Additionally, health care professionals have a specific
skill that deals specifically with medical needs. Pellegrino and Thomasma echo Thomas
Jefferson11 when they state, “The existence of a genuine medical need constitutes a moral
claim on those equipped to help.”12 Therefore, there is an unspoken call that those with
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the ability to help have the responsibility to help. The health care community as a whole
has the responsibility to help. This common charge binds the community.
Universal Common Good: Effective Patient-Centered Care
Values and ethics have been discussed as a necessary part of healthcare since
antiquity, but have only recently been discussed in terms of professional competencies.
Recent discussions of the subject have created a virtual consensus among healthcare
professionals that healthcare should first and foremost be patient-centered. This idea of
patient-centeredness was born out of a re-focusing on quality after the IOM’s report
showed quality shortcomings in multiple healthcare areas. Throughout the discussions of
patient-centeredness, there seems to be lacking a conversation of what it means to be
patient-centered. There exists an obvious moral element to the concept, one that
recognizes patients as living beings that experience illness in unique ways and often
require treatment of both body and mind. It is also easy to see how education itself
reinforces a pathology-centered, or population-centered mindset. Students often learn
about the human body by studying cadavers, which desensitizes them to the living
patient13; likewise, they also study population data to understand health trends, enticing
the practitioner to look beyond the individual.
Focusing primarily on the patient brings with it a need to fully understand what
patient-centered care means. Overlooking this essential step has led to superficial models
that lack authenticity. Policies that are touted as fostering patient-centeredness should
“strengthen the patient-clinician relationship, promote communication about things that
matter, help patients know more about their health, and facilitate involvement in their
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own care.”14 These recommendations focus on meaningful, educational, and patientautonomy-focused communication.
To truly focus on the patient also means changing the language in which
conversations are carried out. For centuries physicians have dominated the dialogue about
healthcare. Because patients today are an active part of the decision-making process, and
ethics itself involves decision-making, patient-provider communication must take place
with an a priori conversational ethic. This ethic is one of partnership and collaboration,
one that requires a certain level of empathy and emotional intelligence. This ethic must
also be supported by healthcare organizations that are often efficiency-driven, leaving
little time for patient engagement. Patient-centered care must focus on the quality of both
personal and professional relationships15, and because healthcare teams are increasing in
both size and complexity, quality patient-centered care must also be a focus at the
organizational level.
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Current Approaches
Virtues in Common
The ‘virtues in common’ approach to values and ethics in interprofessional
healthcare education comes from the work of McNair (2005)16 and Stern (2006)17. In
2005, Ruth McNair recognized the trend towards health care teams and understood the
importance of common ethical grounding in the health care teams. She also recognizes
the difficulty of incorporating teamwork and professionalism into the undergraduate
curricula. Some of the challenges are a lack of knowledge about the roles of other
professions, a lack of teamwork skills in general, and differing levels of respect for the
different professions.18 McNair argues that differences in professional ethical codes can
lead to exclusivity, create rivalries, and these divisions are reinforced through curricular
role-modeling in college.19 McNair’s study recommends teaching professionalism and
shared values. She presents interprofessionalism as a value, a value shared by all to better
prepare students for working in health care teams. She also recommends a way to
evaluate levels of professionalism.
David Stern’s Measuring Medical Professionalism is an attempt to evaluate
professionalism, and is also a response to growing mistrust of physicians in the U.S. He
presents cases of unprofessional behavior including misconduct and selfishness and
argues that the remedy is an expectation of professional behavior. What is needed,
according to Stern, is a way for medical professionals to measure and analyze their own
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professional behavior. His book is an attempt to offer a framework to evaluate
professionalism. McNair and Stern both argue for interprofessionalism with common
values as part of college curricula.
This movement was carried forward by the creation of the Interprofessional
Professionalism Collaborative20 who attempt a definition of interprofessionalism:
“Consistent demonstration of core values evidenced by professionals working together,
aspiring to and wisely applying principles of altruism, excellence, caring, ethics, respect,
communication, [and] accountability to achieve optimal health and wellness in
individuals and communities.”21 The definition proposes starting with core values;
however, offers a list of positive, professional traits that lacks in utility when attempting
to design an interprofessional curriculum. For example, how can we build altruism into a
college course?
Cooperation and Equal Distribution
A second approach to values and ethics in interprofessional healthcare education
comes from the Tavistock Group.22 Their report from 1999 proposed five ethical
principles for health care providers to hold in common. These five were later expanded to
seven following a large meeting and subsequent debate in 2000.23 They include:
healthcare as a right, balance between individual care and population-centered care,
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providing comprehensive care, cooperation between all involved, continuous
improvement, safety focus, and openness.24 This idea is similar to McNair’s ‘virtues in
common,’ and acknowledges that ethical codes are usually discipline-specific, but
expands the idea of a health care team to include “everybody involved in health care.”25
This includes those involved in creating and shaping the health care system, those that
work within it, and even those that use it. Some challenges to this approach are that it is
difficult to measure and evaluate certain values. Group proponents suggest that healthcare
organizations consider adopting the seven ethical principles on good faith and view them
as more aspirational and less formal.26
In response to the Tavistock Group’s publication, the Justice in Health Care
Foundation published a list of five ethical principles in 2001. The list includes: health as a
primary goal, access based on need, accountability for everyone involved, health care
system choice, and a focus on education.27 Where the Tavistock Group started from the
viewpoint of the provider, the Justice in Health Care Foundation focuses more on
educating and empowering the patient, arguing that positive change would come from the
users of the system.
Both lists of ethical principles are similar in that they focus on improving
healthcare and that society has an obligation to provide health care based on need. This
inclusion in both lists has direct effects on healthcare policy. This approach to values and
ethics in interprofessional healthcare takes a stand that health care is a human right, and
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that it is everyone’s responsibility to cooperate in order to deliver on this promise. This
approach also includes education, but offers little in terms of pedagogical reform.
Relationship-Centered Values
A third approach to values and ethics in interprofessional healthcare education is
multifaceted, focusing primarily on quality relationships. These relationships include
intraprofessional, interprofessional, and relationships with patients. This approach also
goes beyond relationships to include ethical considerations that may arise when
collaborating on policy and program creation. This third approach is the one favored by
the IPEC because of its focus on quality relationships as they relate to collaborative care.
A focus on relationships brings respect and trust to the forefront, which in turn,
yields collaboration and honors diversity. One proponent of this approach to
interprofessional healthcare education is Jody Gittell.28 Her book High Performance
Healthcare29 seeks to find ways that complex organizations can solve the qualityefficiency paradox, where focusing on one diminishes the other. After studying the airline
industry, she saw something unique in the way the Southwest Airlines coordinated their
communication and their actions. She introduces the concept of “relational coordination,”
which she has shown to be a “powerful driver of both quality and efficiency outcomes.”30
Gittell theorizes that when organizations have high levels of interdependence, their work
is the most effective when coordinated by individuals that have common goals, learn
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from one another and have relationships built on mutual respect. She adds that these
relationships are nurtured by communication that is frequent, timely, accurate and
focused mainly on problem solving, rather than blaming.31 She notices that employees
coordinate fairly well with their colleagues, but not very well with other professions.
Rhetoric and Philosophy of Communication Approaches
The focus of this chapter is the values and ethics of interprofessional health care
education. Most of the research that analyzes the values of health care focuses on the
philosophy of health and medicine, the physician-patient interaction, or the virtues of a
physician. Even the current approaches described above do not adequately conceptualize
values before using the terms. For instance, both McNair (above) and Stern (above)
recommend teaching and evaluating professionalism and shared values; however, neither
acknowledges different meanings of professionalism. From the earlier section (from the
introduction) on professionalism we learn that each profession evolved with a focus on
differentiating themselves from the other professions (and non-professions). Even the
term ‘values’ is almost too vague to be useful, especially in a time of increasing plurality
among health care workers in the U.S. Another group concerned with the values of
interprofessional care, the Tavistock Group (above), proposes ethical principles to hold in
common. How is this different than a focus on professionalism? What exactly are
principles? And how do they become grounded and productive in acts of healing?
Finally, Gittell’s (above) focus on relationships makes sense, but are her values in
contrast to those of McNair, Stern, and the Tavitock Group? These questions imply that a
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deeper understanding of ethics and values is needed before we can discuss the values of
interprofessional health care education.
One can approach discussions of values and ethics from a number of established
frameworks. We could approach ethics from a deontological perspective, which would
establish ethical codes for interprofessional practice. Within this approach we find moral
concepts such as the ‘Golden Rule,’ or perhaps Immanuel Kant’s “categorical
imperative.”32 Another approach could be consequentialism, a ‘the end justifies the
means’ perspective that subjugates methods. The philosophy of Machiavelli and the
utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill would fall somewhat under this
approach to ethics. Pragmatists, such as John Dewey and Charles Sanders Peirce, argue
for a pragmatic ethics that treats ethics in a similar way to science, that principles and
morals can be refined and improved through scientific inquiry. Finally, ethics can be
approached via the classical virtues, which focus on individual character. A study of
virtue ethics usually begins with the contrasting views of Plato and Aristotle. Plato views
virtues as ends in and of themselves, while Aristotle sees virtues as means to pursue the
common good. Historically, these approaches to values and ethics have been posed as
competing frameworks; however, there are areas of overlap that will be briefly discussed.
This rhetoric and philosophy of communication approach to ethics and values will
begin with an analysis of virtue ethics alongside other ethical traditions and will attempt
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to respond to some of the underlying themes mentioned above (current approaches
section) so as to enter the established conversation. The conversation will then be
directed towards a response to Gittell (above), and her focus on ‘relational coordination’
grounded in respect and having common goals. Her approach opens up a discussion of
relationship building through respect for others. Finally, the above approaches include the
concept of interprofessionality as a virtue in and of itself. Fritz’s work on professional
civility acts a nice supplement to this train of thought.
The Virtue Tradition
The virtues can be traced back to Ancient Greece. Socrates believed that there
was only one virtue, the virtue of knowledge,33 a concept defended by University of
Pittsburgh philosophy professor, John McDowell. McDowell calls virtue a capacity for
perceiving how one should act. This “perceptual capacity” is the only true virtue; all
others are merely “specialized sensitivities,”34 a sentiment consistent with the ancient
Stoics. Plato shares the Socratic sentiment that virtue is an end in itself. Differing from
the Socratic mono-virtue system, the Republic includes the Four Cardinal Virtues. These
virtues (also used also in traditional Christian teaching via Cicero, St. Ambrose, and St.
Thomas Aquinas35) included Prudence, an ability to judge time-appropriate actions,
Courage, or the strength to confront and endure one’s fears, Temperance, which includes
self-control, moderation, and sexual restraint, and the most important of the Four
Cardinal Virtues, Justice, or fairness and righteousness.

33

Plato, Meno, trans. W.R.M. Lamb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library),
1977).
34
John McDowell, “Virtue and Reason,” The Monist 62 no. 3 (1979): 331-350.
35
Perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of the Christian virtues can be found in the Summa
Theologiae and the Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics written by St. Thomas Aquinas between
1265 and 1274. These were often used as instruction manuals for theology students in the Middle Ages.

165

Professor of communication and ethicist Ronald C. Arnett asserts that
communication ethics center around choice and choice begins by protecting and
promoting a given good.36 The question becomes ‘How can we determine this good?’ An
Aristotelian concept of ethics is echoed in the first sentence of Nicomachean Ethics:
“Every craft and every inquiry, and similarly every action and project, seems to aim at
some good; hence the good has been well defined as that which everything aims.”37
Aristotle’s definition of the “good,” thus, is fundamentally teleological. Taken alone, his
definition is circular and less than helpful. MacIntyre’s comment: “In ethics we are
guided by general considerations to general conclusions, which nonetheless admit of
exceptions.”38 MacIntyre’s exceptions only add to the confusion. MacIntyre includes
concepts of courage and wealth generally being good, but in certain instances leading to
destruction. Therefore, judgments about a given context become an important element of
ethics. What becomes clear in both Aristotle and MacIntyre (not so much in Socrates and
Plato) is that virtues require context; thus require phronesis.
Differing from both Socrates and Plato, Aristotle views the virtues not as ends,
but as means to personal and public fulfillment. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle
searches for the final end of which all action is directed. He argues that this final end,
first, must be chosen for its own sake and never as a means to some greater end, and
second, the concept can not be used except for a final end. Aristotle concludes that
eudaimonia, poorly translated as ‘happiness’, but with an intended meaning closer to
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‘human flourishing,’ is this end, the highest human good, and an answer to his famous
question, “What is a good life?” Aristotle sees this ‘happiness’ as activity of the rational
personality, which he calls the soul, in harmony with virtue. He breaks this rationality
into intellectual virtues (wisdom, intelligence, prudence) and moral virtues (liberality,
temperance). Virtue is a result of education and practice, and centers on situational
knowledge and understanding of the mean (the middle ground between two extremes).
MacIntyre explains:
What is courage in one situation would in another be rashness and in a third
cowardice. Virtuous action cannot be specified without reference to the judgment
of a prudent man – that is, of one who knows how to take account of
circumstances. Consequently, knowledge of the mean cannot be knowledge of a
formula, it must be knowledge of how to apply the rules to choices.39
Therefore, if virtue is an understanding of how to apply the mean to given situations,
virtuous action would have to be the end product of profitable practical reasoning. He
lists courage, temperance, ambition, friendliness, and modesty (among others) with the
virtue of each being a “golden mean” between extremes. Aristotle also lists intellectual
virtues, which deal with the mind. He lists intelligence (nous), science (episteme),
theoretical wisdom (sophia), craftsmanship (techne), and most importantly practical
wisdom (phronesis). Aristotle states, “As soon as he possesses the singe virtue of
practical wisdom, he will also possess all the rest.”40 Aristotle’s idea of phronesis is used
by both Pellegrino and MacIntyre and so warrants further discussion.
Phronesis is rhetorical in nature because it is most useful when there are choices
with no clear answers. In this way phronesis is different than both nous (understanding
fundamental principles) and sophia (ability to reason from fundamental principles).
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Phronesis is also action-oriented, and so it differs from techne, which deals with
products. In this distinction we are reminded of Pellegrino’s differentiation between
science and ethics – one is dedicated to the material world (science and techne) while the
other deals with reasoning amidst contingency. Science has an end other than itself, i.e. to
cure a chronic illness. Both virtue ethics and phronesis deal with actions as ends in
themselves.
In a way, Aristotle’s elevation of phronesis to the top of his list of virtues shows
more commonality with the pragmatism of Dewey, than it does with the deontology of
Kant or the consequentialism of Bentham and Mill. Phronesis allows the moral virtues to
be developed contextually and relative to an individual living in a distinct historical
moment within a concrete situation. Alasdair MacIntyre agrees saying that virtues have to
be born from the specific community in which those virtues will be practiced. He points
out the similar root ethics has to ethos, which refer to character traits that represent ideals
for a particular community. Simply put, virtues have to be grounded in a particular
historical moment at a particular place. Author and former Cambridge lecturer, John
Casey,41 describes phronesis as “the ability to ‘see’ what is at stake where the application
of rules may not be at all obvious, and to know how to respond.” Casey elaborates, “It
can go beyond knowing how to act. We can think of the man of practical wisdom as
having moral imagination.”42 Casey’s explanation reveals even more similarity to
rhetoric in the importance of inventio, the first of the five canons, centered on discovery
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and creativity. We can now begin to see ethics and morality as ‘acts’ that require both
philosophy and rhetoric.
In addition to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, other thinkers have offered their own
lists of virtues. MacIntyre recognizes Homer as offering virtues in his Iliad and Odyssey.
Homer’s virtues include hospitality, physical power, courage, cleverness, and most
importantly excellence. Like Aristotle, these virtues, while intrinsically important in
themselves, are means to achieve eternal glory, the greatest accomplishment one could
attain. Eternal glory is Aristotle’s eudaimonia. For Christians, the immortality of ‘eternal
glory’ is realized by admittance to heaven, accomplished by avoiding sin (listed in the ten
commandments and the seven Deadly Sins) and practicing the seven Principal Virtues,
which are the Four Cardinal Virtues (listed above) and the Theological Virtues: faith,
hope, and love.43 The Principal Virtues are often listed as humility/modesty,
generosity/charity, kindness/gratitude, patience/compassion, chastity/purity,
temperance/moderation, and diligence/fervor. Five of the Principal Virtues overlap with
Aristotle’s moral virtues: modesty, liberality and magnificence, friendliness, temperance,
and ambition. In Aristotle we do not find patience or purity, but we do find the
intellectual virtues. As we continue the discussion of values and ethics in
interprofessional healthcare education, we shall draw both from the ancient world as well
as Judeo-Christian concepts of virtue. One main insight gained with the previous
discussion is that the ‘care tradition’ in health care, or an ‘ethics of care’ (as opposed to
an ethics based in virtue) is based in virtue; in fact, four of the seven Principal Virtues
were elaborated by St. Ambrose by connecting the beatitudes to the Four Cardinal
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Virtues found in the Republic. In fact, Ambrose is credited with retrospectively coining
the term Cardinal Virtues, where the Latin cardo refers to a hinge (door hinge). The
virtues, for St. Ambrose were, in a sense, the hinges of a moral life.
The virtue tradition is not new to health care. Both Greek and Judeo-Christian
concepts of virtue have been used. For the Greeks, virtue lies within the individual actor,
while, virtue for Judeo-Christians focuses heavily on relationships. Dedicating much of
his career to interdisciplinary collaboration and the contemplation of virtue ethics in
medicine, Edmund Pellegrino44 may be the perfect cardo to start our discussion.
Edmund Pellegrino: The Virtues in Medical Practice
Professor of medicine and bioethicist, Pellegrino argues for a return to virtue
ethics as a norm for medical practice.45,46 Pellegrino necessarily differentiates science
from ethics. “Science, that is, the use of the scientific method, tends to confine itself to
the physical and perhaps psychological dimensions of human existence.”47 He places
ethics in the “realm of what it is we ought to do and ‘ought’ carries with it the notion of
responsibility, accountability, and how we reason about a moral question.”48 This line of
thinking allows Pellegrino to definitively place ethics under the umbrella of philosophy
“because it uses the methods of philosophy, i.e. moral contemplation on all aspects of
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human existence.”49 Although definitional, Pellegrino’s distinction is key to
understanding ethics as a completely different way of thinking, rather than the role of
ethics within the sciences, such as in the ‘ethical sciences’ of George Campbell. This
simple distinction opens the door for truly interdisciplinary work in the fields of
philosophy and ethics.
Pellegrino’s understanding of virtue ethics focuses on excellence of character that
is teleologically oriented, rational thought over emotivism, and phronesis refined through
practice.50 Although Pellegrino’s ethical prognosis is heavily Greek-influenced, he adds,
“virtue cannot stand alone but must be related to other ethical theories in a more
comprehensive moral philosophy than currently exists.”51 Although Pellegrino does not
apply virtues specifically to environments of interprofessional collaboration, his intuitive
respect for plurality makes him a logical segue into discussions of virtues in the health
professions.
In Pellegrino and Thomasma’s The Virtues in Medical Practice, they list eight
virtues they believe to be important to medicine. They use the term ‘virtue’ throughout
the text as a “habitual disposition to act in a certain way […] that facilitates and enriches
the telos or purpose of whatever human acts we perform.”52 They list (1) fidelity to trust,
(2) compassion, (3) phronesis, (4) justice, (5) fortitude, (6) temperance, (7) integrity, and
(8) self-effacement. Each virtue will be briefly discussed as it relates to health care
environments.
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Trust
“Trust is most problematic when we are in states of special dependence.”53
During these states of vulnerability and dependence, we often have no choice but to trust
health care professionals. Trust allows us to avoid complexity. “No professional can
function properly without discretionary latitude […] to limit that latitude is to limit the
capacity for good as much as it may limit the capacity for harm.”54 Patient autonomy and
the elevation of the contract are direct responses to a deterioration of trust. Medical
decision-making exists in a word of contingency. Contracts, such as a living will, cannot
predict these contingencies, and in many cases limit the “discretionary latitude”55 of
decision-makers. On the subject of replacing relationships with contracts, Pellegrino and
Thomasma state, “A dialogical relationship is much better than a physician-paper one,
since one’s course of illness resembles a drama in which changes may take place daily.”56
This trust applies to both individuals and institutions. Institutions are systems that
function within certain restraints. System trust becomes even more important with teambased care. The virtue of trust must belong to entire health care team. Taken further, there
must be trust in the educational institutions and credentialing agencies as well. The
‘system trust’ becomes trust in the health care system in general. In sum, without the
virtue of trust the health care professional (or any professional for that matter) cannot
achieve its telos.
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Compassion
Compassion as a virtue can be characterized by the habitual disposition to act
towards “healing, helping, and caring for someone who is ill.”57 Often compared to the
Christian virtue of charity, compassion is different in that it has an intellectual as well as
moral component. Compassionate individuals have an ability to tailor caring and healing
to specific patients, and, to a certain extent, to suffer with them. This aspect of
compassion makes it truly phenomenological and completely “embedded in a personal
dynamic relationship.”58 Because the ends of health care (healing, helping, and curing)
are “defined in terms of the patient’s good, which consists not only of the medical good,
but also the good as the patient perceives it herself, or her good as a human person or
spiritual being.”59 Compassion, then becomes an attunement to another’s unique
situation, an opening up of oneself to understand and assist with the emotional, social,
spiritual, personal, and physical illness experience. In Being and Time, Martin
Heidegger60 gives a name to the phenomenon of being. He calls this Dasein. Dasein
always has stimmung, German for mood, but not just mood in general, a particular mood.
The word also means tune, or attunement, often used in music to describe a matching of
vibration or frequency. Here, the language of phenomenology can allow us to understand
compassion as attunement of one person to another. Heidegger claims that our moods and
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attunements create an existence that is “never the same from day to day,”61 and although
limiting, it is this moodiness that opens the world to us, makes it accessible. This is
helpful in understanding compassion, a dynamic attunement to a particular being that
cannot be measured, only experienced.
Phronesis
Phronesis, prudence, or practical wisdom is an intellectual ability to understand
what action or means should be taken in a particular situation that would be most
conducive of the good. Unlike pure wisdom (sophia), phronesis is action-oriented, yet
always moving teleologically toward the good. The specific good for a health care
professional is “a right and good healing action for a specific person.”62 Phronesis, as a
compass, keeping the other virtues pointed toward this end. This action orientation makes
phronesis vital to health care. Phronesis helps to balance the other virtues, such as respect
for persons where too little may lead to paternalism and too much undermines the
provider’s expertise. Unlike the attunement of compassion, caring for another human
being is an activity, a practical initiative that requires not only moral components, but
techne, or technical knowledge (knowing how to do something) as well. The contingent
nature of illness immerses the caring and healing processes in a perpetual state of
judgment and decision-making. Thus, if we view rhetoric as an art of decision-making in
complex, uncertain situations, then health care is inherently rhetorical. Phronesis grounds
the tools of rhetoric in a philosophy of the good.
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Justice
Concepts of justice often vary across different cultures, but are often discussed in
the context of three domains: individual actions, legal actions, and public policies.63
Aristotle breaks the three domains into two types of justice. The first he calls “universal”
justice referring to “justice as a whole.”64 This broader concept of justice is applied to
individual morality and impacts on other people. The second type deals with “particular”
justice65 and can be applied to both legal and political situations in more specific
contexts. Justice as a virtue often falls into the category of ‘justice as a whole.’ Plato
defines justice as a cardinal human virtue that harmonizes reason, spirit, and appetite.66
Both Plato and Aristotle acknowledge the legal aspects of justice, but focus mainly on the
philosophy of fairness and balance. Justice can be applied to the individual, or it can be
applied to the polis as harmony between different parts of the state. This is evident in the
writings Augustine who looks to the heavens for his definition of justice. In City of God
Augustine refers to justice as loving God and ruling oneself and the state in accordance
with the laws of God. Justice becomes the main difference between the ideal and nonideal political states.67 Mahatma Mohandas K. Gandhi, famous for his philosophy of nonviolence, says that “action alone is just which does not harm either party to a dispute.”68
Gandhi’s non-violent sentiment blends with Augustine’s Christian interpretation of
justice in the writings and teachings of Martin Luther King, Jr. King echoes St. Thomas
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Aquinas when he writes, “a just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law
or code of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law.”69
King calls people to “constructive nonviolent tension” using “the method of nonviolence
[that] is based on the conviction that the universe is on the side of justice.”70 His call to
action is based on a warning that “injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”71
Justice is definitionally simple, but as a traditional virtue, is pragmatically
complex. The complexity lies in the fact that this virtue has no mean; there is no
appropriate amount of justice. This characteristic of justice is the root of its complexity.
Rendering to others what they deserve is an all or nothing affair. Most applications of
justice to health care have focused on the costs of health care and access to health care.
Applying the virtue of justice to interprofessional practice makes sense if only that health
care professionals work within a community and justice is a requirement for peaceful
community. For St. Augustine72 justice is rooted in love and ‘true justice’ can only exist
in the City of God. We can only compare communities relative to one another. According
to Augustine, without justice (which cannot exist on earth) we are left only with “gangs
of criminals on a large scale.”73 Augustine’s unattainable earthly justice implies a natural
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inclination towards selfishness. Thomas Hobbes74 captures the natural state of societyless humans beings in De Cive (and later in Leviathan) when he writes the famous phrase
bellum omnium contra omnes, or “the war of all against all.”75 Within the health care
community, Augustine and Hobbes offer warnings regarding justice. Whether we believe
human beings to act altruistically or not, it is hard to argue against the importance of
fairness in the workplace. If one professional or one profession within a specific health
care community takes more than their/its fair share of credit, compensation, status,
power, autonomy, etc. there will be feelings of injustice – and the peace must be restored.
Fortitude
Fortitude is often thought of as similar to courage, but contains moral as well as
physical attributes. As Plato noted, evil people can be courageous.76 One’s willingness to
suffer physically or emotionally for the sake of a greater good characterizes the virtue of
fortitude. St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Aristotle capture elements of fortitude
in their characterization of courage as a steadfastness. Aquinas notes that “pleasurable
good and oppressive evil constrain a man to abandon reason,” but for those with fortitude
will be “accorded greater praise in proportion to the pressure he withstands, which would
force him to fall or retreat.”77 Pellegrino and Thomasma apply fortitude to health care
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referring to it as inspiring confidence that health care professionals will be resistant to
“temptation to diminish the patient’s good through their own fears or through social and
bureaucratic pressure, and that they will use their time and training resourcefully to
accomplish good in society.”78 Additionally, a shift to ‘the patient as a consumer’ brings
with it the temptation to shift responsibility away from the provider and their “moral
obligation.” It requires fortitude to “face adversity and yet bring about the good.”79
Applied to interprofessional practice, fortitude can be characterized as recalcitrance to
agnosticism, or moral grit during interprofessional disagreement, especially amidst power
inequalities or conflicts over roles and responsibilities.
Temperance
Discussed by Plato in Charmides, the Greek word sophrosyne, or temperance is
often used synonymously with self-control, restraint, or modesty; yet, a closer definition
from the Platonic dialogue may be self-knowledge, knowing what you know and what
you do not know, and the subsequent virtue of not being something that you are not.80 In
Gorgias, Plato also refers to temperance as a general health of the soul.81 The dialogues
between Charmides, Critias, and Socrates also hint at elements of respect, openness,
modesty, and humility within temperance. To clarify, temperance is knowing what you
know, but also being open to learn from those that know what you do not know. We can
see this clearly in the Greek sophos, meaning wisdom, as the root of sophrosyne. In this
respect, temperance is vital to healthcare education (as well as IPE) as the conceit of
wisdom, hubris, and arrogance, often lead to professional incivility and patient harms.
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The current health care environment is making it harder for physicians and surgeons to
develop what is commonly referred to as the ‘God complex.’ Easy access to medical
information online has given patients the confidence to question their health care
providers and demand more individual solutions to their unique conditions. In an
exchange of power and hubris, the information revolution may be beneficial in
countering the God complex; however, may have the reciprocal effect of allowing
untrained patients to claim medical expertise.
Integrity
Integrity as it pertains to health care can be approached in two distinct ways. The
first deals with the integrity of persons and the second focuses on the person possessing
integrity. In the first sense, integrity is the equivalent of health. A person with integrity is
balanced physically, mentally, and intelligently. Illness disrupts this balance and alienates
one from their body. “The sick body or mind rebels against the whole. The self itself
becomes fractured,” threatening one’s sense of identity.82 Integrity of the person can also
be seen as integrity of values. If we see a particular person as defined by the sum of their
values, it is quite possible that those values may be in contrast to those attempting to heal.
When a person is ill, then, they are at risk of having their core values challenged. This
vulnerability of values was the impetus for the movement towards patient autonomy. The
underlying assumption in this shift is that “to usurp the patient’s human capacity for selfgovernance is to violate the integrity of her person.”83 This desire for autonomy by the
patient is always countered by the healer’s own integrity/autonomy. This healer/patient
tension of competing integrities is a wonderful example of Baxter and Montgomery’s
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Relational Dialectics84. At the center of their theory are dialectical contradictions formed
during the “dynamic interplay between unified oppositions.”85 Relational dialectics are
present in all relationships; thus, for the patient/healer relationship, the patient has a
desire for privacy while the healer has a desire for transparency (albeit one-sided) and a
certain level of submissiveness (taking a full course of medication even though the
patient may not understand the rationale). Interprofessional relationships also have
dialectical contradictions. A new nurse practitioner may desire autonomy and freedom,
while at the same time depending on the collaborating physician. This
dependence/freedom contradiction can be seen as a necessary and healthy tension.
Integrity can also be approached from the ‘person of integrity’ perspective.
Different than the ‘integrity of persons,’ which focuses on balance and autonomy, this
approach focuses on the character of the healer, namely, their ability for thoughtful
interpretation and application of principles, such as a patient’s autonomy, during the
extent of the healing relationship. The burden of responsibility shifts back to the healer,
who must take the patients’ values into consideration when making decisions. Thus, the
issue of trust reappears as being central to the relationship. From this perspective, the
virtue of integrity implies a certain predictable “intellectual honesty.”86 Although the
virtue of integrity lies within the healers, decisions should be made primarily with the
interest of the patient.
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Self-Effacement
Pellegrino and Thomasma include self-effacement as the final virtue important to
the practice of medicine. Self-effacement refers here to a sort of modest selflessness. A
health care professional that places the needs of a patient ahead of his or her own needs
possesses this virtue. Self-effacement counters self-interest. Because self-effacement is
inconspicuous, it may be difficult for patients to see. Perceptions of care as a commodity
lead to a fear that health care prioritizes financial interests over their own. This fear of
self-interest leads to increased desire for patient autonomy, to protect the voice of the
patient. Self-effacement reclaims trust and grants the healer more latitude in health care
decision-making.
Self-effacement is central to the concept of a profession. “A profession is […] a
way of life in which expert knowledge is used not primarily for personal gain but for the
benefit of those who need that knowledge.”87 The French philosopher, August Comte88,
weaves together the concept of self-effacement with the concept of altruism to create
what he calls “altruistic beneficence.” The idea of beneficence, from the Latin
beneficentia, meaning kindness, generosity, and charity, has been central to medicine for
some time. For Hippocrates, beneficence was the first principle of medicine. Beneficence
refers to an obligation or duty to act in the best interest of others. The ‘principle’ of
“altruism” was coined by Comte as a direct counter to self-interest. These terms, although
similar, differ in that one (beneficence) stems from a sense of duty, while the other
remains voluntary. That said, health care providers that are part of a professional
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framework could not be altruistic in that they are already obligated by a professional code
of care. Comte, by combining this moral obligation with a voluntary decision (or
predisposition) to go beyond what is expected, comes close to a more comprehensive
understanding of self-effacement.
The idea of beneficence as a virtue was, for the most part, unquestioned
throughout antiquity and the medieval period. Virtue ethics was not really challenged as
an ideology until the late 15th century. Niccolò Machiavelli89 lived in a time of war and
tyranny, where a virtuous life had little practical value. Self-effacement, for instance,
could get you killed. Instead, he viewed virtue as an “expression of power, rather than a
disposition to act well.”90 Machiavelli’s concept of virtue inspired the physician Bernard
Mandeville91 who believed that society prospers through “greed, the desire for luxury,
pleasure, and power.”92 In the 19th century, Friedrich Nietzsche sees the virtues as
meaningless and impediments to achieving greatness. For the Uebermensch, virtues
become vices.93 A little less than a century after Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes took a
different approach to virtues when he distanced them from theology and grounded them
in a pessimistic naturalism. For Hobbes, virtues were not the vices of Machiavelli and
Nietzsche; virtues were tools of self-interest. Hobbes begins with an assumption that man
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is not a social animal, a clear break from the Aristotelian mantra that man is, at his core, a
social animal.94 For Hobbes, society “is either for gain or glory: not so much for love of
our fellows, as for love of ourselves.”95 Hobbes sees man as primarily selfish, motivated
by survival and pleasure. Virtues, however, can be used to attain these primary motives.
Self-effacement is an unnatural condition because it allows us to become vulnerable to
others.
Applied to health care education and professional practice, we may assume that
any healthcare organization operated ‘tyrannically,’ whether through dictatorship or
bureaucratic hierarchy, will learn to see the virtues as vices. Self-effacement becomes a
liability and self-promotion becomes necessary for survival. “The Machiavellian and
Hobbesian strains are the heart of today’s moral malaise and cynicism which seeks to
give moral legitimacy to the professional’s self-interest.”96 On the other hand, health care
organizations operated as interdependent systems, modeled after democratic society, will
foster a more Aristotelian view of the virtues.
Pellegrino points to two guiding figures in the field of virtue ethics that have
inspired his thinking: Cambridge University Professor of philosophy, Elizabeth
Anscombe, and Notre Dame Professor Alasdair MacIntyre. Because of his thorough
historical and interpretive treatment of virtue ethics, the next section will focus heavily on
the works of Alasdair MacIntyre; however, Anscombe’s ideas regarding intention and
consequentialism will texture this discussion.
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Alasdair MacIntyre: After Virtue
Because virtues guide decision-making, it becomes important to understand, not
only virtue as a concept, but also how deductive logic informs present day disagreement.
Alasdair MacIntyre follows a similar line of questioning at the beginning of After Virtue.
Fundamental to MacIntyre’s ethical theory is that ethics is a branch of philosophy (see
Pellegrino’s distinction between science and ethics above). After placing ethics firmly
under the umbrella of philosophy, MacIntyre asserts that context (history, culture,
situation) is fundamental to philosophy (and therefore to ethics); however, academic
history carries with it the taint of the modern world. Therefore, because we cannot trust
academic history as an unbiased starting place, MacIntyre attempts, primarily, to
understand the very nature of moral disagreement in the present moment. He argues that
disagreements today “go on and on and on” and never end. He calls these disagreements
“interminable.”97 He isolates three main characteristics of common disagreements that
lead to their interminable nature.
First, despite arguments being valid, that is, conclusions follow deductively from
the premises, the premises themselves contain incommensurable concepts. The
conclusions, then, are conceptually different as well. MacIntyre illustrates the process of
arguing about conclusions to arguing about premises, which then become “pure assertion
and counter-assertion.”98
MacIntyre’s second characteristic of disagreements in the present moment is that
they have the appearance of “impersonal rational arguments and as such are usually
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presented in a mode appropriate to that impersonality.”99 Arguments appear to be
objective. To answer the question, ‘Why should I act in this way?’ is both rhetorical and
philosophical in nature. It is rhetorical in that it involves the motivating tools of
argumentation, and philosophical because it involves the metaphysical. ‘Because one
should act from duty, or fairness, or liberty, or efficiency, or because acting will bring
pleasure to the masses’ “presupposes the existence of impersonal criteria”100 that
‘appears’ independent of personal preference. Combined with the first characteristic, we
see a digression to arguing premises while presupposing objectivity. Thus, interminable
disagreements.
MacIntyre’s third characteristic of modern-day disagreement is that concepts are
used out of context. “Moreover, the concepts we employ have in at least some cases
changed their character in the past three hundred years; the evaluative expressions we use
have changed their meaning.”101 MacIntyre offers ‘virtue,’ ‘justice,’ and ‘piety’ as
examples of concepts that are not used the way they were during another historical
moment. The observation that moral argument is treated simultaneously “as an exercise
of our rational powers” and also as “mere expressive assertion” leads MacIntyre to argue
that “the language of morality passed from a state of order to a state of disorder.”102 This
presents a major obstacle for contemporary moral philosophy that is only exacerbated by
the ahistorical teaching of moral philosophy as competition between concepts.
Different than questions of fact, which can be empirically verified, questions of
value (moral judgments) express attitudes and feelings that are outside the realm of
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scientific method. “Questions of ends are questions of values, and on values reason is
silent; conflict between rival values cannot be rationally settled. Instead one must simply
choose.”103 The expression of value exists in the realm of philosophy and is used
rhetorically. One expresses attitudes often to influence others to adopt similar attitudes.
The theory that surrounds this type of judgment is called emotivism. Traced back to C.L.
Stevenson in the mid 1940s, emotivism was designed to be a theory of meaning.
MacIntyre asserts that emotivism is not a theory of meaning, but a theory of use, or even
a theory of management. He disassembles the assumptions inherent in emotivism and
undermines its veiled authority and power. He invokes the work of Max Weber stating
“no type of authority can appeal to rational criteria to vindicate itself except that of
bureaucratic authority which appeals precisely to its own effectiveness.”104 Furthermore,
the only thing that can be rationally argued is the effective use of power. Thus, the
emotivist has agnostic and opportunistic moral commitments. Values are derived from
archetypal characters that perform certain social and professional roles. The human actor
is contingent, has no telos, no end to which it is moving towards.
MacIntyre traces emotivism to the Enlightenment and the attempts to rationalize
morality. Emotivism was a response to these failed attempts. MacIntyre argues that
Kierkegaard’s ‘radical choice’105 is still a choice, adopted for a certain reason, and “”how
can that which we adopt for one reason have any authority over us?”106 MacIntyre places
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Kierkegaard’s ideas as derivative of the ideas of Immanuel Kant. Kant’s moral
philosophy was deontological in nature, grounding morality in rationality. According to
Kant, if humans are rational, then they are all subject to the rational rules of morality.
Since all beings are bound by these rules, then the only thing that matters is one’s “will to
carry them out.”107 For both Kierkegaard and Kant, the virtues themselves, stemming
from conservative, Lutheran teachings, were never in question, and could be discovered
via a simple test: “can we or can we not consistently will that everyone should always act
on it?”108 MacIntyre illustrates how the logical breakdown in Kant’s argument led
Kierkegaard to move from the authority of rational morality to the authority of our own
choices. What becomes apparent in MacIntyre’s discussion is there seems to be a
historical moment in which “the language of morality passed from a state of order to a
state of disorder.”109 The rational thinkers of the Enlightenment attempted to replace the
church as the foundation for moral thought. When philosophy failed to be functional in
this regard, it was eschewed to the cultural margins, and has, in a sense, remained there.
Janie Fritz: Civility as a Communicative Virtue
Janie Fritz asserts that today’s professionals and the organizations in which they
work are experiencing a crisis of incivility110 that can have detrimental effects for
organizations. She includes high employee turnover, decreased productivity, and stress as
negative outcomes that frequently impact organizations. Fritz references Pearson and
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Porath’s book111, The Cost of Bad Behavior: How Incivility is Damaging Your Business
and What to Do About It, as a thorough review of negative outcomes associated with
incivility in the workplace. Fritz lists detrimental communicative practices such as social
undermining (negative emotions and evaluations to suppress the upward movement of
others), harassment, rudeness, bullying, and backstabbing as examples of “organizational
misbehavior”112 that can contribute to these aforementioned negative effects. Fritz’s main
contention is that incivility undermines the quality of life at work, which compromises
the “good” at which an organization, and the professionals which make it up, are
directed.113
Possible Explanations for Increases in Incivility
Fritz offers explanations for the increase in organizational incivility. First, there
has been an increase of informality alongside increased cultural and generational
diversity. Fritz’s rationale is that different groups may differ in their “implicit
communication rules.”114 A second explanation for increased incivility may be an
increase in the use of technology as a means of communication and the decrease in faceto-face communication, which may increase the likelihood of impulsive, thoughtless
communication. Third, any business has to maintain economic health. This translates into
a focus on profits and losses (P&L) and accountability for productivity. This increased
demand for productivity is often at the center of interpersonal and organizational stress.
Finally, Fritz offers a fourth explanation for increased incivility that involves changing
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normative behaviors and assumptions of the greater society and the infiltration of these
external norms to the internal, organizational environment. Fritz concludes that civility
itself is no longer a social norm. Robert Putnam115 paints a picture of the current
historical moment, one defined by individualism, dishonest and thoughtless leadership,
and economic insecurity.116 Ronald Arnett117 attributes this discord generally, as the lack
of a common, societal, virtue structure.118 Arnett et al.’s suggestion implies that there is
no shared center from which to establish a collective integrity.
The present healthcare climate is one marked by specialization and efficiency,
while at the same time emphasizing continuity of care. These characteristics seem
fundamentally at odds, but do not need to be. These shifts in organizational structure,
however, do bring with them an increased need for collaborative practice. As the
healthcare landscape continues to take shape, it is important to continually monitor
organizational communication against established interprofessional values – and offer
correctives when needed.
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Civility as a Resource
Fritz’s research supports her contention that civility is a resource for professionals
and the organizations in which they work. Viewing civility pragmatically allows the
concept to become more than just civility for the sake of virtuous behavior towards
others. It becomes an intangible asset, which lubricating the entire organizational system.
P.M. Forni119 expounds a rationale for civility as being thoughtful, reflective, and
fostering a common sense of purpose between and among professionals. Not only does
civility increase production, decrease turnover, and support personal and professional
health, but civility fosters the behaviors that allow collaboration to occur. Thus, civility
makes possible the delivery of effective patient care, the cornerstone of the moral
community of healthcare. One scholar dedicated to ethical relationships within this
ethical community is Carol Gilligan.
Ethics of Care
Carol Gilligan
Carol Gilligan is Professor at New York University. She is most well-known as a
feminist, psychologist, ethicist, and the first tenured female at Harvard’s Graduate School
of Education. While at Harvard, Gilligan was influenced by the work of Lawrence
Kohlberg, one of the most influential moral development scholars of the 1970s. Kohlberg
believed that the moral development of individuals progressed in stages, beginning with
the self, moving into social conformity, then “to external rules and forces, and, for the
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rare few, moving again to a stage where universal principles are internalized and
applied.”120 According to his theory, people would advance ethically when their current
ethical positions could not deal with encountered problems, forcing them into new ethical
territory. For the most part, however, people’s ethical positions would conform to society.
Gilligan began to see holes in Kohlberg’s stages theory.
With the legalization of abortion in 1973, Gilligan began interviewing women
who were considering it. As she listened to their reasoning for the decision before them,
she realized that some voices, particularly women, did not fit into Kohlberg’s stages
model. Gilligan recalls, “I was listening for how they constructed the decision they were
making, who was involved, what were the parameters of their thinking about whether to
continue or to end their pregnancy.”121 Gilligan was not able to place their moral
reasoning into a particular category or stage. “I remember the sound of dissonance, a
voice that did not fit into the categories of psychological theory or the terms of the public
abortion debate.”122 Her revelations inspired her to create a new, adaptation of
Kohlberg’s theory which she called the ethic of care.
In the development of ethical reasoning, individuals usually begin by focusing on
their own survival and acquiring that which they need and desire. A second level is
achieved when the individuals begin to look out for others. They feel a responsibility to
self-sacrifice, often putting others’ needs in front of their own “in an effort to care for
others, and to sustain relationships.”123 Additionally, some individuals entered a third
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level of ethical reasoning that involves accepting the consequences of their actions and
taking control of their own lives and their own decisions.124
Gilligan’s ethics of care differentiated the moral reason of women and men into
an ethics of care and an ethics of justice, respectively. She explains how these two modes
of moral reasoning are fundamentally incompatible. An ethics of care bases moral
judgments on careful calculation of responsibilities and relationships. Focusing more on
narratives and context, one perceives moral dilemmas when these responsibilities or
relationships conflict with one another. Conversely, an ethics of justice is centered around
more formal and abstract moral rules.
Gilligan’s impact can be seen in giving a voice to women at a time when most
young girls acquiesced their identities and authentic voices to male authorities. Her ethics
of care is still relevant to interprofessional healthcare education in its moral ontology
centered around “relational responsibilities within professional health care.”125
Furthermore, “moral choices always have to account for the web of relationships, the
relational networks and responsibilities that are an essential part of particular moral
circumstances.”126 Care ethics places interpersonal relationships at its center. These
relationships and the professional context inform ethics, identity formation, and
collaboration. Taken further, care ethics explains the shared moral pull as an individual
and collective response to human vulnerability.
Patricia Benner
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Partially in response to Edmund Pellegrino, Patricia Benner127 offers ‘care ethics’
as a logical compliment to virtue ethics.128 Benner implies that ethnocentrism, present in
normative virtue ethics, can prevent “meeting the other in his or her own terms;”129 thus,
an ethics of care falls more in line with the Judeo-Christian, relationship-oriented, moral
tradition by focusing on “meeting the other”130 and doing so “with respect characterized
by recognition, support for growth or self-acceptance, and/or allowing the other ‘to
be.’”131
Benner incorporates care ethics into her skill acquisition model132, which is
epistemological in nature arguing that nurses gain their nursing skills and patient
knowledge over time, not just in the classroom. Benner adapted the five-stage, Dreyfus
model of skill acquisition133 and applied it to the clinical competency of nursing. Nurses
use their experiences as new paradigms, which enhance critical thought. She describes a
process of skill acquisition that, unlike academic training, does not begin with theory, but
draws from experience. Inspired by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger,
Benner further adapted this model of skill acquisition to include concepts of caring.
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The moral theory of Carol Gilligan, the pragmatic model of Patricia Benner, and
the relational coordination theory of Jody Gittell all place focus on interpersonal
relationships and concern for others in order to achieve collective, moral objectives. Their
perspectives of interpersonal responsibility act as a nice segue into a moral philosophy of
the other. One scholar in particular, Emmanuel Levinas, grounds his entire moral
philosophy in the Other.
The Face of the Other: Burden, Responsibility, and Meaning
Emmanuel Levinas: If not you, then who?
Emmanuel Levinas is a twentieth-century Jewish philosopher, author, and ethicist
greatly influenced by the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl. For
Levinas, communication begins by listening, not speaking. Whether listening to a patient
or to a professional colleague, listening connects one to an “ethical echo.”134 This echo
links us to the very foundation of human existence and “turns us towards the face of the
Other that moves us toward an accompanying attentive response.”135 This a priori “echo”
to which Levinas refers is inspired by the Judeo-Christian proverb “I am my brother’s
keeper.” Levinas believes we all have a fundamental responsibility to respond and attend
to one another. His justification is that because we are social creates by nature, we need
the other. Without the other, there is no I; thus, if we neglect the other “we cease to be
human.”136
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Proxemics matter to Levinas. Our responsibilities begin with what is in front of
us. The visual phenomenon of encountering the actual face of the Other reminds us of our
ethical obligation and shifts us to “phenomenological listening;”137 communication
begins by listening. Accepting our human responsibility is not easy. Levinas even refers
to it as being held hostage. Yet, “as one begins to attend to an ethical echo, one
understands how burden and meaning comingle.”138 It is in this burden that we find our
own meaning for our lives. Healthcare professionals may understand this better than
most. They inhabit places of human vulnerability. They listen and hear ‘Will you help
me?’ Whether called to respond by the professional oath, or by the call “I am my
brother’s keeper,” the healthcare professional responds with ‘Yes, I will.’
We are human. Healthcare workers may encounter a new, burdensome face every
20 minutes throughout their day. Levinas responds to this sort of response fatigue: “The
face fades, and in its impersonal and inexpressive neutrality is prolonged, in ambiguity,
into animality.”139 Interestingly, Levinas sees the ambiguity as good. “It is only this
impersonal sense of disinterest that can lead, ironically, to a personal “God” and to
genuine obligation for another initiated by a primordial and prefigured call for
responsibility.”140 The call from the individual face is replaced by a broader call to
responsibility in general.
Unlike Pellegrino, who places ethics under the umbrella of philosophy, Levinas
places philosophy under ethics. Ethics is so fundamental to Levinas that the whole
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concept of ‘I’ is responsive by nature.141 This shift in thinking frames helping others, not
as acts of heroism, but as an obedience to the call to take on the burden of another. The
call to help may be more salient for healthcare professionals in a clinical setting, yet the
faces that call us care not about titles. In fact, our professional titles may disconnect us
from one another and obfuscate the primarily responsive ‘I’ that defines us as human –
because we are social.
For Levinas, “each encounter with another is an ethical awakening,”142 or
reminder of our ethical responsibility. The pre-reflective ‘I’ “has no name, no situation,
no status. It has a presence afraid of presence, afraid of the insistence of the identical ego,
stripped of all qualities.”143 In this moment of “pre-reflective proximity to another
person,”144 we find ourselves quite naked. In that initial moment of the encounter our
egos are stripped of pride and its characteristic of “dominating imperialism.”145 In the
clinic we come face to face with extreme and immediate alterity. In the clinical encounter
the primary expectation of the patient is that someone will listen to their story. It is in
their story that their concerns are explicated. It is no different with the interprofessional
encounter. Although requiring less immediacy than ill patients, we encounter alterity
nonetheless. When we encounter professionals from other disciplines we are faced with
alterity, and our primary expectation is to tell our story and listen to the stories of others.
The communication begins when we listen to the Other.
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Levinas reminds us that we find purpose in accepting the call to be burdened by
others. When considering interprofessional healthcare education, there is opportunity not
only to encounter the face of the other professional, but to establish a brotherhood and
sisterhood of caring (keeping). Above all, Levinas’s ethics as first philosophy146 is a
“counter to self-righteousness, which finds excessive confidence in ideas imposed on
another person.”147 Although Levinas is clear that the responsibility to respond lies with
each of us individually, through dialogue healthcare professionals from different
specialties can collectively respond to the call ‘I am here, will you help me?’ with ‘Yes,
we will.’
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CONCLUSION
Summary
Healthcare professionals belong to a moral community. Caring for patients is a
community act carried out by healthcare professionals working in teams within complex
political and organizational systems. This teamwork is crucial to quality patient
outcomes; however, incivility threatens to derail necessary and effective collaboration
towards the common organizational good. Necessarily, interprofessional healthcare
education is becoming a required element for pre-health professionals. However, the
necessary integration of professionals presents clear challenges including competing
professional identities, lack of shared values, lack of resources, and variation in
biomedical language literacy. Negotiating these obstacles is necessary to realize the
potential of this moral community.
Currently, schools are using competency-based approaches to interprofessional
education. The IECEP lists four competencies for interprofessional practice:
ethics/values, roles/responsibilities, communication, and teamwork. For reasons
explicated throughout this dissertation, the categorizing of these particular elements as
competencies is problematic. This particular competency approach attempts to ultimately
improve healthcare quality, yet the accrediting bodies and professional organizations
have been cultivated within a positivistic and empirical worldview focused primarily on
quantification. Referring to values, roles, communication, and teamwork as competencies
immediately affirms this empirical and quantitative worldview. This presumption alone
frames conversation, shapes certain outcomes, and limits the educational opportunity for
impactful exploration of difference and meaning.
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This dissertation began with a question: What can rhetoric and philosophy of
communication contribute to educating future healthcare professionals about ethical
collaborative practice? To begin to answer this question we looked to the existing
communication literature and found that most of the research on communication and
professional relationship building is engaged from an empirical, post-positivist approach
and is focused almost entirely on processes and procedures. We then embarked on a
journey from pre to post-industrial professionalism and explored what it means to be a
modern professional, and a subsequent exploration of interprofessionality. Until recently,
the professions have intentionally moved to differentiate themselves from both nonprofessions and other professions; thus, a major challenge for interprofessional practice is
to reconnect what has been intentionally disconnected.
We continued to answer our question by exploring the language of medicine,
biomedical discourse. Nearly all scholarship about interprofessional healthcare education
is explicated in the language of science. We began our inquiry by asking what it was
biomedical discourse was doing – behind the scenes. We discovered that the language of
science, born alongside the scientific method, carries with it an impartiality and
objectivity that masquerades as absolute truth. Those that work in the “mill of hypothesis
and data”1 become subservient to the language, to the data. They lose authorship of
language and become inferior to it. Additionally, the density and compression of
scientific language creates insiders and outsiders, creating barriers between those that are
fluent and those that are not.
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Another consequence of scientific language is that it personifies processes and
results, separating the author from the processes, procedures, and evidence. Again, what
appears is absolute Truth instead of just a claim for it. In any logical argument, data is
used as backing or proof to support a particular rationale that is connected to a claim
through a warrant – scientific language surreptitiously bypasses the reasoning process
and goes straight to the truth claim.
We learn in studying the language of science that although it was created to be
objective, sterile, and free of culture, yet it is impossible to separate language from
culture and context. It is important to reiterate the importance of biomedical discourse,
but also to remember that it is but one language of many. I am not arguing that scientific
discourse be replaced, but to view it as a highly efficient tool for transferring information.
I am arguing for integrating biomedical discourse with other discourses such as history,
art, cultural criticism, philosophy, rhetoric, etc. For example, if the goals of
interprofessional healthcare education are collaboration, and if collaboration involves
trust, respect, knowledge sharing, engaging in constructive dialogue, then maybe
scientific discourse is not the best tool to reach these objectives.
Rhetoric and Philosophy: Adding to the Conversation
Interprofessional healthcare education is tasked with improving collaboration
between health professionals to ensure better patient outcomes. Thus, to achieve this
shared goal we must establish and maintain quality interprofessional relationships. A first
step in working towards this end is understanding and acknowledging alterity, or
difference. A philosophy of communication approach to interprofessional practice can
help professionals navigate alterity and turn potential conflict into opportunities for
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personal and professional growth. The attitude from which we approach difference will
determine the quality of working relationships.
From a philosophy of communication perspective, we come to understand that
genuine conversations are not conducted by us; it is we that are conducted by the
conversation. In designing interprofessional curricula, then, it is important to avoid the
scientific desire to standardize and control. There should be space for genuine
conversation to happen. A philosophy of communication perspective views
communication not as the mere transmission of information, but as lived experience. We
shape and are shaped by the language we use with others; thus, communication is action.
Bakhtin introduces the idea of heteroglossia, which can be a useful byproduct of
communicating with others. When professionals from different disciplines regularly
interact, they start to combine language and styles. They borrow from one another.
Communication shapes identity, creates societies and powerful institutions, it
bridges worldviews and helps us make sense of difference, it is our primary tool for
expressing the world as we see it. Communication as a competency would be
reproductive and mere representational, yet communication is fundamentally productive
and present. We live in a contingent world. Audiences change. Situations change. We
express our worldviews with every utterance, which makes interpretation and meaningmaking an ongoing event to which one can never achieve competency.
So where do we begin? If we are to achieve competence or mastery at something,
let it be rhetoric. Rhetoric is grounded in ethics and focuses on the audience, prioritizing
the conversation over winning. The tools of rhetoric can be learned and practiced. They
include ethical perspective-taking, stirring emotion through storytelling and style, active
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listening, creative writing and speaking using rhetorical devices and tropes, building
credibility, information literacy, understanding how to use proofs (data, testimony) to
support claims, arranging conversational elements for maximum affect, nonverbal
communication, and memorization techniques – because a good first step to collaboration
is remembering the names of those on your team.
Mastering the tools of rhetoric helps people gain insight into their own thinking
and gives you tools for inviting people to act toward a common good. Rhetoric is both
reflective and explicative, tools necessary for getting along on a team. Rhetoric can help
people strengthen interpersonal relationships by listening, sharing narratives, and
identifying with others by always looking for common ground. Rhetoric can help
someone strengthen their positions in order to test ideas. Rhetorical tools can even be
shared amongst healthcare professionals regarding techniques for patient compliance or
motivational interviewing. For instance, there are simple rhetorical techniques that help
people move from “sustain talk” to “change talk.”
Interprofessional healthcare education should consider a curriculum focused on
human experience and practical judgment, or phronesis. Phronesis is an intellectual
ability to understand what action or means should be taken in a particular situation that
would be most conductive of the good. Incidentally, the focus of such a phronesis-based
rhetorical education would be shared learning, creative thinking, and dialogue.
As we consider dialogue as a focus for interprofessional healthcare education, it is
important to ground dialogue in an ethics of civility. Civility in how we communicate
with one another can act as a logical and ethical starting place for interprofessional
collaboration. Civility as a virtue offers a common ground approach to collaboration.
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Civility fosters meaningful dialogue that naturally leads to trust building, attentiveness
and respect towards one another, and ultimately to an effective healthcare team. Civil
dialogue is an act that primarily involves listening to the narratives of the other. In this
dialogic act, meaning is continually created and personal and professional identities are
formed.
I believe that a rhetoric and philosophy of communication approach to
interprofessional education fills a void left wide open by our obsession with biomedical
discourse. Healthcare workers are part of a moral community that responds to calls for
help. Ever increasing demands on healthcare resources necessitates collaboration now
more than ever. Collaboration requires respecting, understanding and learning from
difference through civil dialogue.
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